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Articles
The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation

as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court's
Jurisprudence
Andrew M. Siegel*
Previous commentators on the Rehnquist Court's history, seeking an
overarching explanation for the Court's cases, have focused their attention
primarily on a revitalized 'federalism, " an agenda-driven "conservatism," and
a constitutionallyfixated 'Judicialsupremacy." While each of these themes is
undoubtedly present in the Court's laterjurisprudence, this Article argues that
one cannot understand the Rehnquist Court's complicated intellectual matrix
without taking account of its profound hostility toward the institution of
litigation and its concomitantskepticism as to the ability of litigation to function
as a mechanism for organizing social relations and collectively administering
justice.
The Article takes a pointillist approach, commenting on a large swath of
the Court's caseload and allowing a broaderpicture to gradually emerge from
observations about seemingly discrete areas of law. It first unpacks the contours
of the Rehnquist Court's hostility toward litigation, focusing attention on a
number of areas where the Court has acted aggressively and explicitly to limit
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the scope or availability of litigation, including remedies and rights of action,
qualified immunity and attorney's fees, the enforceability of mandatory
arbitration agreements, and limitations on the permissible scope of punitive
damage awards. The Article then moves from the explicit to the implicit,
examining well-rehearsed areas of the Court's jurisprudence (such as its
federalism cases and the 2000 Presidentialelection controversy) in an effort to
identify the subtler effects of the Court's reflexive hostility to litigation on its
constitutional docket. Finally, the Article pulls back from the cases to
interrogatethe sources of the Court's hostility to litigation, exploring not only
the reasonsfor that hostility but also its curious coexistence with the Court's
concurrent commitment to an aggressive form of judicial supremacy,
particularlyin the constitutionalarena.
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Introduction

With the passing of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the task of
analyzing and assessing the historical importance of his tenure has acquired a
new urgency and bracing sense of finality. Those who turn to that task in the
months and years ahead, will, however, be joining a conversation well under
way. Over the last half decade, a diverse set of academics, journalists,
judges, and practicing attorneys have flooded the market with books, law
review articles, and popular commentary taking stock of an era drawing to a
close.1 While these works differ in tone, rigor, and intended audience, they

1. It is a measure of the breadth of this trend that any list of the relevant works would almost
certainly be incomplete and would, in any event, be out of date before it hit the presses. Some of
the most insightful, interesting, and controversial of these works include: MARTIN GARBUS,
COURTING DISASTER: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE UNMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2002);
JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE
STATES (2002); THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT (Herman Schwartz
ed., 2002); THE REHNQUIST COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE (Martin H. Belsky ed., 2002); REHNQUIST
JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003); THE REHNQUIST
LEGACY (Curtis Bradley ed.) (forthcoming); KENNETH W. STARR, FIRST AMONG EQUALS: THE
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE (2002); MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE
REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2005); Louis D. Bilionis, The
New Scrutiny, 51 EMORY L.J. 481 (2002); Erwin Chemerinsky, Understanding the Rehnquist
Court: An Admiring Reply to ProfessorMerrill, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 659 (2003); Eric R. Claeys,

The Limits of Empirical PoliticalScience and the Possibilities of Living-Constitution Theory for a
Retrospective on the Rehnquist Court, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 737 (2003); Ruth Colker & James J.
Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REv. 80 (2001); Ruth Colker & Kevin M. Scott, Dissing
States?: Invalidation of State Action During the Rehnquist Era, 88 VA. L. REV. 1301 (2002);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's FederalismDecisions,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002); Lino A. Graglia, The Myth of a Conservative Supreme Court: The
October 2000 Term, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 281 (2003); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme
Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We The Court, 115 HARv. L. REV. 4 (2001); Sylvia A. Law, In the

Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court's Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CN. L.
REV. 367 (2002); Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431
(2002); John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville 's America: The Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence
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have shared a common aspiration: to write the first draft of the Rehnquist
Court's history.2
At least until recently, these Rehnquist Court proto-historians3 have
operated under an all but uniform assumption that Chief Justice Rehnquist
and his allies on the Court instigated a judicial "revolution" that has
fundamentally altered both the substance of American law and the
institutional arrangements through which we develop and enforce legal
norms. 4 Operating under this assumption, commentators have searched for a
grand narrative to connect and explain the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence.
The favorite narrative of the earliest commentators (and the one that still
dominates popular commentary) tells the story of a Court obsessed with
issues of federalism and, more specifically, dedicated to recalibrating the
balance between federal and state powers so as to limit federal authority and
empower the states.5 A more recent counter-narrative suggests that the
of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second
Rehnquist Court: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 47 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 569 (2003); William H. Pryor, Jr.,
Madison 's Double Security: In Defense of Federalism,the Separation of Powers, and the Rehnquist
Court, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1167 (2002); Jed Rubenfeld, Essay, The Anti-AntidiscriminationAgenda,
Ill YALE L.J. 1141 (2002); Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes of the Recent Turn in Constitutional
Interpretation, 51 DUKE L.J. 307 (2001); Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative
Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139 (2002); Timothy Zick, Marbury Ascendant: The Rehnquist
Courtand the Power to "Say What the Law Is," 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 839 (2002).
2. As Thomas Merrill, among others, has demonstrated, it is an oversimplification bordering on
an inaccuracy to refer to "the Rehnquist Court" in the singular. The Court's concerns, doctrines,
and practices can be broken fairly cleanly into two eras, the first stretching from September 1986
until June 1994 and the second tracing from the ascension of Justice Stephen Breyer in September
1994 to the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist during the summer of 2005. Merrill, supra note 1, at
569-70. Moreover, some have suggested that the last two to four terms may amount to yet a third
distinctive era or perhaps even a premature end to the Rehnquist Court. See, e.g., Linda
Greenhouse, The Year Rehnquist May Have Lost His Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2004, at Al. For
my take on the problem of periodizing the Rehnquist Court, see infra subpart II(A).
3. I refer to the scholars who have attempted to make sense of the Rehnquist Court as "protohistorians" here and in several other places. By that term, I mean to credit them with starting the
ball rolling on the crafting of a comprehensive legal history of the Rehnquist Court while
acknowledging that many of them do not see themselves as historians or their scholarship as works
of history.
4. References to a "Rehnquist Revolution" and statements that we are in the midst of (or just
completed) a jurisprudential "revolution" are routine in both popular and scholarly commentary on
the Rehnquist Court. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Rehnquist Revolution in Criminal
Procedure, in THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT, supra note 1, at 55;
Kramer, supra note 1, at 130 ("We are witnessing the beginnings of a constitutional
revolution .... ); Linda Greenhouse, William H. Rehnquist, Architect of Conservative Court Is
Dead at 80, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at Al ("William H. Rehnquist, who died Saturday at the age
of 80 almost a year after learning he had thyroid cancer, helped lead a conservative revolution on
the Supreme Court during 19 years as chief justice of the United States."); Tony Mauro, The
Rehnquist Revolution's Humble Start, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 3, 2003, at 1; Edward Lazarus, Looking
Back at the Past Supreme Court Term: The Rehnquist Revolution Comes to a Standstill, ForNow,
FINDLAW, July 8, 2004, http://writ.news.fmdlaw.comflazarus/20040708.html.
5. References to the Rehnquist Court or its jurisprudence as embracing "federalism" are so
voluminous as to defy compilation. For one comprehensive defense of the Rehnquist Court's
"federalism" (coupled, as is often the case, with a lament that the Court has not gone further), see
Massey, supra note 1. For fairly recent statements holding to the view that federalism is at the heart
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purported dedication of the Court to federalist principles reflects little more
than a convenient strategy for achieving particular substantive political
ends-ends that, in line with modem usage and for want of a better term, are
often described as "conservative.", 6 Yet a third narrative--elegantly argued
by a number of scholars enraged but unsurprised by the Court's decision in
Bush v. Gore7-- focuses our attention not so much on the results of the
Rehnquist Court's decisions but on the presumptuous claims of 8judicial
competence, authority, and supremacy that undergird these decisions.
The purpose of this Article is not to tear down any of these narratives.
Indeed, it is hard to imagine any coherent historical account of the Rehnquist
Court that does not come to terms with the Court's commitment to
of the Rehnquist Court's story, see, for example, Saikrishna Prakash, Are the Judicial Safeguards of
Federalismthe Ultimate Form of ConservativeJudicialActivism?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1363, 1363
(2002) ("[T]he Court has shown an old-fashioned interest in the rights of states and the limits on
federal power."); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Marks the Limits of Federalism, TRIAL, Sept.
2003, at 76, 76 ("When historians look back at the Rehnquist Court, undoubtedly they will say that
its most significant changes to the law have been with regard to federalism.").
6. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 659 ("[T]he reality is that the recent and current
activism-as measured by invalidated laws and overruling precedent-is all in a conservative
direction."); Fallon, supra note 1, at 434 ("When federalism and substantive conservatism come into
conflict, substantive conservatism frequently dominates."); Merrill, supra note 1, at 574 (noting that
one of the traits of the "second" Rehnquist Court is that of "an aggressively conservative
jurisprudence in the area of constitutional federalism"); Michael Wells, Naked Politics, Federal
Courts Law, and the Canon ofAcceptable Arguments, 47 EMORY L.J. 89, 121-23 (1998) (arguing
that conservatives' support for federalism doctrines is entirely instrumental and linked to promotion
of substantively conservative outcomes); Richard Briffault, A Fickle Federalism,,AM. PROSPECT,
Mar. 1, 2003, at A26, A26 (noting a "five-justice conservative majority" which favors greater state
power only when it serves conservative ends); cf Rubenfeld, supra note 1 (speculating that an
"anti-antidiscrimination agenda" is actually motivating the Court in its decisions restricting federal
power). For an excellent general discussion of the relationship between the (early) Rehnquist
Court's jurisprudence and one of the dr-texts of conservative political thought, see Ernest Young,
Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and ConstitutionalInterpretation,72 N.C.
L. REV. 619 (1994) (exploring the philosophical theories of Edmund Burke and their relation to the
actions of the Court).
7. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
8. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLuM. L. REV. 237 (2002) (arguing that the
Court's disregard for any past constraints placed upon it by the political question doctrine has
resulted in the Court's belief that it is the final answer to (almost all) constitutional questions and
that the other political branches' interpretations are to be accepted solely at its discretion); Bilionis,
supra note 1, at 495 ("Rather than respond with typical judicial congeniality and equanimity, the
Court confronts [some] precedent as a dangerous constitutional intruder and challenges the very
legitimacy of its underlying.., premises as antithetical to constitutional first principles."); Colker
& Brudney, supra note 1 (arguing that the Rehnquist Court demonstrated an unprecedented lack of
deference to congressional legislation); Kramer, supra note 1, at 130 ("The Rehnquist Court's
activism explicitly denies the people any role in determining the ongoing meaning of their
Constitution, other than by the grace of the Justices themselves ....); Avaim Soifer, Courting
Anarchy, 82 B.U. L. REV. 699, 702 (2002) ("A brief survey of decisions in the months immediately
after Bush v. Gore. . . illustrates the glib unconcern among the Justices for the usual roles of other
branches, for the states, or even for everyday lawyering. Instead, we begin to see a sustained effort
to break down the public nature of government at all levels."); cf Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808, 844 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Power, not reason, is the new currency of this Court's
decisionmaking.").
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strengthening "our federalism," 9 the conservative social and political ends
served by many of its decisions, or the aggressive manner in which the Court
has staked out its role as the primary and ultimate arbiter of the
Constitution's meaning.
Nevertheless, these narratives-whether taken individually or read
syncratically-are incomplete and, as a result, often misleading. Take the
federalism thesis first. Certainly, principles of federalism dominate the
Court's rhetoric. 10 However, as others have observed, the picture is much
more complicated on the plane of results. 1' While the states and their allies
have won a number of major victories at the Supreme Court over the last
decade, their record of success has been far from uniform even in the areas12
where the Court has expressed the greatest sympathy for their position.

9. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999) ("[O]ur federalism requires that Congress treat the
States in a manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the
governance of the Nation.").
10. Almost all of the memorable phrases and passages from the Rehnquist years involve issues
of state sovereignty. See, e.g., id.; Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991) ("This is a case
about federalism. It concerns the respect that federal courts owe the States and the States'
procedural rules when reviewing the claims of state prisoners in federal habeas corpus."). The
following quote is another excellent example of a memorable passage:
Federalism was our Nation's own discovery.
The Framers split the atom of
sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political
capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other. The
resulting Constitution created a legal system unprecedented in form and design,
establishing two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own
privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are
governed by it.
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 839 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
11. See, e.g., Colker & Scott, supra note 1, at 1303-06 (analyzing the role of ideology in the
Court's decisions involving state action); Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1304, 1323 (1999) (considering political ideology as an influence on the results of several
federalism cases); Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal
Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 2-6 (2003) (discussing areas of law which remain
unchanged by the "new federalism"); Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1141-44 (positing "antiantidiscrimination" as a motivating ideology behind the Court's recent federalism cases).
12. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (holding that the federal government
has authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate possession of marijuana even if the
drug is held for medicinal use under a procedure authorized by state law); Citizens Bank v.
Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52 (2003) (per curiam) (summarily reversing a decision of the Alabama
Supreme Court that had relied on an inappropriately circumscribed reading of Congress's powers
under the Commerce Clause); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (holding
that, the Eleventh Amendment notwithstanding, states are liable for damages for violating the
Family and Medical Leave Act because Congress validly abrogated the states' sovereign immunity
pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Pierce County, Wash. v. Guillen, 537 U.S.
129 (2003) (unanimously reversing a decision of the Washington Supreme Court that had relied on
an inappropriately circumscribed reading of Congress's Commerce Clause power); Reno v.
Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (unanimously rejecting South Carolina's Tenth Amendment challenge
to the Driver's Privacy Protection Act).
During the October 2003 Term of the Court, advocates for tighter restrictions on federal power
and greater state autonomy went zero for five before the Supreme Court. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542
U.S. 88 (2004) (holding that the federal Tax Injunction Act does not bar federal courts from
considering federal constitutional challenges to state tax credits); Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S.
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More importantly, the federalism bug has thus far skipped over entire areas
of jurisprudence, some of which-such as preemption-would appear on
first blush to be fertile grounds for the development of new state-favoring,
federalism-oriented doctrines. 13 Finally, the "respect" for the states that the
Court speaks so eloquently about in the Eleventh Amendment and
Commerce Clause contexts is often strikingly absent in both word and deed
when the Court reviews the actions of state legislatures and judges in cases
that are not so self-evidently "about" federalism. 14
Recognizing federalism's limits as a predictor of the Rehnquist Court's
behavior, a number of commentators have argued that the intellectual engine
of the Court's jurisprudence has been a substantive, policy-oriented agenda
variously described as "conservative," ' 15 "antiregulatory,"' 6 or "antiantidiscrimination." 1 7 While appropriately focusing attention on the concrete
results of the Court's decisions and successfully demonstrating the futility of
predictive models that do not take into account the political valence of the
legislation under consideration, these scholars' contributions are subject to

600 (2004) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute that makes it a federal crime to bribe
officials of a state or local government that receives at least $10,000 in federal funds, regardless of
whether federal monies are involved); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (holding that the
Eleventh Amendment is not a bar to individuals suing states under Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act when state court facilities are not accessible to the handicapped); Tenn. Student
Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004) (holding that because a bankruptcy action is an in
rem action, it does not implicate the Eleventh Amendment and does not require dismissal of suit by
a bankrupt individual against a state agency seeking to discharge student loan debt under federal
law); Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not
prohibit federal courts from enforcing consent decrees even when the decrees may require steps that
might not be required by constitutional or statutory provisions).
13. The reluctance of the Court to couple its forays into federalism with decisions narrowly
construing congressional intent to preempt state laws has been the subject of significant scholarly
commentary. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Separationof Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79
TEXAS L. REV. 1321, 1428-30 (2001); Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO.
L.J. 2085, 2087 (2000); Massey, supra note 1, at 438, 502-12; Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L.
REV. 225, 229 & n.16 (2000); James B. Staab, Conservative Activism on the Rehnquist Court:
Federal Preemption is No Longer a Liberal Issue, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 129 (2003);
Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 4, 30-32 (2004).
The Court's similar reluctance to craft doctrines protecting state courts from federally imposed rules
and procedures has drawn considerably less attention. For a significant exception, see Anthony J.
Bellia, Jr., FederalRegulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J. 947 (2001). For my take
on both of these (non)developments, see infra subpart IV(B).
14. See generally Colker & Scott, supra note 1 (discussing, quantifying, and analyzing current
Justices' willingness to "diss" states by overriding and often demeaning the work product of state
legislators, regulators, and judges).
15. E.g., id. at 1311 (noting that "one lasting legacy of the Rehnquist era may be to redefine
federalism so as to include activism on behalf of a conservative political agenda"); Fallon, supra
note 1, at 446 ("It is widely agreed that the current Supreme Court includes at least five
conservative justices and that commitments to federalism and sovereign immunity are part of a
conservative judicial philosophy.").
16. E.g., Cross, supra, note 11, at 1323.
17. Rubenfeld, supra note 1.
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two cross-cutting criticisms. First, with a few notable exceptions, 8 the
substantive principles these scholars identify have been remarkably undertheorized. To take a label that has as little inherent content as "conservative"
and apply it to a Court that has aggressively courted that very appellation
smacks of a truism: as our very notions of what it means for a Court to be
conservative have been shaped by watching the Rehnquist Court in action, it
is neither surprising nor particularly useful to describe the current Court as
such. 19 Paradoxically, a recent series of important and surprising decisions
distressing to the political right have raised serious questions as to whether
the current Court can be described as "conservative"--no matter how
capacious the term-without serious clarification, modification, or
explanation.2 °
In the aftermath of Bush v. Gore,2 1 a third strain of scholars have made
an important contribution to the Rehnquist Court's proto-history by exploring
what might be called the Court's "judicial temperament., 22 These scholars
have noted that in any number of subject areas, the Court's opinions have
been characterized by an aggressiveness of both tone and substance that,
depending on one's perspective, might be characterized as either
presumptuousness or bravery.23 In particular, commentators have focused on

18. See id. at 1141-42 (criticizing labels like "textualism," "activism," and "federalism" as
"manifestly insufficient" when describing the Rehnquist Court and instead describing the theme of
the Court's jurisprudence as "anti-antidiscrimination"); McGinnis, supra note 1, at 1 (seeking to
"ground the full range of [the Rehnquist Court's] jurisprudence in a coherent theory of governance"
by comparing its jurisprudence to Tocqueville's theory of democracy).
19. For one largely successful effort to explore what it means for a Court to be conservative, see
Young, supra note 1.
20. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (declaring that citizens detained as
enemy combatants are still entitled to due process protections); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)
(allowing aliens held by the U.S. military at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to challenge their detention
using the writ of habeas corpus); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling prior
precedent and holding that the Constitution prohibits states from criminalizing same-sex sexual
activity between adults); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (endorsing and validating
continued use of affirmative action under certain circumstances); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003) (same); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (holding that, the Eleventh
Amendment notwithstanding, states are liable for money damages for violating the Family and
Medical Leave Act because Congress validly abrogated states' sovereign immunity pursuant to
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). See also Graglia, supra note I (arguing that the
Rehnquist Court is not a conservative court); Marci Hamilton, The Supreme Court's End of Term
Cases, FINDLAW, July 3, 2003, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20030703.html (arguing that
recent decisions demonstrate a more centrist political affiliation for the Court than commentators
suggest).
21. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
22. For one particularly elegant version of this argument, see Larry D. Kramer, supra note I.
For Dean Kramer's take on Bush v. Gore, see Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court in Politics, in
THE UNFINISHED ELECTION OF 2000 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2001). Kramer is hardly alone in
accusing the Rehnquist Court of turning to a new form of activism after the mid-1990s. See, e.g.,
Barkow, supra note 8; Bilionis, supra note 1; Colker & Brudney, supra note 1; Law, supra note 1;
Soifer, supra note 8.
23. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 1, at 15 (noting that the Court "sees no need to accommodate
the political branches at all" and "has instead staked its claim to being the only institution
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the Court's growing unwillingness to defer to other bodies-whether the
body in question is Congress, an executive agency, a state legislature, or
another court.24 In one of the most influential and insightful analyses of this
phenomenon, Dean Larry Kramer persuasively argues that the substance and
tone of the Court's recent constitutional decisions reflect a hyper-aggressive
commitment to "judicial supremacy" ("the notion that judges have the last
word when it comes to constitutional interpretation and that their decisions
determine the meaning of the Constitution for everyone") 25 that is rapidly
shading over into an unprecedented embrace of "judicial sovereignty" (the
26
belief that the Court can and must "wield its authority over every question"
and that, when it does, the Court can and should "dismiss" or "quickly
supplant the views of other, more democratic institutions").27
Though some commentators have disputed whether the Rehnquist
Court's juridical assertiveness is unique,2 8 the brusqueness with which the
empowered to speak with authority when it comes to the meaning of the Constitution"); Laurence
H. Tribe, Erog v. Hsub and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its Hall of Mirrors, 115
HARV. L. REV. 170, 288 (2001) (arguing that the "Court's self-confidence in matters constitutional
is matched only by its disdain for the meaningful participation of other actors in constitutional
debate"). Over the last five years, this theme has worked its way into journalistic commentary
about the Court, in particular into the work of the New York Times' influential Supreme Court
correspondent, Linda Greenhouse. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 4, at Al (describing "the
Court's institutional enhancement" as a central legacy of Chief Justice Rehnquist's tenure); Linda
Greenhouse, In a Momentous Term, Justices Remake the Law, and the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,
2003, at Al ("It is a Court that in recent years has displayed a notable institutional self-confidence,
striking down federal statutes at near-record rates.").
24. See, e.g., Bilinois, supra note 1, at 486-87 (noting that the Court's decisions limiting
Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
"mark a judicial willingness to police the boundaries of the federal government's enumerated
powers that has not been seen in generations"); Colker & Brudney, supra note 1, at 83 ("In acting
repeatedly to invalidate federal legislation, the Court is using its authority to diminish the proper
role of Congress.").
25. Kramer, supra note 1, at 6.
26. Id. at 13.
27. Id. Kramer not only points out the importance of judicial supremacy in understanding the
Rehnquist Court, but also argues that the Rehnquist Court's commitment to that concept is both
historically distinctive and normatively disastrous. Id. at 14-15. See also LARRY D. KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (developing

these themes more fully, tracing the historical background in more detail, and arguing for a return to
a more organic and chaotic "popular constitutionalism"). Reviewers by and large have not been
friendly to Dean Kramer's book or to his historical analysis in particular. See, e.g., Larry Alexander
& Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594 (2005) (book
review); Richard A. Posner, The People's Court, NEW REPUBLIC, July 19, 2004, at 32 (book
review); L.A. Powe, Jr., Are "the People "Missing in Action (andShould Anyone Care)?, 83 TEXAS
L. REV. 855 (2005) (book review). But see Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Bringing the People Back In, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 653 (2005) (book review) (reviewing the book more favorably); Norman R.
Williams, The People's Constitution, 57 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2004) (book review) (same). While I
touch on these issues in passing, a full evaluation of Dean Kramer's broader historical and
prescriptive claims are beyond the scope of this Article.
28. See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 1, at 489 (highlighting differences between the Warren and
Rehnquist Courts' jurisprudence and noting that the Warren Court "preferred to generate social
norms based on a more top-down vision of civic order"); cf L.A. Powe, Jr., The Not-So-Brave New
Constitutional Order, 117 HARV. L. REV. 647, 675 (2003) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW
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contemporary Court has defended its own interpretive authority and rejected
the handiwork of legislators, regulators, and other jurists is-if not quite
unprecedented-still astounding. This trend is further underscored by the
Court's more cautious, though still assertive, rebuke to the Bush
administration's invocation of unique and allegedly unreviewable powers in
the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.2 9 When legal historians of future
generations tell the story of the current Court, one of their central tasks will
be to explain how and why the modem Court came to embrace an often
combative court-centered constitutionalism.
As others have noted, however, to describe the current Court's ideology
as reflecting a commitment to "judicial supremacy" is something of a non
sequitor.
While the Court's commitment to a robust judiciary and
willingness to step on the toes of other political and judicial actors is a salient
and historically relevant trend, it tells us little, if anything, about the
substantive content of the Court's rulings, let alone about any overriding
political, philosophical, or jurisprudential predilections that might have
produced those rulings. Even in the sophisticated hands of Dean Kramer,
who carefully explores the jurisprudential ramifications of the recent slippage
towards judicial supremacy, the Court's vision of its own authority to
interpret the Constitution is only a single, not particularly predictive vector in
31
a complicated "intellectual matrix.",
Moreover, those who would focus our attention on the Court's penchant
for hoarding interpretive authority must confront a striking anomaly in the
Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence. Put bluntly, the same Court that has given
us Bush v. Gore,32 Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.

CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2005)) ("[L]ike the Warren Court, the Rehnquist Court has been willing
to overrule.").
29. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004);
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
30. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review ofState-Court Determinations of
State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1919, 1921 (2003) (dismissing "judicial
supremacy" as "a term of splendidly indefinite content"). Professor Rubenfeld also criticizes the
concept ofjudicial sovereignty at length. He states:
The trouble with the "judicial sovereignty" account is that it has little explanatory

power. Any case that finds anything unconstitutional can be attacked as an exercise of
"judicial sovereignty." Virtually every time the Court strikes down a federal statute,
the Justices implicitly assert the constitutional supremacy of their judgment, together
with the view that the other "branches do not have equal standing to interpret the text."
Imputing an anti-Congress animus to the present Court, or a disdain for all other
political actors, while certainly consistent with every case in which the Court has
struck something down, tells us little about why the Justices have struck down the
particular laws they have (the number of which remains infinitesimal compared to the
total amount of legislation and regulation in force). Explaining everything, the
"judicial sovereignty" view explains nothing.
Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1163.
31. Kramer, supra note 1, at 160.
32. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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Garrett,33 City of Boerne v. Flores,4 United States v. Morrison,3 5 and other
ringing endorsements of judicial supremacy, has worked assiduously to limit
the power of courts to adjudicate run-of-the-mill civil disputes. In case after
case and in wildly divergent areas of the law, the Rehnquist Court has
expressed a profound hostility to litigation. Sometimes this theme is
expressed overtly-for example, in decisions that drastically shrink the
universe of federal statutes that individuals can seek to enforce through
private lawsuits,36 tighten the conditions under which successful litigants can
recover damages or attorney's fees from governmental malefactors,37
countenance procedures that funnel claims out of the court system and into
private dispute resolution mechanisms, 38 or impose new limitations on the
scale of punitive damage awards. 39 At other times, such as in the Eleventh
Amendment and preemption contexts, the Court's hostility to litigation
bubbles just below the surface, explaining and justifying decisions that on
their face seem to turn on other concerns.4n Moreover, the hostility of the
Court to the litigation enterprise is so pronounced, and so visceral, that it has
even played a significant role in reshaping the methodologies the Court
employs when interpreting statutes and, to a lesser extent, the Constitution.4'
Indeed, a plausible case can be made that the vehemence with which the
Court's majority reacted to the Florida Supreme Court's decisions in the
2000 presidential election cases stems as much from their hostility towards

33. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
34. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
35. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
36. See infra subpart Ill(A).
37. See infra subpart III(B).
38. See infra subpart III(C).
39. See infra subpart III(D). This list is purely by way of example. The Court's hostility to
litigation bubbles to the surface in innumerable and widely varied contexts.
Interestingly, justiciability, an area that was once seen as a primary battleground in the effort to
cut back on litigation, has remained largely dormant over the last decade. Compare Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 589-90 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (reading the
majority's resolution of the case as portending a major shift in the Court's approach to justiciability)
with Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (overturning a
lower court decision that sought to enforce strict standing and mootness requirements on citizen
suits seeking to enforce environmental protections); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) (allowing
citizen suits to enforce election laws under a statutory right-granting provision similar to the one the
Court refused to credit in Lujan). But cf Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125 (2004) (finding that
attorneys lack third-party standing to challenge Michigan's broad new limitation on the right to
appointed counsel); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (utilizing a novel
prudential standing analysis to find a controversial Establishment Clause claim nonjusticiable).
Note that the Michigan law at issue in Kowalski was struck down several months later when
challenged by proper Article III plaintiffs. Halbert v. Michigan, 125 S.Ct. 2582, 2594 (2005).
40. See infra Part IV.
41. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990)
(identifying and providing a name for new trends in statutory interpretation); John F. Manning,
Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2001) (providing a leading
academic defense of new interpretive methodologies and tying the validity of these methodologies
to the current Court's understanding of the proper judicial role).
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the role the Florida Supreme Court carved out for itself in resolving the
dispute as from the political valence of the state court decision. 42
This Article attempts to add another layer to our understanding of the
Rehnquist Court. In so doing, it argues that it is impossible to understand the
Court's complicated intellectual matrix without acknowledging and
assimilating the Court's hostility towards the institution of litigation and its
concomitant skepticism as to the ability of litigation to function as a
mechanism for organizing social relations and collectively administering
justice. It also argues more cautiously for the proposition that-while a
reinvigorated federalism, an agenda-driven conservatism, and a
constitutionally fixated judicial supremacy are all part and parcel of the
legacy of the Rehnquist Court-hostility to litigation 43 has been, in the end,
the most historically significant and all-encompassing theme of the
Rehnquist era.44
42. See infra Part V.
43. In describing this current in the Court's jurisprudence as "hostility" to "litigation," both
terms have been chosen with care. For an extended discussion of how and why I chose my terms,
see infra Part II(B). A few other scholars have adopted the same construction in explaining aspects
of the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence, although only one has provided any serious substantive
explanation of her meaning. See Vicki C. Jackson, Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign
Immunity, and the Denationalization of Federal Law, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 691, 706-19 (2000)
(locating the Supreme Court's 1999 sovereign immunity decisions in the context of a variety of
other anti-litigation initiatives of the Rehnquist Court and offering the Court's "hostility to
litigation" as one of many overlapping themes motivating those decisions).
44. In justifying these propositions, I am forced to contend not only with alternative thematic
explanations of the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence, but also with a recent strain of commentary
suggesting that-for a variety of reasons-the task of seeking an overarching "ideational"
explanation for the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence is incoherent or futile. See, e.g., Merrill, supra
note 1, at 571 (rejecting an "ideational approach" to understanding the Rehnquist Court because it
fails to accommodate a variety of the Court's holdings). Some have attacked the idea that the years
of the Chief Justice's tenure represent a single era. See, e.g., id. at 569 (observing that legal
scholars "can already perceive that there have been two Rehnquist Courts"); Chemerinsky, supra
note 1, at 659 ("In its first years, the Rehnquist Court invalidated few laws and professed an
approach to constitutional law that exalted majoritarianism. In the last decade, however, the Court
has invalidated statutes at an unprecedented rate and has rarely deferred to Congress, to the
Executive, to state legislatures or to state courts."); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitutional
Jurisprudenceof the Rehnquist Court, in THE REHNQUIST COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 1
at 195, 196 (contrasting the staunchly majoritarian decisions of the early court to the more recent
decisions); infra subpart II(A) (participating in that debate). Others have questioned whether the
Chief Justice's name properly belongs on the era given the influential role others have played in the
Court's deliberations. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Justice O'Connor and Federalism, 32
McGEORGE L. REV. 877, 877 (2001) (describing the current Court as the "O'Connor Court");
Warren Richey, The Quiet Ascent ofJustice Stevens, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 9, 2004, at Al
(arguing that Justice Stevens quietly led the Court on important issues during the 2003-2004 term);
Cliff Sloan,
In Praise of John Paul Stevens, NEWSWEEK,
May 6,
2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7748622/site/newsweek (arguing that it is increasingly clear that this
is the "Stevens Court"); cf Greenhouse, supra note 2 (commenting that the 2003-2004 term may
"go down in history as the one when Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist lost his court"). Still
others have challenged the assumption that there is anything particularly revolutionary about the
era. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 93 (2003) (expressing
skepticism about attempts to characterize the Rehnquist Court as "revolutionary"); Powe, supra note
27, at 889 (commenting that the Rehnquist Court did nothing more profound than simply follow
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This Article proceeds in five parts. In Part II, I extend the work of the
introduction, defining my terms, explaining my argument, and offering
preemptive defenses against some predictable misreadings of my thesis. In
Part III, I unpack the contours of the Rehnquist Court's hostility to litigation,
focusing attention on a number of areas where the Court has acted
aggressively and explicitly to limit the scope or availability of litigation:
remedies and rights of action, qualified immunity and attorney's fees, the
enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements, and limitations on the
permissible scope of punitive damage awards. I then move from the explicit
to the implicit, examining well-rehearsed areas of the Court's jurisprudence
in an effort to identify the subtle effects of the Court's reflexive hostility to
litigation on its constitutional docket. Part IV explores the interaction of the
Court's commitment to federalism and its hostility to litigation; this Part
argues both that the Court's hostility to litigation fanned the flames that
provoked the last decade's Eleventh Amendment revolution and that the
Court's reluctance to countenance broad civil remedies even when imposed
by sovereign states has served to impose limits on the Court's federalism
jurisprudence. Part V tackles the Court's fiber-controversial decision in Bush
"election returns"); Keith E. Whittington, William H. Rehnquist: Nixon 's Strict Constructionist,
Reagan's Chief Justice, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 8 (noting that, despite his long
tenure, Rehnquist's constitutional vision has never "quite captured the Supreme Court"); Young,
supra note 1, at 1213-14 (rejecting attempts to characterize the Rehnquist Court as a hotbed of
"conservative judicial activism" as inconsistent with the reality that the Court "has generally
respected precedent-even when that precedent points in politically liberal directions"); Hamilton,
supra note 20 (arguing that the Rehnquist Court is clearly "centrist" -and not the radical "archconservative" body it is "wrongly caricatured as being"). I take those claims on-and moderate my
thesis to account for them-in detail in Part II and in passing throughout the Article.
By far the most challenging strand of the recent skepticism about thematic analyses of the
Rehnquist Court is the suggestion that, because the Court's work is too dense and nuanced to be
"subsumed under any single conceptual rubric," scholars of the current Court should instead pursue
a micro-analysis of individual Justices' policy preferences, strategic considerations, and
interpersonal relationships. Merrill, supra note 1, at 571; see also TUSHNET, supra note 1
(analyzing the Rehnquist Court through the assumption that the current Justices, including the
Court's conservative majority, are hopelessly divided on first principles of constitutional law and
constitutional interpretation and that, as a result, the Court's work product reflects strategic
compromise and accidental overlaps rather than any grand theme); cf Robert C. Post, Foreword:
Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003)
(manifesting a similar skepticism as to the utility of some of the recent Rehnquist Court scholarship,
albeit in a critique that proposes that we deepen our analyses of the current Court by ratcheting up
the scope of our inquiry to include an examination of the current Court's (mis)understanding of the
boundaries of constitutional law and of the relationship between law and culture rather than
ratcheting down the scope of our analysis as Merrill suggests). I take Professor Merrill's
methodological criticism seriously and hope that this Article approaches its thematic analysis in a
refined and humble way. Nonetheless, my approach is unabashedly ideational-I tell a story about
the Rehnquist Court in which a single intellectual impulse carries substantial explanatory power. I
hope that my refinements of the ideational approach-in particular my assessment that the driving
force of the Rehnquist Court's anti-litigation fervor is not an idea per se, but rather a dense and
under-theorized cultural impulse-will win over some who are skeptical about thematic
assessments of this (or any other) Court. In the end, however, this Article is an intervention in the
ongoing debate about the dominant themes of the Rehnquist Court and may prove unsatisfying to
those who reject such an approach.
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v. Gore,45 arguing that skepticism about the litigation enterprise both fueled

the Court's startling foray into presidential selection and shaped the content
of the Justices' rushed and often cryptic opinions. Finally, in a brief Part VI,
I pull back from the cases to interrogate the sources of the Court's hostility to
litigation, exploring not only the reasons for that hostility but also its curious
coexistence with the Court's concurrent commitment to an aggressive form
of judicial supremacy, particularly in the constitutional arena.
My conclusions are neither simple nor startling. As I read our recent
judicial past, the nine judicial actors who sat together on the Supreme Court
for the last decade shared genuine affinity for the work they and their lower
court colleagues perform and for the profession at whose apogee they rank.4 6
That pride notwithstanding, however, the Court's decisions manifest a
studied ambivalence toward the powers of the judiciary and the role of the
legal system over which judges reign. Whether one is examining the
Rehnquist Court's rhetoric or its results, themes of judicial supremacy share
center stage with themes of judicial self-abasement. This tension is not
unprincipled; indeed, at some level, it may even be intentionally dialectic.
Nor, however, is it fully theorized or fully consistent. It is the product of
discrete political, intellectual, and cultural forces that will take decades of
historical study to fully untangle. And it is the lead storyline in the history of
this peculiar and peculiarly interesting Court.
II.

Defining the Project

A. Periodizingthe Rehnquist Court
Any attempt to explain the salient themes of the Rehnquist Court must
deal with the fact that its subject ("the Rehnquist Court") is not a static entity
but instead a moving target-evolving, changing, and providing new
evidence continuously over a period of almost two decades. Given the
possibility-most would say, the certainty--of change over time, it behooves
a scholar of the Rehnquist Court to offer an explanation of the chronological
reach of his or her thesis.
Most scholars break the history of the Chief Justice's tenure down into
at least two eras.4 7 The first began, naturally, with his appointment in June
1986 and lasted until Justice Stephen Breyer joined the Court in the fall of
1994. This is a period characterized by constant flux in the Court's

45. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
46. For an astute discussion of the odd pride the current Justices take in their "seriousness" and
professionalism, see Powe, supra note 28, at 672 ("Judicial seriousness is a best-face projection by
the Justices."). Respect for the institution of the judiciary-if not for its traditional powers-was,
according to many, a central theme in the legacy of Chief Justice Rehnquist. See, e.g., Editorial, A
Defender of Independent Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005, at A2 1.

47. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 1, at 569-71 (discussing the "first" and "second" Rehnquist

Courts).
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membership, 48 scattered and unpredictable majority coalitions, and an intense
but unfocused attack on the leading precedents of predecessor Courts. The
"Second Rehnquist Court '49 began with the appointment of Justice Breyer
and arguably lasted until the Chief Justice's death during the 2005 summer
recess. This period, in contrast to the earlier Rehnquist days, is characterized
by stability in personnel, 50 predictable voting patterns, and relatively
consistent juridical themes.
Some commentators have begun to posit the possibility that a "Third
Rehnquist Court" emerged over the last several terms of the Chief Justice's
tenure. 5' Though the defining characteristics of such a Court, if it even
existed, remained imperfectly realized, careful observers have noted that over
the last few years the Court has begun to mark off the limits of its most
aggressive doctrinal innovations,52 that voting coalitions have become
increasingly fluid,5 3 and that the more liberal and moderate Justices have

48. New Justices joined the Court for six of the eight terms during this era. See id. at 577.
49. See id. passim.
50. No new Justice joined the Court between the arrival of Justice Breyer and the death of Chief
Justice Rehnquist. This is the longest amount of time that a nine-member Court has ever stayed
together. See Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most DangerousJustice Rides Again: Revisiting
the Power Pageant of the Justices, 86 MtNN. L. REV. 131, 134 & n.1 2 (2001) (discussing the
longest gaps in history between the seating of new Justices). While the Rehnquist Court has, in a
literal sense, expired with the passing of its namesake, only time will tell if its central themes
(including hostility to litigation) live on. Early predictions are that the substitution of John G.
Roberts for William Rehnquist as Chief Justice will do little to soothe the Court's hostility to
litigation. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Humble Fie: Why Does John Roberts Hate Courts So Much?,
SLATE, Sept. 2, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2125469/?nav/ais/ (discussing John Roberts's
writings and career and concluding that he "sees almost no role for courts as remedial institutions"
and "has made it his work to try and hobble the courts").
51. See generally supra note 44 and sources cited therein (discussing the argument that, in
recent terms, the Supreme Court has increasingly been led by moderate or liberal Justices and
deviated from the themes and ideas of Chief Justice Rehnquist).
52. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005) (holding that the
condemnation of private property of one owner for use of a second owner is not precluded by the
Takings Clause if the transaction is part of an economic development program considered to be in
the public interest by relevant local regulatory authorities); Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195,
2201 (2005) (holding that the federal government has authority under the Commerce Clause to
regulate intra-state possession of marijuana even if the drug is held for medicinal use under
procedures authorized by state law); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 515 (2004) (holding that the
Eleventh Amendment is not a bar to individuals suing states under Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act when state court facilities are not accessible to the handicapped); Nev. Dep't of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 725 (2003) (holding that, the Eleventh Amendment
notwithstanding, states are liable for damages for violating the Family and Medical Leave Act
because Congress validly abrogated states' sovereign immunity pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 322 (2002) (holding that temporary development moratoria enacted to allow for reasoned
land-use planning do not require compensation under the Takings Clause).
53. For example, during the last term of the Rehnquist Court (October Term 2004), the Court's
five most conservative Justices voted together in only 21% of the 5-4 decisions (five out of twentyfour), a strong contrast from previous terms where that alignment routinely accounted for half or
even two-thirds of the 5-4 decisions. Interestingly, however, a surprisingly small number of the
remaining 5-4 decisions (eight) were made up of majorities consisting of the four most liberal
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become increasingly able to put their most pressing concerns on the Court's
agenda.54
Like most Rehnquist Court scholars, my focus is largely on the Second
Rehnquist Court, the decade-long stretch in which the Chief Justice and his
ideological allies were able to assemble consistent majorities for predictable
results in a recurring set of important doctrinal areas. This was the decade
that spawned most of the cases that will form the Chief Justice's legacy. It
was also the rare instance of what might be deemed a "mature court"-nine
Justices sufficiently familiar with each other's passions and concerns to
engage in long-running jurisprudential conversations, often without direct
prompting or regard to the specific subject matter at issue.5 5 In rough cut,
one might suggest that the years prior to 1994 represent rehearsal and
experimentation with the agenda for the Rehnquist Revolution, the period
from 1994 until 2002 or 2003, the years of the Revolution, and the years
since then a period of consolidation or retrenchment.
While I largely agree with the prevailing periodization, one of the
virtues of the theme on which I focus-hostility to litigation-is that it
illuminates a number of points of contact between the jurisprudence of the
First and Second Rehnquist Courts. To illustrate the connection, it is worth
remembering that once upon a time the suggestion that the prevailing ethos
of the Rehnquist Court was motivated by hostility to litigation would have
evoked little, if any, surprise. In the months and years immediately
following the promotion of Chief Justice Rehnquist in 1986, the Court

Justices and one conservative "defector." Many of the close decisions were instead decided by ad
hoc coalitions of Justices, including several alignments never seen before. Altogether, each Justice
joined between 12 and 14 of the 24 5-4 decisions. Similarly, in comparison to previous terms, the
various Justices dissented in a much more evenly distributed number of cases, with Justices Breyer,
O'Connor, and Kennedy dissenting 11 times each; Justice Stevens 21 times; and the remaining five
Justices between 15 and 18 times. All statistics are calculated from the wonderful and timely
reports posted by the law firm Goldstein & Howe on their "SCOTUS Blog." GOLDSTEIN & HOWE,
OT2004 NON-VOTING STATISTICS (2005), http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/
FinalOT04NonVotingStats.pdf; GOLDSTEIN & HOWE, END OF TERM STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS -

OCTOBER
TERM
2004
(2005),
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/
FinalOT04StatsMemo.pdf.
54. Most notable are the handful of cases where Justice Stevens was able to put together
majorities for positions he had once championed in dissent. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 578-79 (2005) (overruling prior precedent and holding that the Constitution prohibits the
execution of individuals for crimes committed as juveniles); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 57879 (2003) (overruling prior precedent and holding that the Constitution prohibits states from
criminalizing private consensual same-sex sexual activity between adults); Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (overruling prior precedent and holding that the Constitution requires that
juries find the facts that trigger eligibility for the death penalty); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
321 (2002) (overruling prior precedent and holding that the Constitution prohibits the execution of
the mentally retarded).
55. Cf Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court ForecastingProject:Legal and Political
Science Approaches to Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1150, 1160 & n.38

(2004) (noting that political scientists refer to such a long-serving court as a "natural court");
Merrill, supra note 1, at 638-51 (discussing the consequences of membership "stasis" for Court
decisionmaking during the Second Rehnquist Court).
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directly and consistently moved to limit both access to and the remedial
power of the federal courts, often in high profile constitutional litigation.5 6 In
small but significant steps, with calm but firm rhetoric, the First Rehnquist
Court expressed a desire and an intention to roll back the institutional
assertiveness of the federal judiciary. This avowed anti-activist agenda put
the Court on a collision course with the legacy of the Warren Court, and
court-watchers took note.
As events transpired, the apocalyptic confrontation between Warren
Court "activism" and Rehnquist Court "restraint" never came to fruition.
Miranda, Roe, and Bakke survived furious challenges, 57 the full Court
embraced substantive due process, 58 and institutional reform litigation limped
on-hampered by the decisions of the Court, statutory reforms, and a change
in the national zeitgeist, but still an accepted and formidable weapon for
advocates and reformers. 59 Where the Rehnquist Court did innovate-for
example, in the Eleventh Amendment, Commerce Clause, or freedom of
association contexts-issues of judicial power were rarely in the forefront of
the conversation. Indeed, the Court's alacrity in striking down federal and
state statutes and its disdain for the considered judgment of non-judicial

56. See, e.g., Martin v. D.C. Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1, 1 (1992) (closing the Court's in
forma pauperis docket to litigants who have allegedly abused the Court's processes through
frequent filings); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62 (1992) (imposing sharp new
standing limits); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 471 (1992) (curtailing the availability of remedies
in school desegregation cases); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 240
(1991) (same); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 37 (1990) (same); Spallone v. United States, 493
U.S. 265, 267 (1990) (precluding judges from imposing sanctions on legislators for failing to pass
legislation funding court-ordered housing desegregation efforts); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180,
180 (1989) (like Martin, closing the Court's docket to litigants who have abused the Court's
processes through frequent filings).
57. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (endorsing Justice Powell's qualified
acceptance of affirmative action in Regents of University of Californiav. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 271
(1978), and validating continued use of affirmative action under certain circumstances); Dickerson
v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (maintaining the rule in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), and stating that the rule is "constitutional"); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (preserving the "essential holding" of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
58. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 77, 80, 86, 92, 95 (2000) (including opinions
signed by all nine Justices accepting that "substantive due process" exists and protects certain
conduct from government regulation); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719, 736, 741,
756, 789, 790 (1997) (same).
59. See generally Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the StructuralReform Injunction: Oops ... It's
Still Moving!, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 143, 145 (2003) (disputing the idea that the structural reform
injunction will cease to exist by citing the existence of "sufficiently egregious, systematic
constitutional issues that inspire (or could inspire) the requisite breadth of support and depth of
reformist zeal to motor the machinery of the structural reform injunction"); Charles F. Sabel &
William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L.
REv. 1015, 1020 (2004) (arguing that the emergence of the experimentalism model in public law
litigation further bolsters the role of the judiciary in the recognition and enforcement of such rights);
Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge: InstitutionalReform Litigation as Litigation, 97 MICH.
L. REv. 1994, 2036 (1999) (affirming the legitimacy of institutional reform litigation, in particular
that of prisons, as a political practice rather than as a judicial movement).
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actors turned the early Rehnquist Court's skepticism about the scope of
judicial power into easy fodder for the Court's critics. 60
It is my thesis that the anti-litigation spirit of the early Rehnquist Court
did not die, but instead was redirected into lower profile areas of litigation,
employed more subtly in higher profile cases, and complicated by the
Court's increasing confidence in its own ability to resolve constitutional
disputes. Though the day-to-day commentary on the Court lost track of the
theme, litigation hostility remained a powerful force shaping the Court's
basal understanding of its institutional project.
B. Defining "Hostility" and "Litigation"
In describing this current in the Court's jurisprudence as "hostility" to
"litigation," both terms have been chosen with care. By "hostility" I mean to
suggest an attitudinal orientation against litigation, an instinctive skepticism
that is triggered whenever the proposed disposition of a case requires the
extensive, aggressive, or creative use of the courts or the judicial power.
While other terms might be substituted without doing substantial violence to
my argument-try on skepticism, distrust, perhaps even ambivalencehostility best captures and reinforces the fact that the phenomenon in
question is both emotional and intellectual. The members of the Court are on
some level aware of this strand in their jurisprudence and write about it,
debate it, and rationally argue about it. On the other hand, there is a
profound visceral component to the Court's orientation towards litigationan inchoate, under-theorized, instinctive reaction. In the language of history,
the Court's hostility to litigation is as much a cultural phenomenon as an
intellectual one.
As for the object of the Court's hostility, I mean "litigation" to be
understood broadly. I include within the target of the Court's skepticism
both the decision by particular individuals or groups to resolve problems and
seek redress through formal application to the courts and the complex of
individuals, institutions, and practices through which such disputes are
adjudicated. 6' More specifically, I mean to reference the social institution of
litigation (call it capital-L "Litigation" if you prefer)-the complex of
cultural attitudes about problem solving, institutional arrangements, doctrinal
rules, and professional roles that nourish our particular judicially focused
dispute-resolution system.

60. The contrast is so pronounced that some commentators made mention of it in their
obituaries for Chief Justice Rehnquist. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 4, at Al ("[T]he court's
institutional enhancement was an irony of Chief Justice Rehnquist's tenure, because another goal
that he accomplished in large measure was to shrink the role of the federal courts by taking them out

of the business of running prisons, school systems, and other institutions of government.").
61. This Article does not address, except tangentially, the Rehnquist Court's attitude towards
administrative proceedings.
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Though I see the institution of Litigation writ large as the Court's target,
the Court's hostility manifests itself differently in different areas of the law.
Sometimes it comes across as an overt inclination to close the courts to
particular kinds of claims or claimants, at other times as skepticism about
doctrinal innovations that might have the immediate or second-order
consequence of facilitating litigation. Sometimes it comes dressed as an
attack upon the equitable power of the judiciary, at others it is wrapped up in
a broad critique of strategies of judicial interpretation that seem to privilege
the courts at the expense of other social and political institutions. The
common thread throughout is doubt in the efficacy of a lawsuit as a
mechanism for resolving the problem at hand, coupled perhaps with a
disproportionate animosity towards those who believe otherwise.
C. The Limits and Scope of My Thesis
This Article builds on the work of a number of scholars who have begun
to recognize the Rehnquist Court's propensity for denigrating common law
rulemaking, curtailing the remedial options available to courts and litigants,
and more generally manifesting an unwillingness to "take responsibility for
shaping a workable legal system in the everyday disputes that come before
the judiciary without great fanfare., 62 However, I part company with the
others who have focused attention on these issues in several important ways.
First, I suggest that these themes reach more deeply into the fabric of the
Court's jurisprudence than others have hypothesized. While others who have
begun to develop similar themes have tended to focus on one or two areas of
law, my analysis identifies manifestations of the Court's hostility to litigation
throughout the Court's jurisprudence-at times on the face of the opinion but
often just beneath the surface. More specifically, while the others have
focused exclusively (or nearly so) on the Court's nonconstitutional docket,
62. Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's JudicialPassivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 343
(2002). See also Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the PrivateAttorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
183, 186 (arguing that "the Court has launched a wholesale assault on one of the primary
mechanisms Congress has used for enforcing civil rights: the private attorney general"); Judith
Resnik, ConstrictingRemedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND.
L.J. 223, 224 (2003) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court has "revised the scope of federal equitable
and common law powers" and that the holdings of recent Supreme Court cases "instruct federal
judges not to craft remedies without express congressional permission, and, when permission has
been granted, to read it narrowly"); Sabel & Simon, supra note 59, at 1020 ("Although key
decisions of the Rehnquist Court sometimes seem unreflectively hostile to public law litigation, they
are plausible in their demand that lower courts demonstrate stronger connections between the
principles on which their determinations of liability are based and the specific means they impose as
remedies."); Peter Strauss, Courts or Tribunals? FederalCourts and the Common Law, 53 ALA. L.
REv. 891, 898 (2002) ("The Justices of the Supreme Court, then, face a considerable temptation to
follow Justice Scalia into relatively simple, either-or, bright-line rules-approaches that avoid the
rich contextualism and modesty of classic common law reasoning, yet might from the Court's
perspective seem to promise control over adventurism in the lower echelons of the federal
judiciary."); cf Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103
MICH. L. REv. 589, 623 (2005) (discussing, in the context of a case the Rehnquist Court ultimately
dodged, the Court's increasing hostility to private actions brought to enforce public values).
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this Article demonstrates that the Court's skepticism about the utility and
propriety of litigation solutions influences its decisions in high-profile
constitutional litigation as pronouncedly as it does in run-of-the-mill civil
disputes.
Second, this Article rejects the suggestion, propounded-perhaps
unwittingly-by those who describe this theme as involving "judicial
passivity,, 63 or the "scope of federal [courts'] equitable and common-law

powers, 6 4 that the current Court's actions in these cases can be reduced to
the staking out of a position in a methodological dispute between jurists.
Instead, I propose a hostility to litigation that is more deeply rooted and more
profound than that characterization would imply. In my reading, the mature
Rehnquist Court possessed an attitudinal orientation against litigation that
interacted with doctrine and judicial philosophy but which resided in a
deeper, more guttural place. Though this hostility competed with and
coexisted with other themes and impulses, it was omnipresent in the complex
soup of internal factors that motivated the Justices in individual cases and
baked into the rhetorical and doctrinal language in which they debated and
justified their decisions.65
Though the contours of this hostility will become clear in the ensuing
pages, it is useful to note at the outset what this Article is not arguing. First,
the Court's hostility to litigation cannot be reduced to politically motivated
antipathy for tort plaintiffs, employment discrimination complainants, trial
lawyers, or any of the other favorite targets of modern right-wing politics.
While I do not discount the possibility that personalized distaste for trial
lawyers or tort plaintiffs plays a substantial role in shaping the Court's
attitudes, it does not provide a sufficient explanation for a jurisprudential
phenomenon that rears its head in a variety of contexts unrelated to or even
hostile to the contemporary anti-plaintiffs law crusade.
Moreover, to the extent that a careful reading of the Rehnquist Court's
decisions suggest linkages between the Court's hostility to litigation and the
Justices' instinctual distaste for the modem plantiffs' bar, I do not assume
that these connections stem directly or even principally from partisan
politics. The frequent participation-and occasional leadership-of the
Court's more liberal members in shaping a Court fundamentally hostile to
litigation demands a more nuanced explanation. To the extent that the

63. Meltzer, supra note 62,passim.
64. Resnik, supra note 62, at 224.
65. In a 2000 symposium essay, Vicki Jackson noted the Rehnquist Court's "hostility to
litigation" and spent several pages sketching out some evidence of the theme. See Jackson, supra
note 43, at 706-19. Though we select largely different examples to illustrate our points, our
(independently derived) accounts are largely in accord. That having been said, Professor Jackson's
discussion-like the others distinguished in this Part-offers a less ambitious account of the Court's
skepticism towards the litigation enterprise, one that both focuses largely on cases where the Court
is directly denying access to the courts and accords such hostility only limited explanatory power
even within those cases.
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Rehnquist Court's hostility to litigation reflects prior ideological
commitments that bias them against certain segments of the bar or certain
categories of litigants, those commitments are just as likely to stem from the
Justices' class position or professional and educational experiences as from
their partisan political allegiance.66
Second, the Court's hostility to litigation is not motivated in any
significant way by the belief that it is Congress's role to create remedies.
While separation of powers rhetoric dots the Court's opinions, the parsimony
with which the Rehnquist Court doles out the remedial loaf is manifest in
decisions interpreting congressionally created remedies as well as decisions
denying implied remedies. Indeed, in areas such as qualified immunity, the
Rehnquist Court has often erected elaborate judicially created barriers to
recovery under statutes that appear to promise much greater relief. Similarly,
the Court's skepticism about judicial exercise of equitable power is not
placated in cases where such power is expressly authorized by statute or state
constitutional provision.
III. The Contours of the Court's Hostility to Litigation
Any survey of the Rehnquist Court's hostility to litigation, however
cursory, must begin with the obvious: In myriad ways, the Court has made
life very difficult for civil plaintiffs.6 7 To take but a few examples, the Court
has narrowly construed statutes and case law to reduce and eliminate
remedial options. It has protected governments and governmental officials
from financial liability through expansive immunity doctrines and cramped
interpretations of the federal fee-shifting statutes.
It has consistently
enforced form arbitration agreements that shift cases from courts to
alternative forums without regard for the practical consequences to potential

66. All nine of the Justices of the late Rehnquist Court were graduates of elite schools with
either little practice experience or practice experience largely limited to constitutional litigation or
defense-side civil litigation. For a brief discussion of the implication of these facts for the direction
of the Rehnquist Court, see infra subpart VI(B).
67. The reach of this Article is limited to civil litigation and purposefully excludes discussion of
habeas corpus law which, while nominally civil, is substantively about criminal law and criminal
trials. That having been said, some of the themes addressed herein have substantial applicability in
the criminal arena. To take the obvious example, the Court has validated or created innumerable
procedural obstacles that habeas petitioners must scale before bringing the merits of their claims to
the attention of the federal courts, a parallel path of judicial hostility that has been noted by many
commentators. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 43, at 707-08 (discussing habeas cases as an example
of the Rehnquist Court's "hostility to litigation"). To take a more obscure example, some of the
Court's decisions interpreting the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel demonstrate a
Court unaware of the actual interactions of lawyers and clients in our contemporary criminal justice
system and "refus[ing] to take responsibility for shaping a workable legal system," Meltzer, supra
note 62, at 343, to resolve criminal justice matters. See, e.g., Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001)
(holding-in conflict with norms and policies in virtually every locale-that a client represented by
a lawyer on a burglary charge stemming from an incident where a homeowner went missing was
"unrepresented" with regard to a charge of murdering the missing woman and could thus be
interrogated outside the presence of his lawyer without violating the Sixth Amendment).
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plaintiffs. And it has birthed novel constitutional limitations on the scope of
recoverable damages.
This Part analyzes the Court's recent decisions in each of those four
areas. These are not the only areas where the Court has acted directly to
curtail litigation. Examples to the contrary abound.68 These areas are not
selected randomly, however. Each has been chosen because it demonstrates
something important about the scope and shape of the Court's hostility to
litigation. Rehearsing the decisions in these four areas gives life and breath
to a theme that might otherwise appear little more than an arid slogan. That
is the mission of this Part.
A. A Reluctance to Afford Remedies: The ParadigmCases
Among the many areas where the Rehnquist Court has manifested
hostility to litigation, its narrow construction of statutes and case law
defining the remedial options available to civil litigants is among the most
pronounced. 69 Even a cursory examination of the Rehnquist Court's docket
reveals that a substantial percentage of the Court's cases in recent years have
dealt with the scope and availability of remedies for violations of various
federal statutes, of federal common law, of state statutes arguably preempted
by federal law, and of rights protected by the United States Constitution. 0
The majority of such cases are decided in lawyerly opinions of modest
ambition employing standard tools of statutory interpretation and historical
analysis. 7' In a significant minority of cases, however, the Court has gone
beyond the details of the dispute in question to explain and debate more
fundamental issues of remedial authority. These cases present a striking
microcosm of the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence.
Though the forthright debate over broad remedial questions has been the
centerpiece of several dozen Rehnquist Court decisions, 72 a quartet of cases

68. A partial list of other areas with relevant decisions might include justiciability (but see
supra note 39), habeas corpus (but see supra note 67), civil actions by prisoners, preemption, and
sovereign immunity. For my take on the last two of those, see infra Part IV.
69. A small but steady stream of scholarship has ably documented the Rehnquist Court's
parsimony with remedies. For two excellent articles on this subject, see Meltzer, supra note 62, and
Resnik, supra note 62.
70. By my count, the Supreme Court decided a significant issue as to the scope or availability
of a statutory remedy, qualified or sovereign immunity, the availability of attorney's fees,
preemption, or justiciability in at least twenty-four of the seventy-four cases decided on the merits
after oral argument during October Term 2003. The numbers for the prior two terms are similar.
Calculations were made by skimming and coding all opinions for each term listed chronologically at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/opinions.htnl.
71. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004); Jones v. R.R.
Donnelly & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004).
72. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (debating the scope of liability
under the Alien Tort Claims Act); Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.,
527 U.S. 308 (1999) (using an historical analysis of courts in equity to deny a preliminary
injunction preventing a party from disposing of their assets pending a decision on their contract
claim); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (denying recovery of damages
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decided between April 2001 and June 2002 nicely illustrates the Court's
handling of-and preoccupation with-such cases. On the surface, these
cases are importantly different-involving different kinds of remedial issues,
different areas of law, and differently situated plaintiffs. When the cases are
placed side-by-side, however, those differences are dwarfed by striking
similarities in the Court's approach to and resolution of the cases, similarities
that speak volumes about the motivating concerns of the Rehnquist Court.7 3
In many ways, these cases are the paradigm cases of the Rehnquist era, the
cases you would assign an outside observer who wanted to quickly
understand how the contemporary Court thinks and works.
They
demonstrate a Court committed both intellectually and viscerally to limiting
litigation.
1. The Cases.-In the first of the cases, Alexander v. Sandoval,7 4 the
Court faced the question whether a private fight of action exists to enforce
federal regulations barring entities who receive federal funds from adopting
policies that have the "effect" of discriminating on the basis of race. These
"disparate impact" regulations were authorized by Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 19647' and adopted by the relevant federal agencies
immediately after the passage of that Act. Several prior Supreme Court
76
decisions assumed or strongly suggested that such a right of action exists,
every single federal court of appeals has concluded or assumed the same,77
and Congress had amended the content of the legislation with the
understanding that whatever substance they gave to the statute would be

for teacher-student sexual harassment under Title IX unless a school district official had notice of,
and was indifferent to, the teacher's misconduct); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (rejecting private claims of aiding and abetting under
§ 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934); Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992)
(holding that § 671(a)(15) of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 does not
confer a private right enforceable in a § 1983 action). Compare, for example, Norfolk Shipbuilding
& Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811, 820 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (engaging the
opinion of the Court sharply on the scope of remedial power because of disagreement with a
sweeping aside dropped into an otherwise straightforward opinion in an unexceptional remedial
case).
73. Judith Resnik has noted in passing the essential congruity between these cases (and their
importance) in a piece that develops themes similar to those raised in this section through a detailed
discussion of one of these cases. See Resnik, supra note 62, at 232-33.
74. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-d (2000).
76. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y. City, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (concluding,
though arguably in dicta and through separate opinions of five Justices, that individuals can seek
declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI); Cannon v.
Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (determining that a private right of action exists to enforce Title
VI without differentiating between the statute and its implementing regulations); Lau v. Nichols,
414 U.S. 563 (1974) (deciding on the merits a dispute that was legally indistinguishable from the
question raised in Sandoval).
77. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 294 n. I (Stevens, J., dissenting) (listing cases from all circuits but

the Eighth).
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privately enforceable. 78 Nonetheless, in a hotly contested 5-4 decision, the
Court held that no private right of action exists to enforce the disparate
impact regulations.7 9
In Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko,8 ° the Court considered
whether a federal prisoner held in a private correctional facility can bring an
action for damages against the corporation administering the prison for
violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual
punishment."8' 1 Though that remedial course seemed authorized by the
Court's decisions in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics82 and its progeny, 83 the Court held, again 5-4,
that a
84
Bivens action was not available under the circumstances of the case.
Just six weeks later, in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v.
Knudson, 85 the Court was required to construe a central remedial provision of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 86 to
determine whether an employee benefit plan could compel a plan beneficiary
to make restitution after recovering damages from a third-party tortfeasor.
By the same 5-4 margin, the Court narrowly construed the remedial
provision to deny a right of recovery,87 over two spirited dissents that took
issue with the Court's textual interpretation, its use of precedent,
its reading
88
considerations.
equitable
to
receptivity
of
of history, and its lack
Finally, in Gonzaga University v. Doe,89 the Court considered whether
private individuals harmed by violations of the Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) 90 could seek redress under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Though seven Justices ultimately concluded that no relief was

78. See id. at 302 n.9.
79. Id. at 293 (majority opinion).
80. 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
81. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

82. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that an action for damages can be brought directly under the
Constitution against a federal agent for violation of the Fourth Amendment in the absence of an
alternative remedial scheme).
83. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (extending Bivens to Eighth Amendment

actions).
84. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74.
85. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
86. That provision provides:
A civil action may be brought-.. .(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A)
to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such
violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000).
87.
88.
89.
90.

Great-West, 534 U.S. at 219-20.
See id. at 221 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 224 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
536 U.S. 273 (2002).
20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000).
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available under § 1983, 91 the Court was again divided 5-4 on the crucial
doctrinal issue: in this case, whether (and under what circumstances)
individuals may seek relief for violations of federal statutes under § 1983
without meeting the increasingly stringent standards for establishing that the
statute creates an implied private right of action. 92 Though the Court's
opinion left some ambiguity on the matter, the five-Justice majority appears
to have answered the question with a nearly absolute "no," leaving the
remedial value of § 1983 seriously circumscribed.93
2. Their Similarities.-These decisions-taken collectively and in
concert with others like them-have the effect of imposing new strictures,
limitations, and roadblocks on the ability of civil litigants to seek redress in
the courts. As such, they provide some direct, albeit quite broad, evidence of
the Rehnquist Court's hostility to litigation. Beyond that, however, their

91. In addition to the five Justices who joined the broad majority, Justices Breyer and Souter
would have denied relief, albeit under a narrower theory that would have continued to allow § 1983
suits to proceed in a substantial number of cases where plaintiffs could not sustain the difficult
burden of establishing the availability of an implied right of.action. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 291
(Breyer, J., joined by Souter, J., concurring).
92. See id. at 291-92 (rejecting the majority's importation of private right of action caselaw into
the § 1983 context because "the statute books are too many, the laws too diverse, and their purposes
too complex, for any single legal formula to offer more than general guidance" and declining to "in
effect, predetermine an outcome through the use of a presumption-such as the majority's
presumption that a right is conferred only if set forth 'unambiguously' in the statute's 'text and
structure'); id. at 299-303 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority's opinion has merged the § 1983 analysis with the more stringent implied private right of
action analysis and objecting strenuously to that step).
93. See, e.g., id. at 290 (majority opinion) ("In sum, if Congress wishes to create new rights
enforceable under § 1983, it must do so in clear and unambiguous terms-no less and no more than
what is required for Congress to create new rights enforceable under an implied private right of
action."); see also id. at 299-300 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the above-quoted language
effectively merges the inquiries). But see id. at 284 (majority opinion) (arguing that the § 1983
plaintiffs have one less burden to clear than implied private right of action plaintiffs because once
they establish that a statute creates an individual right, implied private right of action claimants must
still establish an "intent to create a private remedy"). Whether the decision in this case leaves any
actions sustainable under § 1983 that cannot be brought as implied private rights of action likely
depends on whether the category of cases where plaintiffs can establish that Congress intended to
create a private right but not a private remedy contains any members; given the conflation of the
two inquiries in most implied right of action cases, there is a strong possibility that the category is
actually a null set. For one student work that frames the question of Gonzaga's reach with
particular clarity, see Sasha Samberg-Champion, Note, How to Read Gonzaga: Laying the Seeds of
a Coherent Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1838 (2003). According to some
academic commentators, the issue is further complicated by the possibility that administrative
agencies might attempt to authorize either a federal right or a federal remedy or both as part of their
duty to issue regulations interpreting ambiguous federal statutes. See generally Charles Davant IV,
Sorcerer or Sorcerer'sApprentice?: FederalAgencies and the Creation of Individual Rights, 2003
WiS. L. REV. 613; Brian D. Galle, Can Federal Agencies Authorize Private Suits Under Section
1983?, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 163 (2003); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private
Enforcement: The Casefor Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93,
163-66 & nn.244-45 (2005). Deep engagement with these issues is beyond the scope of this
Article.
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language and detail have the potential to reveal a great deal about the shape
and intensity of the Court's hostility.
The commonalities between the cases are striking. All four address the
basic question of whether a party who has suffered an acknowledged or
assumed injury to a defined legal interest may obtain relief under a particular
cause of action. In each case, the result is arguably governed by a prior
Supreme Court decision suggesting that relief is available, although in all
four the status of the prior opinion is itself a subject of debate.94 And, in each
case, the same 5-4 majority 95 rejects the implications of the prior caselaw
and decides the crucial doctrinal issue against the party seeking access to the
courts.9 6

The similarities do not end with those relatively dry narrative facts, but
extend to the tone and substance of the opinions. As suggested above, all
four treat the preexisting cases arguably settling their issue as second-class
precedents, not illegitimate per se but not sufficiently compelling to counsel
adherence if they can be read narrowly, 97 classified as dicta, 98 or interpreted
94. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280-83 (discussing several relevant cases, particularly Wilder v.
Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990)); Great-West Life Ins. & Annuity Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S.
204, 214-17 (2002) (discussing Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993)); Corr. Servs.
Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66-74 & n.4 (2001) (discussing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14
(1980)); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 282-83 (2001) (discussing Guardians Ass'n v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n ofN.Y. City, 463 U.S. 582 (1983)).
95. In each of the four cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas signed the majority opinion, with their four more liberal colleagues writing separately
and disagreeing vehemently with their analysis. In three of the four cases, the four-Justice block
would have allowed the plaintiff access to the courts on the theory he or she proposed, while in
Gonzaga, the "liberal" bloc was divided on the ultimate result. See supra notes 91-93 (explaining
the voting alignment in Gonzaga).
96. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 290 ("In sum, if Congress wishes to create new rights
enforceable under § 1983, it must do so in clear and unambiguous terms-no less and no more than
what is required for Congress to create new rights enforceable under an implied private right of
action. FERPA's nondisclosure provisions contain no rights-creating language, they have an
aggregate, not individual, focus, and they serve primarily to direct the Secretary of Education's
distribution of public funds to educational institutions. They therefore create no rights enforceable
under § 1983."); Great-West, 534 U.S. at 221 ("[Section] 502(a)(3), by its terms, only allows for
equitable relief. We will not attempt to adjust the 'carefully crafted and detailed enforcement
scheme' embodied in the text that Congress has adopted. Because petitioners are seeking legal
relief-the imposition of personal liability on respondents for a contractual obligation to pay
money-§ 502(a)(3) does not authorize this action." (citation omitted)); Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74
("Respondent... seeks a marked extension of Bivens to contexts that would not advance Bivens'
core purpose of deterring individual officers from engaging in unconstitutional wrongdoing. The
caution toward extending Bivens remedies into any new context, a caution consistently and
repeatedly recognized for three decades, forecloses such an extension here."); Sandoval, 532 U.S. at
293 ("Neither as originally enacted nor as later amended does Title VI display an intent to create a
freestanding private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under § 602. We therefore
hold that no such right of action exists.").
97. See, e.g., Great-West, 534 U.S. at 214-15 (reading Mertens's suggestion that restitution is
available under the relevant provision to apply only to the type of restitution that could be obtained
in traditional equity courts); Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70 & n.4 (reading Carlson's approval of a Bivens
actions against governmental officials for violations of the Eighth Amendment as inapplicable to an
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so as to conflict with intervening decisions. 99 Moreover, each of the four
decisions is sweeping in its approach-frankly admitting that it is not simply
deciding the remedial issue before the Court but also clarifying existing
methodologies and giving guidance to lower courts as to how to interpret
other claims of the same type (i.e., implied right of action claims, Bivens
claims, statutory rights of action, and § 1983 claims).100 In the course of
lending such guidance, each opinion ignores or downplays the importance of
the traditional presumption that rights imply remedies and the historic role of
the federal courts in insuring that remedial schemes are sufficient to protect
federal rights. 01
identical action against private corporations managing public prisons because the policy
considerations supporting such an action in the former case are allegedly absent in the latter);
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 282-85 (reading each of the potentially controlling Court authorities
narrowly).
98. See, e.g., Great-West, 534 U.S. at 215 (describing Mertens's statements regarding the
availability of restitution under the relevant provision as "dicta"); cf Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 282
("Some language in our opinions might be read to suggest that something less than an
unambiguously conferred right is enforceable by § 1983."); Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 282 ("[T]his
Court is bound by holdings, not language.").
99. See, e.g., Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280-81 (diminishing the authority of Wilder by contrasting
its reasoning with "[o]ur more recent decisions"); Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68-70 (reading intervening
cases as requiring that Bivens and Carlson be read narrowly); id. at 67 n.3 (arguing that the Court
has "retreated from" and "abandoned" implied private right of action precedent that was the impetus
for the recognition of Bivens actions) (internal quotation marks omitted); Sandoval, 532 U.S at 282
(arguing that a decision validating the regulations at issue in the case are "in considerable tension"
with later decisions of the Court); cf Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279 (describing it as an
"understatement" that the Court's "opinions have not eliminated all uncertainty regarding [Title
VI]'s commands").
100. See, e.g., Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 290 (concluding that "if Congress wishes to create new
rights enforceable under § 1983, it must do so in clear and unambiguous terms-no less and no
more than what is required for Congress to create new rights enforceable under an implied private
right of action"); Great-West, 534 U.S. at 220-21 (explaining that when Congress has adopted a
"carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme" it is the Court's job to parse that language with
exactitude rather than relying on the statute's general policy objectives and equitable concerns about
the general availability of remedies); Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74 (summarizing opinion's explanation
that Bivens actions are only available where the plaintiff would otherwise be left without a remedy
and where the implication of a remedy would deter individual officer's misconduct and concluding
that courts must treat claims "extending" Bivens with "caution"); Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286-87
(explaining the current Court's "particular understanding of the genesis of private causes of action,"
and the text-focused, intent-driven methodology that Court has adopted to implement that
understanding).
101. Oft-cited expressions of this pro-remedial presumption abound. See, e.g., WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *23 (considering it "a general and indisputable rule, that where
there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit or action at law, whenever that right is
invaded"); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) ("It is for the federal courts 'to adjust
their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief where federally secured rights are invaded."
(quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946))); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
162 (1803) (asking rhetorically "If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his
country afford him a remedy?"); see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1048 (3d ed. 2005) ("The traditional view was that the intended
beneficiaries of a statute could sue for damages from a violation unless the statute implied that such
claims should not be allowed. The statute created the right; the common law created the remedy
unless the statute negated it."). For the opinions' brief attempts to deal with this tradition, see, for
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Perhaps most striking of all, each opinion is, for want of a better word,
obsessed with the proper role of the federal courts. To that end, each is filled
with a full complement of tangential observations, broad assertions, and
acerbic jibes. 0 2 While, to the uninitiated, these observations and asides may
appear out of proportion to the issues at stake in the cases, to the members of
the Court they are but the latest entries in a familiar and crucially important
meta-dialogue about the role ofjudges and the value of litigation.
3. Some Lessons.a. Hostility to Litigation That Transcends Subject Matter and
Political Valence.-The deep similarities in the way the Court handled these
disparate cases strongly suggest that the Court's hostility to litigation
transcends doctrinal nicety, subject matter, and political valence. First of all,
though all four cases involve the scope and availability of remedies, each
comes from a distinct doctrinal area-one dealing with the implication of a
private remedy from a federal statute and its attendant regulations
(Sandoval), another dealing with the implication of a private remedy directly
from the Constitution (Malesko), a third dealing with a narrow and specific
statutory remedy (Great-West), and the fourth dealing with the broad and
general federal civil rights remedy (Gonzaga, interpreting the reach of §
1983). Moreover, as civil cases go, the substance of the four cases could
hardly have been more different: one was a broad and aggressive civil rights
action; 10 3 another, a personal injury tort claim; 1°4 a third, an action for

example, Great-West, 534 U.S. at 220-21, which speculates that the Court's restrictive
interpretation of a statute might not foreclose all possible avenues of relief but insists that, even if it
does, the choice to close off relief in these circumstances rests with Congress.
102. The most pointed and controversial of these unsurprisingly came from the pen of Justice
Scalia. See, e.g., Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Bivens is a relic of the heady
days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action-decreeing them
to be 'implied' by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional prohibition."); Sandoval, 532
U.S. at 287 ("'Raising up causes of action where a statute has not created them may be a proper
function for common-law courts, but not for federal tribunals."' (quoting Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 365 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment))); id. ("Having sworn off the habit of venturing beyond Congress's intent,
we will not accept respondents' invitation to have one last drink."); id. at 291 ("But it is most
certainly incorrect to say that language in a regulation can conjure up a private cause of action that
has not been authorized by Congress. Agencies may play the sorcerer's apprentice but not the
sorcerer himself."). These assertive articulations of a limited vision of federal remedial power have
spurred not only the vigorous dissents of sitting judges but also a cottage industry of academic
criticism. For one particularly critical and insightful discussion of Justice Scalia's statements in
Sandoval, see Strauss, supra note 62. It is worth noting that-despite his aversion to common law
causes of action-Justice Scalia has been willing to "conjure up" common law defenses to statutory
causes of action. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (creating, in a
majority opinion by Justice Scalia, a non-statutory rule limiting the liability of government
contractors); infra subpart III(B) (discussing qualified immunity cases).
103. Sandoval involved a class-action lawsuit alleging that Alabama's new policy of giving
drivers' license exams only in English constituted discrimination on the basis of national origin.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 278-79.
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damages for a fairly technical violation of a privacy statute; 10 5 and the fourth,
a contractual dispute between several insurance companies and a
policyholder. 10 6 More subjectively, the plaintiffs in the actions seem to
evoke very different political sympathies, with the Sandoval plaintiffs
appealing to traditional "liberal" concerns about ethnic discrimination, the
Great-West plaintiff appealing to traditional "conservative" concerns about
obligation of contract and the efficient provision of services, and the other
plaintiffs pulling at heartstrings in more complicated, cross-cutting ways.'0 7
That the Court would approach these diverse cases in similar ways and
would divide over them in identical coalitions tells us a great deal about both
the strength and the contours of the Court's hostility to litigation. To the
Justices of the Rehnquist Court, these cases were-first and foremost--cases
about the available scope of remedies and the legitimacy of resort to
litigation as a mechanism for resolving disputes. Rather than viewing these
cases through the prism of their subject matter or their political valence, the
Court approached all of them as if they posed identical (disfavored) requests
for tickets to litigate. As a result, the Court launched into a predictable set of
soliloquies, reflections, and exchanges about the scope of judicial authority
and the nature of the judicial function.
The Court's near-Pavlovian resort to rhetorical set pieces and rehashed
debates in these varied cases calls into question some of the more traditional
explanations for the contemporary Court's reluctance to accord remedies.
First, while the Court has self-consciously tried to package its more skeptical
approach to implied private right of action and Bivens cases as a belated
acknowledgment of the separation of powers concerns raised by judicially
crafted remedies,108 these cases suggest that the Court's ire falls

104. Though the issue raised in Malesko involved the availability of an Eighth Amendment
"cruel and unusual punishment" claim, the underlying litigation was a fairly standard tort action
against the operator of the private halfway house for contributing to the heart attack of a prisoner.
Malesko, 534 U.S. at 64-65 (describing the substantive allegations in the case as raising claims the
prison operator was "negligent").
105. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 276-77 (narrating facts and details of the plaintiffs FERPA
claim).
106. See Great-West,534 U.S. at 207-09 (narrating facts of the complicated contractual dispute
that eventually gave rise to the statutory issue decided by the Court). It is worth emphasizing that
the party thwarted by the Court's litigation hostility in Great-West was a large insurance company
while the party who benefited was a quintessential "little guy."
107. John Malesko was a convicted criminal bringing an Eighth Amendment claim based on his
treatment while incarcerated; on the other hand, he was an atypical prison litigant-a middle-aged
man convicted of securities fraud and serving his sentence in a halfway house. Brief of Respondent
at 1, Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (No. 00-860). John Doe was seeking damages from Gonzaga University
for violation of a privacy statute that was largely the product of liberal good government agitation;
on the other hand, the alleged violation of his privacy rights involved the revelation that, as an
undergraduate, he was accused of sexual misconduct, Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 277, a factual scenario
that might play to those who believe that contemporary college campuses produce a substantial
number of false allegations of date rape that unfairly tarnish the reputations of young men.
108. See, e.g., Malesko, 534 U.S. at 67 n.3 (noting "retreat[]" from an expansive vision of the
concurring) (describing Bivens as a "relic
Court's authority to imply remedies); id. at 75 (Scalia, J.,
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indiscriminately on those advocating for the availability of a remedy, even
when the authority for that claimed remedy is an affirmative congressional
enactment. Thus, the Court approaches Great-West's argument for an
expansive reading of ERISA § 502(a)(3) with the same presumptive
dismissiveness as it approaches attempts to judicially extrapolate remedies
from silent statutes. Similarly, in assessing whether and when individuals
can use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce federal statutes against government
actors, the Court employs policy-based arguments and tools of construction
drawn from the implied private right of action context' °-many of which are
premised on concerns relating to the absence of affirmative congressional
mandates-while blithely ignoring the countervailing separation of powers
concerns raised by precluding actions seemingly authorized by the plain
language of § 1983.110 If the Court's symmetrical treatment of these
seemingly asymmetrical cases tells us anything, it tells us that something
more than mere solicitude for congressional prerogatives is at work in the
Court's remedial jurisprudence.
However, it is increasingly clear that the operative principle behind the
Court's remedial hostility is not bluntly or categorically political. As noted
above, the political valence of these decisions varies dramatically without
altering the outcome of the cases. More significantly, in each case, the
Court's majority rushes headlong down the path towards its anti-litigation
barricades without even assimilating or taking stock of the political or
equitable scenery. There is no handwringing over the denial of remedies to
plaintiffs with whose claims the conservative Justices would normally
sympathize, no sense of reluctance that symmetry or precedent requires an
otherwise unpalatable result.
b. Hostility to Litigation as a Phenomenon of the Entire Court.Consistent 5-4 voting patterns and spirited dissents notwithstanding, these
cases illustrate the degree to which hostility to litigation is a phenomenon of
the entire Court, not just the five most conservative Justices. Both the
substance and the tone of the dissenting opinions in these cases suggest that
of the heady days" when the Court took upon itself powers that properly belonged to the
legislature).
109. See generally Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 273 (holding that because FERPA's confidentiality
provisions speak only in terms of institutional "policy or practice" and not to individual instances of
disclosure, they have an aggregate focus, they are not concerned with whether the needs of any
particular person have been satisfied, and they cannot give rise to individual rights; and noting that
although the question of whether a statutory violation may be enforced through § 1983 is a different
inquiry from that involved in determining whether a private right of action can be implied from a
particular statute, the inquiries overlap in that it must first be determined whether Congress intended
to create a federal right).
110. See id. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]mposing the implied right of action framework
upon the § 1983 inquiry is not necessary: The separation-of-powers concerns present in the implied
right of action context 'are not present in a § 1983 case,' because Congress expressly authorized
private suits in § 1983 itself." (citation omitted) (quoting Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498,

509 n.9 (1990))).
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even the more expansive Justices are operating within a conceptual
framework in which courts are reluctant to extrapolate remedies and err on
the side of closing the courthouse door."1' In implied right of action cases, in
particular, the center of debate has swung drastically in an anti-litigation
direction. In Sandoval, as in most other recent cases, all nine Justices adopt
an approach that allows for a private right of action only if there is
substantial evidence that Congress intended such a remedy.' 12 Though the
Justices disagree mightily over what kinds of evidence to consider and how
strong that evidence must be, all accept the modem rule that congressional
intent to create a remedy is a sine qua non of judicial implication. None
defend the traditional rule that courts may extrapolate appropriate remedies
from silent statutes so as to effectuate legislative purposes or even the
intermediate positions adopted and abandoned by the Court in its threedecade-long retreat from the traditional rule.' 13

111. In addition to the material noted in the following footnotes, note the votes of Justices
Breyer and Souter in Gonzaga. See supra note 92 (explaining their votes). Note also Justice
Stevens's concessions about implied right of action cases in arguing for a different rule in § 1983
cases, supra note 110, and the narrow, precedent-driven arguments advanced by the dissenters in
Malesko. 534 U.S. at 75-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the case is controlled by Carlson
v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980)).
112. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) ("The judicial task is to interpret the
statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private
right but also a private remedy. Statutory intent on this latter point is determinative.") (citation
omitted); id. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In order to impose its own preferences as to the
availability of judicial remedies, the Court today adopts a methodology that blinds itself to
important evidence of congressional intent.").
113. What I call the "traditional" rule was most clearly articulated in JI. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) ("It is for the federal courts 'to adjust their remedies so as to grant the
necessary relief' where federally secured rights are invaded." (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,
684 (1946)). See also LAYCOCK, supra note 101, at 1048 (explaining and paraphrasing the
"traditional rule"). But cf Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 731, 735 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "[the implying of a private action from a federal regulatory statute has
been an exceptional occurrence in the past history of this Court" and calling Borak a "break in this
pattern"). In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), the Court offered a new test for the availability of
an implied private right of action that put a heavier emphasis on express evidence of congressional
intent but which still considered such evidence only one of several factors. In Cannon the Court
moved further, suggesting that congressional intent was the central question in the analysis but not
entirely abandoning other considerations. See 441 U.S. at 689 (noting that even though the court
considers four factors in determining whether Congress intended a private right of action, whether
there is congressional intent to that end is "the threshold question"). The Cort and Cannon
decisions are, in retrospect, largely doctrinal rest stops on the path from a rule conceptualizing the
adoption of appropriate remedies as a proper equitable function for the courts to one in which the
courts are powerless to extrapolate remedies beyond those that Congress expressly established or
clearly intended but simply forgot to memorialize. The first modern decision definitively stating the
new rule was issued a month after Cannon but not uniformly followed until nearly two decades
later. Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979) ("[O]ur task is limited solely to
determining whether Congress intended to create the private right of action .... ). My reading of
the dissent as adopting this once-radical single factor analysis is echoed by many commentators.
See, e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note 101, at 1051 (arguing that the dissenters in Sandoval "want only an
honest inquiry into probable congressional intent, considering all the evidence").
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To a degree that is easily missed if one focuses on the day-to-day
movement of the doctrine and the back-and-forth between the majority and
the dissenters in any given case, the Justices' actual positions are, by
historical standards, not that far apart. None of the Justices on the Rehnquist
Court conceptualizes the judiciary as a full partner with Congress in the
design and implementation of cohesive remedial schemes to ensure the
protection of constitutionally mandated or democratically enacted rights. All
see the modem judiciary as constrained in its remedial creativity by a dense
statutory framework reflective of a fundamental transfer of remedial power
from the courts to the legislatures. Each of the Justices appears committed to
the notion that-all things being even remotely equal-it is more
democratically sound and, therefore, normatively superior for legislatures to
specify the available remedies for violations of rights and duties rather than
to rely on the ad hoc equitable judgments of the judiciary. The contentious
struggles over remedial issues that litter the Rehnquist Court's case reports
are not battles over whether the Court should cut back on judicial discretion,
equitable remedies, or litigation-positive interpretive strategies but instead
disputes over how far such a trend should go.
c. Judicial Assertiveness in the Service of Limiting Judicial
Power.-The final lesson that can be drawn from these cases is one of
caution about terminology and perspective.
In discussing these cases
specifically and the Rehnquist Court more generally, it is easy to be drawn
into a spirited debate about whether the Court's decisions manifest activism
or passivity, supremacy or minimalism. 114 These cases reveal the degree to
which an honest and intellectually satisfactory resolution to that debate
requires a nuanced answer and a willingness to embrace paradox. Here, as
elsewhere, the driving Justices on the Court are pursuing a limited vision of
judicial5 power but harnessing that vision to a starkly assertive judicial
11
style.
Though in substance and consequence these remedial cases serve to
limit the availability of litigation and the power of the courts, they achieve
those ends through means that are the antithesis of minimalism. To begin
with, in each of the four cases, the Court went out of its way to grant
certiorari, when a more prudent or less agenda-driven Court might have
declined review.1 16 Having granted the cases, the Court then declined to

114. Compare, e.g., Kramer, supra note 1, at 130 (arguing that the Rehnquist Court displays a
disturbing commitment to judicial "supremacy") with Meltzer, supra note 62 (arguing that many of
the Rehnquist Court's decisions manifest a striking judicial "passivity") and CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MfNIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT xi (1999) (arguing that the

Rehnquist Court is properly committed to judicial "minimalism").
115. For a broadly similar argument in the context of criminal procedure, see Stephen F. Smith,
Activism as Restraint: Lessonsfrom CriminalProcedure, 80 TEXAS L. REV. 1057 (2002).
116. Sandoval, for example, involved an issue over which the courts of appeal had issued three
decades of broadly consistent opinions, in large part in response to the Court's own signals. See
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apply the most relevant precedents dispassionately, instead openly invoking
the power to restate and recalibrate the law in areas where prior decisions are
confusing, contradictory, or overbroad.' 1 7 Finally, in resolving the cases, the
Court fully embraced the broader jurisprudential implications of each of
them, using them as vehicles for articulating broad standards for resolving
the particular kinds of remedial questions at issue, rather than simply
resolving the dispute at hand." 8
B. Official Immunity and Fee-Shifting Statutes: Judicially Crafted
Obstacles to DemocraticallyAdopted Remedies
The right of action cases discussed above directly curtail litigation,
either by closing off the courtroom altogether or by foreclosing lucrative or
otherwise promising litigation strategies. Moreover, as discussed above,
their substance and tone strongly suggest that they are motivated, at least in
part, by an inchoate skepticism about the propriety and efficacy of litigation.
However, those decisions taken alone do not lead inexorably to the
conclusion that the Court's jurisprudence is primarily driven by an
overarching orientation against litigation. To the contrary, those decisions
admit of a number of other possible explanatory tropes-several of which are
also present on the face of the Court's opinions. In particular, the Court goes
to great pains to suggest that its decisions limiting the remedies available to
civil litigants are driven by a general commitment to democracy and a more
specific responsibility to ensure that coercive sanctions are imposed only
after careful communal deliberation." 19
That alternative explanation for the Court's remedial cases-however
tenable it may be with regard to implied private right of action and Bivens
cases-offers a strained interpretation of decisions such as Great-Western
and Gonzaga, which involve the interpretation and implementation of
congressionally adopted remedial schemes rather than the judicial

Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 295 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (listing cases). Malesko involved a fairly
straightforward application of one of the Court's precedents, albeit to a more complicated and
interesting factual scenario. The question specifically presented by Gonzaga was a fairly narrow
issue of statutory construction the Court had on prior occasions declined to answer. See, e.g.,
Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-011 v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426, 430-31 (2002). Even Great-Westwhich raised an issue of substantial financial importance that divided the courts of appeal-was a
poor candidate for certiorari, given its peculiar procedural posture. See Great-West Life Ins. &
Annuity Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 61, 208-09 (2002) (explaining briefly the procedural posture of
the case, in particular the fact that respondents were granted summary judgment by the district court
on an alternative ground, making it likely that the Court's decision would not substantially affect the
resolution of the parties' dispute).
117. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe,
536 U.S. 273, 280-81 (2002) (describing the need for Congress to speak clearly of its intention to
create a private remedy); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 204, 67-69 (2001) (discussing a
series of Court decisions limiting the remedies available to civil litigants in terms of separation of
powers).
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implication of remedies.
Moreover, whatever plausibility such an
explanation retains when the above cases are interrogated in isolation
dissolves when they are put into dialogue with other related areas of the
Court's recent jurisprudence, particularly the Court's decisions expanding the
scope of public officials' immunity from damage actions brought pursuant to
§ 1983 and contracting the universe of § 1983 cases in which successful
litigants are able to recoup their attorney's fees.
As will be developed below, the Rehnquist Court's qualified immunity
and attorney's fees cases suggest that the very same Justices who express
unease at implying or imposing judicially constructed remedies are perfectly
sanguine about implying or imposing judicially constructed limitations on
democratically enacted remedies. The linchpin running through these
seemingly incongruous decisions is neither deference to the democratic
branches of government nor aggressive judicial lawmaking; it is a subtle
distaste for the institution of Litigation and a concomitant desire to curtail its
operation.
1. Qualified Immunity and Related Doctrines.-Among the significant
modern doctrinal impediments to litigation, the development of "qualified
immunity" for governmental officials accused of violating the civil rights of
private citizens almost certainly deserves pride of place. The doctrine
provides immunity from liability-and where possible legal process2°--to
any public official who violates the constitutional or statutory rights of a
citizen if the underlying constitutional or statutory violation was not "clearly
established" at the time of the relevant conduct.'12 This exception to liability
draws heavily on traditional common law sources but was reworked to serve
22
modern policy concerns in the landmark 1982 case Harlow v. Fitzgerald.1

120. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-27 (1985) (holding that the qualified
immunity doctrine "recognize[s] an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of

litigation, conditioned on the resolution of the essentially legal question whether the conduct of
which the plaintiff complains violated clearly established law" and noting that "[tihe entitlement is
an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability"); see also infra note 127 and
accompanying text (discussing reasons for this approach).
121. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (articulating the modem doctrine of
qualified immunity); cf Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (stating that qualified immunity
protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law").
122. 457 U.S. 800. The Court first utilized the phrase "qualified immunity" in referring to the
protection governmental officials retain from certain suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974), but in that case the Court continued to follow the traditional rule
tying immunity to the subjective good faith of the officer and, in any event, declined to define the
terms of the available immunity. Over the next eight years, the Court offered some decisions that
tried to explain the content of the "qualified immunity" available in § 1983 and Bivens cases-see,
for example, Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975)-but did not arrive at the current (objective)
standard until Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-19.
The observation that Harlow involved the conscious, policy-driven adaptation of a longstanding
common law rule-and the corollary that the conservative jurists who drove that change were
opening themselves up to charges of hypocrisy if they voiced theoretical, rather than policy-driven,
objections to similar efforts on behalf of more liberal policy aims-has been voiced in a variety of
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In the quarter-century since that decision, a period roughly coterminous with
the tenure of the Rehnquist Court, the Supreme Court (with the aggressive
assistance of the courts of appeal) has
123 developed a complicated common law
jurisprudence of official immunity.
While qualified immunity and other related immunity doctrines 124 have
been rapidly normalized and integrated into our understanding of the
underlying remedial statutes, both the existence of these doctrines and their
contours are not inevitabilities, but instead the product of the particular
juridical culture that has held sway over the last quarter-century. While that
culture is, of course, made up of many influences and vectors, here, as
elsewhere, a visceral skepticism about the wisdom and propriety of litigation
appears to be central to the Court's decisionmaking.
As Vicki Jackson and Richard Fallon, among others, have argued, the
development of a doctrine of qualified immunity is in and of itself hostile to
contexts. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 177-78 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(citing Harlow, in a death penalty case, for the proposition that "[t]he Court certainly has the
authority to expand or contract a common-law doctrine where necessary to serve an important
judicial or societal interest").
123. Central to this new jurisprudence are progressively more stringent standards for
determining that a right was clearly established and progressively greater tolerance for errors of
judgment. A number of cases were important signposts on the road to that tougher standard. See,
e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam) (summarily reversing a denial of
summary judgment in an excessive force case involving the shooting of an unarmed fleeing suspect
because the right not to be shot under the circumstances was not clearly established in a sufficiently
"particularized" way and because "[q]ualified immunity shields an officer from suit when she
makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law
governing the circumstances she confronted"); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (holding that
police officers who use an "objectively unreasonable" amount of force may still be entitled to
qualified immunity in § 1983 actions alleging excessive force if they "reasonably" but mistakenly
believed that the amount of force used was "objectively reasonable"); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.
224, 229 (1991) (per curiam) (applying the rule that the "qualified immunity standard 'gives ample
room for mistaken judgments' by protecting 'all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law"' to summarily reverse factbound denial of immunity) (citations
omitted); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-40 (1987) (holding that the relevant "legal
rule" must be "clearly established" in a specific and "particularized" way).
124. Qualified immunity can be claimed only by real people, not by governmental entities. See
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980) (holding that "municipalities have no
immunity from damages liability flowing from their constitutional violations"). Municipalities
(though not states) can be sued for damages under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (holding that "local governing bodies" can be sued under § 1983 for
"monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief"). Therefore, qualified immunity would only be of
limited effectiveness in dissuading litigation if municipalities were broadly liable under the statute.
However, the Court has been careful to impose substantial limitations on governmental liability
under § 1983, limitations that work in tandem with qualified immunity to immunize much illegal or
unconstitutional conduct from suits for damages. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan
County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (holding that municipal liability cannot be established by
demonstrating that a constitutional violation was attributable to the conduct of a policymaker acting
on behalf of a municipality absent some showing that the municipality itself was a "moving force"
behind the illegal conduct); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981)
(concluding that punitive damages are not available in § 1983 actions against municipalities);
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (holding that municipal liability only attaches when tortious conduct was
the result of an official governmental policy or practice).
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litigation in a direct and unvarnished way, in that it (particularly in
conjunction with other doctrines of official immunity) forecloses liability in a
whole host of situations where an individual has suffered a violation of a
substantial right and sought relief through a remedial mechanism that on its
face promises recovery. 125 The details of the modem immunity doctrines
only reinforce their anti-litigation pedigree. For example, the Court has
created a streamlined summary judgment process for lawsuits against public
officials, allowing for near-automatic interlocutory appeals when a motion
for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is denied and
arguably imposing higher substantive standards to survive summary
judgment in such cases than in other litigation. 126 In so doing, the Court has
been explicit in its rationale, explaining that qualified immunity is meant to
impart protection from the burden of defending against litigation as well as
protection from liability. 2 7 Similarly, despite the technical classification of
qualified immunity as a defense, the burden to prove that a right was clearly

125. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 1, at 482-84; Jackson, supra note 43, at 707. The notion that
the Court's modem decisions restricting the scope of official liability are "activist" in a more
general sense has long been a staple of left-wing criticism of the decisions. See, e.g., David
Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism and the
Restriction of ConstitutionalRights, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 23 (1989).
126. See, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (per curiam) ("Immunity ordinarily
should be decided by the court long before trial."); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985)
(holding a district court's denial of qualified immunity immediately appealable "to the extent that it
turns on an issue of law"); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 n.35 ("reiterat[ing] [an earlier] admonition" that
"insubstantial" suits against governmental officials "undermine the effectiveness of government"
and calling for the "firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" to defeat such claims
at the summary judgment stage).
127. See, e.g., Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-01 ("Where the defendant seeks qualified immunity, a
ruling on that issue should be made early in the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial

are avoided where the defense is dispositive. Qualified immunity is 'an entitlement not to stand trial
or face the other burdens of litigation.' The privilege is 'an immunity from suit rather than a mere
defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously
permitted to go to trial."' (citation omitted) (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526)); Mitchell, 472 U.S.
at 526-27 (holding that qualified immunity doctrine "recognize[s] an entitlement not to stand trial
or face the other burdens of litigation"); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984) ("The qualified
immunity doctrine recognizes that officials can act without fear of harassing litigation only if they
reasonably can anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages and only if
unjustified lawsuits are quickly terminated."); see also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308-09
(1996) (holding that defendants are entitled to immediate appeal of both a motion to dismiss and a
motion for summary judgment in qualified immunity cases because the first serves defendants'
interest in immunity from discovery while the second serves their interest in immunity from trial
process).
This explanation of the role of qualified immunity is a break from the explanation offered during
the early days of the doctrine, in which qualified immunity was portrayed as a shield from ultimate
liability rather than a protection from trial process. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419
& n.13 (1976) ("The procedural difference between the absolute and the qualified immunities is
important. An absolute immunity defeats a suit at the outset, so long as the official's actions were
within the scope of the immunity. The fate of an official with qualified immunity depends upon the
circumstances and motivations of his actions, as established by the evidence at trial.").

2006]

The Court Against the Courts

1133

128
established at the time it was violated rests on the party seeking relief
Finally, the central innovation of the qualified immunity approach to official
immunity is its shift from subjective assessment of the actor's "good faith" to
an objective assessment of the firmness of the underlying legal rules.129 As a
matter of theory, this change reflects a determination that litigation is an
inappropriate mechanism for policing official conduct on the constitutional
margins; as a matter of policy, it makes it substantially easier 13to0 establish
immunity by mooting a previously insuperable problem of proof.
The complicated immunity doctrines that have emerged over the last
1 31
quarter-century serve as common law caveats to statutory exclamations.
That the Court is willing to utilize policy arguments and general speculation
about the purpose of congressional enactments to interpose unwritten
limitations on civil rights plaintiffs is particularly striking given its increasing
unwillingness to credit parallel arguments in favor of implying remedies

128. See, e.g., Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991) ("Qualified immunity is a defense
that must be pleaded by a defendant official."). While the burden of proof is ultimately on the
plaintiff to establish that the official defendant violated a clearly established legal rule, the initial
burden of pleading qualified immunity appears to be on the defendant. See id.; Harlow, 457 U.S. at
815 & n.24 (so stating, albeit fairly early in the development of the doctrine); cf Gomez v. Toledo,
446 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1980) (holding that the burden is on the defendant to plead that she acted in
"good faith" and is, therefore, entitled to "qualified immunity" under the pre-Harlow immunity
standard). But see Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics, Intelligence, & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 166-67 (1993) (reserving the question of whether qualified immunity jurisprudence
imposes a "heightened pleading standard" on those suing public officials for monetary damages
under civil rights statutes).
129. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-19 (executing and justifying the change).
130. The Court offered such justifications explicitly in Harlow. See id. at 815-16 ("The
subjective element of the good-faith defense frequently has proved incompatible with our
admonition in [an earlier case] that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial."); id. at 816
("[A]n official's subjective good faith has been considered to be a question of fact that some courts
have regarded as inherently requiring resolution by a jury."); id. at 816-17 ("[I]t now is clear that
substantial costs attend the litigation of the subjective good faith of government officials. Not only
are there the general costs of subjecting officials to the risks of trial--distraction of officials from
their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from
public service. There are special costs to 'subjective' inquiries of this kind.... Inquiries of this kind
can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government."). Later cases have only been more direct.
See, e.g., Behrens, 516 U.S. at 306 ("Harlow adopted this criterion of 'objective legal
reasonableness,' rather than good faith, precisely in order to 'permit the defeat of insubstantial
claims without resort to trial."').
131. The Court has, on a number of occasions expressly acknowledged that the immunity
doctrines are judge-extrapolated exceptions to categorical statutory text. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Cole,
504 U.S. 158, 163-64 (1992) ("Section 1983 'creates a species of tort liability that on its face
admits of no immunities.' Nonetheless, we have accorded certain government officials either
absolute or qualified immunity from suit...." (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 417)). To be clear,
qualified immunity only so operates in actions brought against state and local officials pursuant to
§ 1983. In actions against federal officials, qualified immunity serves as a common law exception
to a common law remedy. For that reason some commentators have suggested that Harlow itself
was rightly decided but that the Court erred in extending qualified immunity to § 1983 actions. See,
e.g., Garry S. Gildin, Immunizing Intentional Violations of ConstitutionalRights Through Judicial
Legislation: The Extension of Harlow v. Fitzgerald to Section 1983 Actions, 38 EMORY L.J. 369
(1989).
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from silent statutes. 132 When one puts the implied right of action and
qualified immunity cases next to each other, it often appears that the Court's
operative methodology for interpreting remedial statutes is neither strict nor
broad, but instead simply litigation-hostile. The point here is not that the
Court has been wrong to develop fairly strong immunity doctrines in civil
rights cases, but merely that in so doing it has demonstrated a substantive
resistance to litigation that transcends textualist and democratic concerns.
Once again, it is worth noting that the caselaw in this area suggests that
hostility to litigation is a phenomenon that implicated the entire Rehnquist
Court, though affecting each Justice in a different way and to a different
degree. Despite the absence of any text or direct legislative history
supporting judicial extrapolation of substantial immunities from suit under §
1983, all nine Justices are comfortable with at least a fairly broad qualified
immunity doctrine, and all nine have joined opinions expressly praising the
doctrine for forestalling litigation. 134 When the Justices engage each other on
the scope of qualified immunity, they do not dispute its central role or
justification but instead bicker about peripheral concerns such as whether
officials are allowed one or two interlocutory appeals of pretrial denials of
qualified immunity, 135 whether the logic of qualified immunity requires a
heightened pleading standard in order to facilitate summary judgment when

132. For two reasons, the long historical pedigree of official immunity does not explain the
difference. First, the modem doctrine of qualified immunity expressly deviates from traditional
dictates in a number of ways, including its abandonment of a requirement of subjective good faith.
See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-19. As Justice Stevens demonstrated in his dissent in a 1978 case,
even the precursor qualified immunity decisions of the 1970s gave up the pretense of simply
applying common law immunities when they abandoned inquiry into the particular immunities
traditionally accorded to each governmental office for a generalized vision of qualified official
immunity. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 568 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Second,
the argument that current immunity doctrines track traditional common law rules and, thus, must
have been intended by legislators, see, e.g., Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 163-64,--even if true-mirrors a
structurally identical argument about implied private rights of action that has been offered by the
dissenters but rejected by the majority in a number of Rehnquist era cases. See, e.g., Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287-88 (2001) (rejecting an argument based on the "expectations" of the
"enacting Congress").
133. I say that there is no "direct legislative history" in support of qualified immunity (or other
modem immunity doctrines) specifically to acknowledge that the Court has at times defended these
immunity doctrines on grounds of congressional intent. In particular, the Court has argued that, in
some instances, a "tradition of immunity was so firmly rooted in the common law and was
supported by such strong policy reasons that 'Congress would have specifically so provided had it
wished to abolish the doctrine."' Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637 (1980) (quoting
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967)).
134. See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 590-91 (1998) (opinion by Justice Stevens
joined, inter alia, by Justice Breyer); Behrens, 516 U.S. at 306 (opinion joined by seven of the nine
Justices of the second Rehnquist Court, all except Justices Stevens and Breyer); Harlow, 457 U.S. at
816-17 (opinion joined, inter alia, by Justice Stevens).
135. See Behrens, 516 U.S. at 301 (deciding the question of "whether a defendant's immediate
appeal of an unfavorable qualified-immunity ruling on his motion to dismiss deprives the court of
appeals of jurisdiction over a second appeal, also based on qualified immunity, immediately
following denial of summary judgment").
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the substance of the right asserted requires a showing of bad faith, 13 6 and
whether qualified immunity extends to employees of private entities
performing governmental functions on a contractual basis. 137 To the extent
that there is a dispute among the Justices as to the breadth of the underlying
doctrine, their disagreement appears to focus on whether qualified immunity
provides a general immunity for all governmental "mistakes of judgment" or
whether certain lapses38of judgment are sufficiently inexcusable to permit
litigation and liability.'
One intriguing aspect of the doctrinal history of qualified immunity is
the complicated role played by the Court in both fanning the anti-litigation
flames and then imposing limits on the doctrine developed by the most
aggressive circuit courts. Though the modem Court gave birth to qualified
immunity, provided its rationale, and nourished it until it had become an
essential part of federal civil rights law, it has not always been willing to
push the doctrine quite as far as some of the circuit courts. In a handful of
interesting cases, the Court has reversed lower court decisions offering
particularly broad interpretations of the reach or effects of qualified
immunity. 139 That the Court has imposed some limits on its own antilitigation initiative no more disproves the Court's hostility to litigation than
recent decisions declining to push the frontier of the Court's federalism or
takings jurisprudence14 0 disprove the Court's commitment to federalism or
property rights. Nonetheless, the fact that the Court has on occasion had to
serve as a backstop against excessive lower court infatuation with qualified
immunity does remind us that the Court's hostility to litigation co-exists with
a variety of other impulses and ideas, some of which are inherently crosscutting and most of which occasionally must be balanced against the Court's
anti-litigation zeal. 141

136. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. 574.
137. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997).
138. See, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (per curiam) (disagreeing over whether
shooting of suspect was excusable as a matter of law or required jury consideration); Groh v.
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004) (disagreeing over whether mistake in judgment that resulted in
insufficiently particularized search warrant was excusable as a matter of law); Hunter v. Bryant, 502
U.S. 224 (1991) (per curiam) (disagreeing over whether the Secret Service's arrest of an individual
mistakenly thought to be a threat to the President's life was excusable as a matter of law).
139. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (holding that the circuit court erred in
applying a "rigid gloss" to the qualified immunity standard that denied relief to tort plaintiffs if
there was no prior case with "materially similar" facts where a constitutional violation had been
established); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 307 (1995) (unanimously holding, contrary to the
position of a number of circuits, that an order denying summary judgment in a qualified immunity
case because of uncertainty about the factual sufficiency of the allegations was not immediately
appealable).
140. See supra note 52 (citing some such cases).
141. While I speak here primarily of the balancing of semi-rational impulses and influences-a
process that occurs largely off stage-it is worth noting that the Court has, on numerous occasions,
expressly identified qualified immunity doctrine as the result of the careful and explicit balancing of
competing policy interests. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992) ("Qualified
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2. Attorney's Fees in Civil Rights Actions.-Under the traditional
"American Rule," the winning party in a civil lawsuit remains responsible for
his or her own attorney's fees. 142 However, Congress (and state legislatures)
remain free to adopt a different rule for particular causes of action and they
have not been shy to do SO. 14 3 Beginning in the mid-1960s, Congress
gradually adopted a general policy of allowing for attorney's fees in most
major civil rights actions, including actions under several titles of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.'44 This policy was confirmed and rationalized in the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976, which authorized courts to award
fees to "prevailing parties" in actions to enforce the major Reconstruction
Era civil rights statutes, in particular 42 U.S.C. § 1983.145 In the years since
1976, whenever Congress has adopted substantial new civil rights legislation,
it has made sure to authorize the availability of attorney's fees. 146 Congress's
purposeful abandonment of the traditional American Rule in civil rights
cases was motivated by a general desire "to encourage litigation protecting
civil rights" as well as a more specific intent "to enable potential plaintiffs to
obtain the assistance of competent counsel in vindicating their rights."' 147 By
compelling losing parties to subsidize the attorneys of those whose civil
rights they violate, Congress endorsed civil rights litigation as an essential
mechanism of individual dispute resolution and as' 148a legitimate weapon
"securely within the federal law enforcement arsenal.'
Over the last two decades, the Rehnquist Court has handed down a
series of decisions that have chipped away at the availability of attorney's
fees for civil rights plaintiffs. In particular, the Court has fashioned a
definition of "prevailing party" that defines out of that category a wide
variety of plaintiffs with meritorious civil rights claims. In two late-1980s
cases arising out of prisoners' lawsuits, the Court in rapid succession held
that a determination by the federal courts that a petitioner's rights have been
violated without an entry of a formal declaratory judgment or injunction does

immunity strikes a balance between compensating those who have been injured by official conduct
and protecting government's ability to perform its traditional functions.").
142. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819 (1994); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.
v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
143. For a long list of federal statutes that allow for the award of attorney's fees, albeit one that
is twenty years out of date and was never intended to be complete in the first place, see Marek v.
Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43-51 (1985).
144. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 included provisions for fee awards to enforce its Title II
(public accommodations) and Title VII (employment) provisions. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care
Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 622, 635-38 (2001)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (narrating the relevant history).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000).
146. See, e.g., Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601 (noting that the complaint at issue in that case
involved claims under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631, and
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, both of which contained
specific fee-shifting provision modeled on other civil rights statutes).
147. Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 436 (1991).
148. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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not render him a prevailing party, 149 and that a declaratory judgment to the
same effect is itself insufficient if it is entered at a point in time where it does
not provide any substantive benefit to the litigant.' 50 A few years later, the
Court determined that an award of nominal damages does in fact render a
plaintiff eligible for attorney's fees under the fee-shifting statutes, but
nonetheless reversed an award of fees to a victorious litigant on the grounds
that attorney's fees are usually inappropriate when a victorious civil rights
plaintiff asks for substantial damages but receives only nominal ones.' 5 '
Finally, in a hotly contested 2001 case, the Court held-in conflict with the
prevailing rule in the vast majority of the circuits-that a party whose civil
rights lawsuit compels a defendant to abandon an illegal or unconstitutional
practice or rule (and who thereby receives all the relief she sought) is not a
''prevailing party" within the meaning of the statute unless the change is
memorialized and made binding by a judicial decree.152
These decisions, like those in the qualified immunity context,
demonstrate both literal and theoretical hostility to litigation. On the
pragmatic side, these decisions make it more difficult for attorneys to
undertake civil rights litigation, in that they both directly curtail the number
of situations in which the attorney will be able to obtain her fees and portend
an inhospitable welcome if the case should generate a novel question about
the availability of fees. In particular, by limiting the availability of fees to
situations in which the plaintiff obtains a judicially enforceable judgment or
decree that provides significant betterment of his condition (through
substantial damages or a consequential injunction), the decisions require an
attorney considering a civil rights lawsuit to evaluate not only the underlying
merits of the plaintiffs claim but also such extraneous variables as the
likelihood that the action will become moot, the possibility that relief will
come through
non-judicial channels, and the scope of any potential damage
53
award. 1

149. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 759-60 (1987).
150. Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1988) (per curiam).
151. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992).
152. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605 (rejecting the "catalyst theory"). Nine of ten circuit courts
who considered the question in the 1990s had adopted the catalyst theory. See id. at 602 n.3; see
also id. at 622, 626-27 & n.4 (arguing that, prior to a 1994 Fourth Circuit decision, every single
regional circuit had adopted the rule).
153. It should be noted that, while I am generally critical of the Rehnquist Court's hostility to
litigation, I do not mean to suggest that there is a one-to-one correlation between decisions that
reduce the volume of litigation and decisions that are normatively undesirable. To the contrary, the
rapid dismissal of truly meritless claims and the development of alternative mechanisms for
resolving certain types of disputes that do not lend themselves to litigation are worthy goals, no
matter how "hostile to litigation" they may be. While I need not take a position on the ultimate
wisdom of the rules announced in these attorney's fees cases, there are certainly strong arguments to
be made for the proposition that lawyers ought to be encouraged to take into account the likelihood
of a case being moot or the potential scope of damages before determining whether to bring any
action, even a civil rights action. But see supra text accompanying notes 146-151 (explaining that
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By adopting a definition of prevailing party that is so directly tied to the
substantive relief obtained by the plaintiff via judicial decree, the Court also
demonstrates a more general and more theoretical discomfort with an
expansive understanding of litigation's nature, purpose, and domain. These
decisions reflect an understanding of litigation that, however grudgingly,
accepts the utility of court process and professional assistance in obtaining
substantive relief but assumes the illegitimacy of private litigation as a tool
for regaining dignity, vindicating abstract rights, or ensuring compliance with
public norms. These decisions are, to some extent, of a piece with the early
Rehnquist Court's decisions manifesting hostility to structural reform
litigation, 154 but they go beyond those decisions in objecting to nontraditional
litigation even when such litigation poses no threat of over-reaching or antidemocratic judicial155
remedies, involves private defendants, and raises classic
Hohfeldian claims.
In the attorney's fees cases, the Court's analysis bears a somewhat
ambiguous relationship to the majoritarian critique that sometimes decorates
its litigation-hostile decisions. 56 On the one hand, unlike in the qualified
immunity context, 157 the Court's decisions do cite to statutory text in
imposing limitations on litigation. 58 Moreover, in so doing, the Court offers
a forthright analysis of the relevant provision that is, at least superficially,

Congress provided for attorney's fees under the major civil rights statutes in order to allow worthy
litigants to obtain both relief and full compliance with civil rights law).
154. See supra subpart II(A).
155. The term "Hohfeldian" derives from the legal taxonomy developed by Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld.
That taxonomy defines the relationships between legal concepts-right, no-right,
privilege, duty, power, liability, immunity, and disability-as either opposite or correlative. For
example, if A has a right to possess a piece of property, B has no-right to it (an opposite) and a duty
not to trespass (a correlative). A's liberty, therefore, depends on whether B's duty is enforced. See
generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917) (developing a taxonomy ofjural opposites and correlatives to
clarify formal legal thought); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal ConceptionsAs
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) (same). In the late 1960s and 1970s, some
modern civil rights litigation-in particular structural reform litigation-was described (and at
times derided) as "non-Hohfeldian" because it involved attempts to assert the rights of and obtain
relief for third parties. See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in PublicActions: The NonHohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff,116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968). See generally Morrison, supra
note 62 (discussing the Rehnquist Court's attitude towards non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs). My point
here is non-technical; I mean only to note that the Rehnquist Court's hostility to civil rights
litigation extends to situations where a single individual asserts violations of a personal or property
right against another individual and seeks directly proportionate recompense from that individual, a
traditional use of the legal system considered legitimate by just about every commentator who has
discussed the proper scope of litigation.
156. See supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 134-135 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603-08 (discussing the meaning of the statutory term
"prevailing party" with reference to both plain meaning of terms and legislative history and
detailing similar efforts of the Supreme Court in all other significant cases setting limits on the
availability of attorney's fees).
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plausible.' 59 On the other hand, the Court's over-arching approach to
interpreting the fee statutes is in substantial tension with the policy choices
Congress has made. Where Congress appears to have made a concerted
effort to develop private civil rights litigation as an important mechanism for
enforcing communal norms and making real our commitment to civic
equality, the Court reads the statutes almost exclusively as a mechanism for
ensuring access to the civil courts for litigants possessing particularly
substantial claims for personalized relief. Where Congress has specifically
delineated civil rights litigation as a different species of litigation in which

recoupment of attorney's fees is the norm, the Court has continued to
interpret civil rights fee-shifting statutes narrowly, relying on the general
presumptive rule against fee shifting that Congress considered and largely
rejected when designing the relevant statutory scheme. In interpreting
statutes drafted to facilitate litigation through a filter of litigation skepticism,
the Court is paying heed to Congress's notes while missing its tone.
C. EmbracingArbitration:Deprivilegingthe Courts
1. The Rehnquist Court and the Federal Arbitration Act.-In
understanding the nature of the Rehnquist Court's hostility to litigation, the
Court's decisions interpreting the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) 160 are another important subject of inquiry. In over twenty decisions
spread roughly evenly over the last two decades, the Rehnquist Court has
given the FAA an increasingly prominent role in shaping the contours of
American dispute resolution. 16
Endorsing a formulation coined in an
159. See id.; see also id. at 610-16 (Scalia, J., concurring) (offering a more detailed argument
in favor of a narrow reading of "prevailing party" focused on the term's history). The thrust of the
argument, as reflected in both the Buckhannon majority and concurrence, is that "prevailing party"
is a term of art with a fixed and limited meaning. See id. at 603 ("In designating those parties
eligible for an award of litigation costs, Congress employed the term 'prevailing party,' a legal term
of art."); id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("'Prevailing party' is not some newfangled legal term
invented for use in late-20th-century fee-shifting statutes.").
160. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
161. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003) (holding that the FAA
requires an arbitrator rather than a state court to determine in the first instance whether an
arbitration agreement allows for class action arbitration); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532
U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (narrowly construing an FAA provision excluding from its pro-arbitration
mandate 'contracts of employment of ... workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce'"
(quoting 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000))); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000)
(holding, inter alia, that a litigant bears the burden of establishing that the high costs of arbitration
would thwart her effort to vindicate statutory rights); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson,
513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995) (holding that the FAA applies to all transactions within Congress's
Commerce Clause power); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991)
(holding that, under the FAA, statutory anti-discrimination claims can be subjected to compulsory
arbitration); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 490 U.S. 477, 479-80 (1989) (holding
that the FAA permits agreements requiring arbitration of federal securities law claims); cf
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1984) (holding, in a decision that slightly predates
the Rehnquist era but was repeatedly reinforced during that period, that the FAA's requirements
regarding enforcement of arbitration agreements apply in state as well as federal courts).
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opinion issued shortly before the Rehnquist era formally began,16 2 the Court
has repeatedly asserted that the FAA states a "liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements" and has utilized that policy as a blunt tool to resolve
1 63
nearly every issue of statutory construction regarding the statutory scheme.
In short order, the Court has determined that the FAA applies with full force
to disputes between employers and employees, 164 treats form agreements
between large entities and individual citizens as if they were fully bargained
private contracts,1 65 considers arbitration to be a sufficient forum for the
vindication of most statutory rights (including central civil rights
provisions), 166 mandates the arbitration of claims brought in state as well as
federal court, 16167 8and preempts states from adopting rules that protect access
to their courts.
The Court has been uncommonly frank about its reasons for favoring
arbitration. In case after case, the Justices, at times unanimously, have
indicated that the FAA was adopted with the specific purpose of abrogating
69
the Anglo-American legal system's traditional hostility to arbitration.'
Seeing their purpose as uprooting a longstanding institutional bias against
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, the Justices have taken that role
seriously-creating a blanket rule that resolves every close issue of
construction in favor of arbitration. 70 In large measure, the Justices see the

162. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
163. See, e.g., Randolph, 531 U.S. at 91 (quoting the above principle); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25
(same); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (same).
164. See, e.g., Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109 (addressing the scope of exclusion from the FAA of
certain categories of employment contracts); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 & n.2 (age discrimination claim
between employer and employee).
165. See, e.g., Randolph, 531 U.S. at 82; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2 (form securities regulation
application).
166. See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-27 (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Rodriguez
de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 486 (1989) (Securities Act of 1933); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and the
Securities Act of 1934).
167. The main precedent in this area is a decision from the immediate pre-Rehnquist Court era,
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1984), which held that the FAA's requirements
regarding enforcement of arbitration agreements apply in state as well as federal court. The
Rehnquist Court has consistently applied that decision, despite some substantial doctrinal
misgivings. For a brief discussion of this issue, see infra note 176.
168. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (the FAA preempts a
Montana statute requiring that an arbitration clause be indicated on the first page of a contract in
prominent font); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (the FAA preempts
an Alabama statute imposing restrictions on availability of arbitration); Perry, 482 U.S. at 491
(1987) (the FAA preempts a California law guaranteeing access to courts in wage collection
actions).
169. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 118; Randolph, 531 U.S. at 89; Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 272;
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 225.
170. This rule of construction has been stated in various forms. See, e.g., supra text
accompanying notes 162-163 (noting the Rehnquist Court's frequent reference to the FAA's
"liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements"); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475 (1989) (stating that arbitration agreements must be
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FAA not as a specific statute authorizing deviation from a traditional rule in a
limited set of circumstances in order to achieve particular policy ends, but
rather as a general effort to normalize arbitration as a method of dispute
resolution. Central to that task is the conviction-shared, in the telling, by
the statute's drafters and the majority of the modem Court-that arbitration
is, in most instances, a substantively adequate1 7and procedurally preferable
alternative to the mire and expense of litigation. 1
At a minimum, the Court's commitment to destigmatizing arbitration is
functionally hostile to litigation, in that it works to shift disputes-often in
large volume-from the institution of Litigation to alternative, culturally
distinct forums. Moreover, as indicated above, it does so in large measure
out of the conviction--openly voiced only on occasion but always presentthat there is nothing intrinsically special or desirable about litigation as a
method for resolving disputes. Litigation is sheered of its special status
(ostensibly by Congress) and made to compete against other dispute
resolution models for that heavy work, and to do so on a playing field that
values efficiency and flexibility above all else.
Some have argued that the Court's broad construction of the FAA also
reflects hostility to litigation in a broader and more colloquial sense.
According to this reading, what started out as an honest effort to enforce
Congress's intention to put arbitration on an even footing with litigation as
potential mechanisms for resolving commercial disputes has morphed over
the last two decades into a policy-driven assault on the wisdom and propriety
of litigation as a mechanism for resolving such disputes. 172 As Justice
Stevens, probably the strongest proponent of this view on the current Court,

"generously construed as to issues of arbitrability" (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985))); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) ("The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law,
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration,
whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.").
171. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 280 (talking about "arbitration's advantages" including
the fact that it can be "cheaper," "faster," and "simpler" than litigation); Volt Info. Scis., 489 U.S. at
478 (referring to a Congressional policy to "encourage the expeditious resolution of disputes"); see
also supra note 166 (listing some cases where the Court has found arbitration a sufficient forum for
the vindication of important federal statutory rights); cf. Randolph, 531 U.S. at 79 (dismissing
concerns about the procedural fairness of arbitration for less informed and poorer citizens).
172. This view has been voiced by both internal and external critics. See, e.g., Paul D.
Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 401 (arguing
that the Supreme Court's arbitration jurisprudence will allow "birds of prey" to "sup on workers,
consumers, shippers, passengers, and franchisees"); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to
Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Right Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration,
1997 Wis. L. REV. 33, 36 ("The Supreme Court has created a monster."); Jean R. Sternlight,
Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preferencefor Binding Arbitration: A
Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separationof Powers,and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REv.
1 (1997) (critiquing arbitration caselaw for increasingly favoring arbitral forums without regard for
basic fairness or rule of law norms); infra note 173 and accompanying text (quoting Justice
Stevens).
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has argued, the Court's recent decisions "have pushed the pendulum far
beyond a neutral attitude and
173 endorsed a policy that strongly favors private
arbitration" over litigation.
Whether the Rehnquist Court's cases offering an expansive
interpretation of the FAA are aimed at deprivileging litigation or more
broadly at destabilizing it, and concomitantly whether the driving force
behind this interpretive thrust is the drafters of the statute or the current
Justices, are difficult and important analytic questions, but, for our purposes,
they are only disputes about the degree to which the decisions are hostile to
litigation. The decisions boldly, repeatedly, and explicitly call for the courts
to shepherd more and more cases out their own courthouse doors and into the
hands of arbitrators, and do so in language suggesting that little, if anything,
is lost by that shift.
As in the other areas surveyed above, the details of the cases tell us a
great deal about the nature of the Rehnquist Court's hostility to litigation.
For example, once again we can note that the Court's entire membership has
participated in the development of a litigation-hostile doctrinal field (though,
again, approaching the task with differing degrees of zeal). 17 4 Similarly, this
area of the law gives us the first hint of an aspect of the Rehnquist Court's
hostility to litigation that will be the subject of substantial comment later in
this Article: 175 when hostility to litigation comes into conflict with
federalism, this strongly pro-federalism court will nonetheless sacrifice that
value in order to keep the courts inaccessible. 7 6 Finally, as in the areas of
173. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 105, 131-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. A few recent cases raising basic concerns about the availability of justice have seen the
four more liberal members of the Court dissent as a bloc. See, e.g., Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 124
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Randolph, 531 U.S. at 92 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In addition, in a few
cases, some of the more conservative justices have dissented or otherwise voiced displeasure due to
their overarching commitment to federalism. See infra note 176 (discussing the separate opinions in
Allied-Bruce). However, some of the opinions cited in this Part have been joined by most of the
Justices and all of the Justices have joined some of the opinions. The participation of the Court's
left wing in the modem arbitration jurisprudence is underscored by the identity of the author of the
choice phrases in the Moses H. Cone case: Justice Brennan.
175. See infra subpart IV(B) (tracing this theme).
176. See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (holding that the FAA preempts state
law protecting access to courts in wage collection actions); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,
11-12 (1984) (holding that the FAA's requirements regarding enforcement of arbitration
agreements apply in state as well as federal court). While the Court, with at least the occasional
vote of every Justice but Justice Thomas has applied the FAA in state court and has read the statute
as having broad preemptive effect, most of the strong advocates of federalism have questioned those
decisions and have, on occasion, called for their overruling. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce, 515 U.S. at 282
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting her dissent from Southland and stating that she still believes it
wrongly decided, but arguing that the decision is now sufficiently entrenched that only Congress
can overrule it); id. at 284 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling for overruling Southland but determining
to enforce it until there are sufficient votes to overrule it); id. at 285 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (calling
for the overruling of Southland); Southland, 465 U.S. at 21 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting from initial decision). It is unclear whether there ever existed a majority on the
Rehnquist Court for abandoning Southland. If there did, the fact that the Court never got around to
it reflects that restoring a federalist balance on this issue was not a particular priority. If there did
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implied private rights of action and official immunity,177 the Justices on all
sides of each decision aggressively claim the support of history for their
approach and work assiduously to craft historical narratives that validate
their own approach and mark any contrary position as not only wrong, but
also fundamentally illegitimate. 178 Particularly noticeable in this area, the
tendency to claim that decisions hostile to litigation (or dissents from such
decisions) are the necessary consequence of an independently unfurling
historical course seems driven by a desire-perhaps unconscious-to mask
the degree to which these crucially important decisions about the nature of
our courts are being made by the current Justices.
2. An Intriguing Episode of Indecision.-The degree to which the
current Court's hostility to litigation is under-theorized is made manifest by
the Court's confused reaction to the legal issues posed by one 2003 case,
Green Tree FinancialCorp. v. Bazzle.179 Bazzle presented the Court with its
first opportunity to confront a development in arbitration practice that
threatens to perplex the Justices in coming years: the push by plaintiffs'
lawyers (and some state judges) to build class certification and other aspects
of contemporary mass litigation practice into compelled arbitrations.1 80 That

not, that fact may have had a lot to do with the degree to which some of the more conservative
Justices came to appreciate the anti-litigation (and pro-business) consequences of the rule.
177. See supra subparts III(A)-(B).
178. Compare, for example, the two diametrically different accounts of the statute's history
provided by the majority and dissenting opinions in CircuitCity, 532 U.S. at 105 (majority) and id.
at 124 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Southland, 465 U.S. at 21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(contending that the majority's conclusion was wrong as a matter of statutory construction and that
"[o]ne rarely finds a legislative history as unambiguous as the FAA's").
179. 539 U.S. 444 (2003). Bazzle involved two actions in which different groups of
homeowners sought damages from the same lending company based on alleged violations of a state
consumer protection statute. The company sought to compel arbitration pursuant to a standard
contract that the homeowners had signed, and the homeowners countered by requesting that the
arbitration, if ordered, be conducted as a class action proceeding. In a series of procedurally
complicated rulings, the courts ultimately compelled arbitration and the courts and the arbitrator
determined that the arbitrations would proceed as class actions. After substantial judgments were
entered in both cases and confirmed by the state courts, the lender sought relief from the United
States Supreme Court, arguing that the decision to proceed as a class action was contrary to the
terms of the relevant arbitration agreement and, thus, violated the FAA. Id. at 447-50.
180. For a general discussion of the emergence of class action arbitration, see Jean R.
Stemlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action
Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000). For academic discussion of Bazzle, see Imre S.
Szalai, The New ADR: Aggregate Dispute Resolution and Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 41
CAL. W. L. REV. 1 (2004), and The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 226, 410-20 (2003) [hereinafter HarvardNote]. It should be noted that, while these articlesand the larger academic literature on the Supreme Court's current arbitration jurisprudence--frame
the relevant issues in doctrinal rather than cultural terms, they express similar interest and confusion
about whether the Supreme Court's arbitration jurisprudence will ultimately produce a relatively
equitable dispute resolution culture or will instead effectively close off meaningful review for many
employees and consumers. For another work speculating fairly overtly on these issues in the
employment law context, see Dennis R. Nolan, Employment Arbitration After Circuit City, 41
BRANDEIS L.J. 853 (2003).
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practice and others like it,1 81 which individually and collectively have the
effect of making arbitration look a lot more like litigation, serve as something
of a diagnostic test for the Justices' hostility to litigation, requiring the
Justices to ask what it is precisely about litigation that triggers their disfavor.
If, the Justices' antipathy towards the institution of Litigation stems
largely from distrust of or disappointment with the courts or the judges who
staff them, then the Justices ought have little stake in the procedures that are
adopted in alternative dispute resolution forums. Having succeeded in
deprivileging the formal courts and ensuring that parties who wish to do so
can guarantee themselves an arbitral forum (and veto power over the legal
and factual decisionmaker), the Court's work is largely done. If some
lawyers, judges, or advocates want to use creative mass settlement
procedures to solve some of the equity and access questions that arise out of
compelled arbitration, that is no business of the Court; it is instead a policy
matter to be worked out through the normal interplay of state statutes,
common law rules, and privately drafted agreements.
If, on the other hand, the impulse nourishing the Court's hostility to
litigation and contributing to its arbitration jurisprudence reflects not only a
distrust of the courts but also a deeper set of concerns about the cost of
litigation, the explosion of liability for trivial offenses, and the manipulation
of class action procedures, then it is imperative for the Court to police the
actions of state courts and arbitrators to ensure that they do not turn
arbitrations into a species of expensive, meddlesome private litigation. On
this reading, it is not our over-reliance on courts or the anti-democratic nature
of court-driven remediation efforts that trouble the Justices, but instead the
very culture of modem civil litigation. Transplanting that culture into
another forum does nothing to alleviate the problem; it simply poisons that
forum.
In Bazzle, this deep theoretical question was complicated by a less
weighty but equally cross-cutting question: who gets to decide whether
contracts allow for class action arbitration. This question similarly highlights
strains in the Court's underlying anti-litigation impulse, at least as mobilized
in the arbitration context. On the one hand, a decision granting that authority
unequivocally to arbitrators would demonstrate further respect for their
abilities and for the integrity of alternative dispute resolution forums; as such

Though the Court's reaction to arbitrations that share essential characteristics of litigation is
certain to come up in future litigation, it is possible that the specific issue addressed in Bazzle (the
propriety of class arbitration when the relevant contract is silent on the matter) may not arise again,
as proactive businesses have been routinely including express prohibitions on class action
arbitration in their agreements. For a general discussion of that movement and speculation that the
propriety of those clauses will eventually make their way to the high court, see Harvard Note,
supra, at 410-11, 415-20.
181. Cf Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995) (involving a
dispute about the propriety of awarding punitive damages in a securities arbitration).
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it would be a step towards institutional parity between courts and alternative
forums. On the other hand, if the Court conceptualizes the FAA as
manifesting a desire to protect businesses who so contract from the substance
of modem civil litigation-the costs, the inconveniences, the general mirethen it is important to locate the power to make that determination with the
onset of the proceeding
entity best poised to make that determination at the 82
review.'
appellate
to
subject
manner
a
and to do so in
The decision in Bazzle did little to reveal the Court's resolution of these
issues, but it did highlight the degree to which they befuddle the Justices.
Though none of the Justices directly addressed the wisdom or propriety of
infusing class action mechanisms into private arbitration, the Chief Justice's
dissenting opinion (joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy) strongly
suggested that its signers disfavored such a hybrid institution and would
prefer legal rules that limit its development,' 83 while Justice Stevens's
opinion hinted that he saw no problem with such a development.' 84 The
remaining five Justices found doctrinal reasons to avoid commenting-even
obliquely--on this broader issue, as the plurality opinion spoke only to the
second procedural issue' 85 and Justice Thomas declined to reach either
question on federalism grounds.' 86 These fractured opinions left the Court
literally paralyzed with indecision and would have put the Court in the very
rare position of being unable to issue a judgment if Justice Stevens had not
his vote against his favored
taken the even rarer step of expressly casting
87
disposition in order to produce a judgment.'

182. Moreover, in the case at issue, Justices who might take this more substantive anti-litigation
tack were confronted with a completed dispute resolution process that had utilized class action
procedures and produced enormous judgments for relatively technical statutory violations. In
considering whether to locate the power within the judiciary, they had the tempting opportunity to
immediately invalidate a proceeding that likely rankled.
183. See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 455 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the decision as to
whether a contract allows class action arbitration belongs to the courts, that the South Carolina
courts' conclusion on this matter directly contravenes the language of the contract and the proarbitration purposes of the FAA, and that the common law developed in the South Carolina courts'
decisions should, therefore, be preempted).
184. See id. at 454 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (arguing that
"[tihere is nothing in the Federal Arbitration Act that precludes" the South Carolina courts'
determinations and that the decision below should be affirned).
185. See id. at 447 (plurality opinion of Breyer, J.) (arguing that the decision as to whether the
contract allowed class action arbitration belonged to the arbitrator and vacating the decision and
sending it back to the arbitrator for a determination since the arbitrator had not had an untainted
opportunity to make that finding). Though the Court was able to obtain a judgment in support of
remand, it could not even definitively resolve this lesser issue. See, e.g., Szalai, supra note 180, at
17-30 (observing that Justice Stevens sent conflicting signals on this issue while Justice Thomas
declined to speak to it at all, leaving the Court divided 4-3 on the issue and its ultimate resolution
up in the air).
186. See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 460 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that he would leave the
judgment below "undisturbed" because the FAA should not be read to apply in state courts).
187. See id. at 454-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) ("[For the
reasons stated above], I would simply affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina.
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D. Punitive Damages and the Due Process Clause: ConstitutionalizingTort
Reform
1. Punitive Damages and Anti-Litigation Zeal.-The flowering of a

constitutional law of punitive damages was yet another important antilitigation development of the Rehnquist years. In a sixteen year period, the
Court considered at least eight significant constitutional challenges to state
court awards of punitive damages, gradually adopting a series of
progressively more intrusive federal doctrines limiting the availability 189
of
such damages. 188

These well-known

and much-debated

decisions

proceeded in overlapping stages, first providing significant procedural
protections to defendants,

90

then affirming the general principle that the

Constitution imposes substantive limitations on the amount of damages,' 9'

Were I to adhere to my preferred disposition of the case, however, there would be no controlling
judgment of the Court. In order to avoid that outcome, and because Justice Breyer's opinion
expresses a view of the case close to my own, I concur in the judgment.").
188. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (striking down
a damage award as excessive); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424,
426, 448 (2001) (holding that appellate courts should review trial court determinations as to the
constitutionality of punitive damage awards de novo); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,
585-86 (1996) (striking down a damage award as excessive); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S.
415, 418 (1994) (holding that the lax standard for appellate review of punitive damages mandated
by the Oregon Constitution violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); TXO
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 446, 465-66 (1993) (reviewing a punitive damage
award for excessiveness but finding it within constitutional limits); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991) (reviewing both Alabama's method of assessing punitive damages
and the magnitude of an award in a particular case but finding no constitutional problem);
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259-60 (1989) (holding that the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not apply to punitive damage awards and
declining to set aside a punitive damage award as excessive); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw,
486 U.S. 71, 76-80 (1988) (discussing but declining to answer on prudential grounds major
constitutional questions regarding punitive damage awards).
189. For one fine example among the many recent articles that chronicle these decisions, see
Michael P. Allen, The Supreme Court, Punitive Damages andState Sovereignty, 13 GEO. MASON L.
REv. 1 (2004). The Allen article also provides a mini-bibliography of the recent discourse on
punitive damages. See id. at 3 n.7 (citing articles praising and critiquing the Supreme Court's
punitive damage decisions); id. at 8 n.22 (citing articles discussing the history of punitive damages);
id. at 8 n.23 (citing articles discussing the normative purposes of punitive damages). For one
particularly interesting contribution to the debate about the proper normative conceptualization of
punitive damages, see Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE
L.J. 347, 355 (2003).
190. See, e.g., Honda Motor Co., 512 U.S. at 418 (striking down an Oregon appellate review
provision on procedural due process grounds); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 499 U.S. at 23-24
(approving of procedural protections provided by Alabama and relying, in large part on those
protections, to validate a large punitive damage award).
191. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 446, 465-66 (reviewing award of punitive
damages for excessiveness and finding it within constitutional limits); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 449
U.S. at 23-24 (same).
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and finally framing and applying 1specific
constitutional standards to strike
92
down "excessive" damage awards.
On their face, these decisions serve anti-litigation ends, reducing the
available universe of remedies and discouraging litigation in situations where
economic harms are minimal or difficult to establish. 1 93 In particular, the
decisions serve to reduce the utility of litigation as a tool for ensuring
corporate compliance with legal and ethical norms,' 94 a fact underscored by
the substantial resources and energies American95 business has poured into
arguing for these new constitutional protections.
Moreover, these decisions reflect an anti-litigation impulse that
transcends their direct consequences. As the Justices have occasionally let
slip, the pressure to develop this previously barren constitutional comer
stems largely from their conviction that punitive damage awards have "run
wild., 196 In expounding that view, and in shifting constitutional doctrine to
attempt to alleviate the problem, the Justices are both embracing and
perpetuating a critique of the modem American tort regime that is both
widely held and extremely controversial. According to this critique, the
American system of compensation for private injuries is desperately out of
control, producing untold riches for plaintiffs' lawyers and mammoth
rewards for a handful of lucky litigants, warping the incentive structures for
businesses and professionals, and causing a concomitant loss of efficiency

192. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 429 (striking down award of damages as excessive); BMW,
517 U.S. at 585-86 (same).
193. In theory, cases where compensatory damages are minimal might still be brought as class
action lawsuits, and many such suits are filed. However, due both to the substantive and procedural
requirements of class action law and the practicalities of class action litigation, class action lawsuits
are not always easy to file and settlements in those actions often fail to approach full value. Though
this area has not been a major front in the Rehnquist Court's anti-litigation crusade, the Court's few
decisions in this area have largely been litigation-hostile. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527
U.S. 815, 864-65 (1999) (refusing to certify a class containing both present and future claim
holders); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (same).
194. The two cases where the Supreme Court has overturned large punitive damage awards
illustrate this fact, as both involved questionable corporate conduct that likely (but not definitively)
violated legal rules in at least some jurisdictions, but did not necessarily lend themselves to
individualized enforcement actions. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 413-14 (involving an insurance
company conducting the defense of its insured in a manner that put its own interests ahead of those
of its policyholder); BMW, 517 U.S. at 563-64 (involving the failure to disclose minor repairs to
purchasers of vehicles being marketed as new).
195. Note for example the enormous list of high-priced legal talent participating in the drafting
of amicus briefs in each of the punitive damage cases. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 499 U.S. at
3 (listing counsel).
196. Id. at 18; see also, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 472-73 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the new constitutional law of punitive damages is designed "to restore fairness in
what is rapidly becoming an arbitrary and oppressive system"); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc.
v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O'Connor, J., joined by Stevens J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (complaining that "[alwards of punitive damages are skyrocketing" and
discussing the "detrimental effect" on the American economy of that trend).
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and societal wealth. 97 Importantly, this overarching critique of the alleged
tort crisis is not aimed exclusively-or even primarily-at popular
susceptibility to maudlin or demagogic appeals or even at broader cultural
attitudes about risk and reward, but rather at the legal system that provides a
forum for such attitudes.
Punitive damages have become a lightening rod in the popular debate
over tort reform not only because they represent a substantial share of the
costs of our current regime, but also because they appear by their very nature
to be artificial, a creature of our legal regime rather than a reflection of an
underlying physical or economic reality.' 98 Though punitive damages have a
long pedigree in Anglo-American jurisprudence, their availability in the end
reflects a policy choice, one which increasing numbers of politicians and
theorists have come to question. 199 Moreover, as critics of the current system

197. Within the Court, the most explicit statement of this critique comes from Justice
O'Connor. See, for example, Justice O'Connor's opinion in Browning-Ferris:
Awards of punitive damages are skyrocketing. As recently as a decade ago, the largest
award of punitive damages affirmed by an appellate court in a products liability case
was $250,000. Since then, awards more than 30 times as high have been sustained on
appeal. The threat of such enormous awards has a detrimental effect on the research
and development of new products. Some manufacturers of prescription drugs, for
example, have decided that it is better to avoid uncertain liability than to introduce a
new pill or vaccine into the market. Similarly, designers of airplanes and motor
vehicles have been forced to abandon new projects for fear of lawsuits that can often
lead to awards of punitive damages.
492 U.S. at 282 (citations omitted). For a representative external expression of the critique,
interesting only because of the identity of the author, Theodore B. Olson, see Was Justice Served?,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1995, at A14 ("The civil justice system seems ... demented, with freakish
punitive damage bonanzas for persons who pour coffee on themselves or ricochet golf balls into
their own foreheads." (quoting Olson)). The argument that there is a "tort crisis" afoot has gained
significant initial traction from the work of a number of legal scholars. See, e.g., George L. Priest,
The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1552-60 (1987) (arguing
that tort law at the time had restricted the availability of insurance, creating an insurance crisis);
George L. Priest, Puzzles of the Tort Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 497, 497 (1987) (arguing that the
"single most important phenomenon of the recent tort crisis.., is the withdrawal of the insurance
industry from the business of insurance"). But the idea has also been the subject of much
subsequent academic criticism. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims,
48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443, 447 (1987) ("The real tort crisis is old, not new. It is a crisis ofunderclaiming
rather than overclaiming."); Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in
Crisis? New EmpiricalEvidence, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 315, 396 (1999) ("There are problems in the tort
system, just as there are difficulties in every complex organization, but the crisis described by most
tort reformers does not exist.").
198. See, e.g., State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416 ("[I]n our judicial system compensatory and
punitive damages, although usually awarded at the same time by the same decisionmaker, serve
different purposes. Compensatory damages 'are intended to redress the concrete loss that the
plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant's wrongful conduct."' (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc.
v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) (citations omitted)); see also Cooper
Indus., 532 U.S. at 432 (arguing similarly); BMW, 517 U.S. at 568 (tying the existence of punitive
damages to the "state's legitimate interest" rather than that of private parties).
199. See, e.g., James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic that has
Outlived its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1154-65 (1984) (arguing that the punitive damages
system is undesirable theoretically, legally, and economically); Helen Dewar, Senate GOP Is
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have sharpened their attack on punitive damages, they have increasingly
questioned whether the perpetuation of such damages continues to reflect a
majoritarian political choice or instead reflects only the entrenched interests
of lawyers and judges, who profit respectively from the substantial fees
produced by large damage awards and the power implicit in formulating the
rules that govern American business practices.200 Finally, the evolution of
punitive damages into a significant method of aggregate dispute resolution
has triggered further concerns about their legitimacy, transplanting into this
context familiar debates about the appropriateness of litigation for resolving
complicated, policy-ridden, multi-party disputes.2 1
Particularly when viewed in the context of the national tort reform
movement, the Rehnquist Court's decision to take on the project of
developing a constitutional law of punitive damages is big news. Here,
unlike in the other areas thus far discussed,2 2 the Justices are not simply
interpreting statutes or crafting common law doctrines that might be
overturned by congressional enactment. Instead, they are taking the bold
step of determining that certain aspects of our existing litigation culture so
transcend the Constitution's basic fairness norms that they are per se
verboten. Leaving aside for the purposes of this Article the endlessly
complicated question of whether our constitutional regime empowers judges
to read into the Constitution prohibitions on a narrow set of particularly
odious policy choices,20 3 what is notable is the Court's decision to add the
tolerance of certain seemingly excessive punitive damage awards to the short
list of substantive policies that cross that threshold and are thus prohibited by
the Due Process Clause. It is hard to imagine better evidence regarding the
centrality of the Court's hostility to litigation.
2. Some Lessons from the Punitive Damages Cases.-Like all the other
doctrinal areas examined, the realm of punitive damages provides further
pointillist evidence as to the nature and substance of the Rehnquist Court's
hostility to litigation. First, as suggested above, the development of antipunitive damage law suggests that, contrary to the suggestion of other

Blocked on Court Award Limits, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2003, at A4 (describing closely fought
congressional battles over tort reform and punitive damages).
200. For the view that lawyers and our litigation culture are to blame, see, for example, PHILIP
K. HOWARD, THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMON GOOD: How AMERICA'S LAWSUIT CULTURE
UNDERMINES OUR FREEDOM 56-62 (2001).

201. For the best general discussion of how we ought to come to terms with the fact that
punitive damages have become a form of aggregate settlement, see Sharkey, supra note 189.
Compare supra subpart III(A) on the Rehnquist Court's skepticism about the role of the courts in
resolving policy-ridden, multi-party disputes.
202. See generally discussion supra subparts II(A)-(C).
203. Justices Scalia and Thomas have dissented from the most recent decisions on the grounds
that courts lack such authority. See, e.g., State Farm, 538 U.S. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at
429-30 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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commentators,2 °4 the Rehnquist Court's hostility to litigation cannot be
cabined to non-constitutional cases. To the contrary, a majority of the
Justices--expressly motivated by a growing concern with the fairness and
efficacy of our modern litigation culture-affirmatively turned to the
Constitution for a remedy, extrapolating novel limitations on the civil
litigation process from the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. As
my discussion of other areas of the Court's jurisprudence will demonstrate,2 °5
this is not an isolated instance of the Court's policy fears overrunning its best
constitutional impulses, but rather an example of the degree to which a
cultured antipathy towards litigation has become a fundamental filament of
the Court's judicial philosophy.
Second, these decisions suggest that the Court's hostility to the
institution of Litigation transcends concerns about the institutional
competence of the courts and incorporates a fundamental, substantive distrust
for the specific processes and doctrines that structure the modern litigation
enterprise.20 6 While I remain convinced that the Court's hostility to litigation
is, at most, only partially theorized, these decisions in both words and deed
target very specific aspects of our litigation culture: non-compensatory
damages that have "run wild,, 20 7 local courts that impose sanctions intended
not only to settle the dispute before them but also to punish and deter conduct
aimed at non-parties,20 8 and lawyers who use the scale and expense of
modern litigation to exact settlements without a finding of liability.20 9 These
opinions enacting constitutional tort reform, no less than the speeches calling
for statutory tort reform, echo with a critique of the institution of Litigation
that is particularized and firmly grounded in the authors' perceptions of our
contemporary dispute resolution culture.
Finally, the punitive damages cases remind us that hostility to litigation,
while central to the Court's collective intellectual matrix, is in constant
competition with other themes and influences as the Justices intellectually

204. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 62, at 343-45 (limiting his discussion of similar issues to
"subconstitutional matters" and drawing a dividing line between the Court's "passivity" on such
matters and its "constitutional activism").
205. See infra Part IV (discussing constitutional federalism cases); Part V (discussing the
Court's constitutional analysis in the 2000 presidential election cases).
206. Cf supra subpart III(C) (arguing that the Court's arbitration decisions support two
different readings of the wellsprings of the Court's anti-litigation impulse, one more substantive and

particularized than the other).
207. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (noting the Court's
ongoing "concern about punitive damages that 'run wild"').
208. See, e.g., State Farm, 538 U.S at 420 (explaining that one of the things that made the
award constitutionally suspect was that "[tlhis case.. . was used as a platform to expose, and
punish, the perceived deficiencies of State Farm's operations throughout the country"); id. at 423
("Due process does not permit courts, in the calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the
merits of other parties' hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise of the
reprehensibility analysis ....
").
209. Cf., e.g., id. at 422 (noting that "much" of the underlying conduct that contributed to the
high punitive damage award in the case was "lawful where it occurred").
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and viscerally process novel issues. This is most vividly illustrated by the
sharp divisions among the Justices provoked by the shift in focus from
procedural to substantive limitations on state court punitive damage awards.
While all (or almost all) 210 of the Justices express at least some degree of
frustration with the modem litigation culture, some of the Court's most
conservative members dissent from the imposition of substantive due process
limits on the ground that such a limitation-while perhaps wise-is not
properly discernible from the Constitution.2 1 Intriguingly, the drive for
substantive constitutional review of punitive damage awards is led by some
of the Court's more liberal and moderate members, jurists who in other
contexts manifest substantial hostility to litigation but by no means lead the
Court in the intensity of their hostility. 212 It seems that the willingness of the

210. The possible exception is Justice Ginsburg who, since she has joined the Court, has joined
none of the decisions imposing constitutional limitations on punitive damages. But see State Farm,
538 U.S. at 431 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The large size of the award upheld by the Utah Supreme
Court in this case indicates why damages-capping legislation may be altogether fitting and
proper.").
211. Justices Scalia and Thomas have consistently dissented on this ground. See, e.g., State
Farm, 538 U.S. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 429-30 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice
Ginsburg, a relative liberal, has also consistently dissented, though on slightly more ambiguous
grounds. See, e.g., State Farm, 538 U.S. at 430-31 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (rejecting the rule of
BMW and State Farm, primarily for historical and federalism-tinged policy reasons); BMW, 517
U.S. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (same). Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented from BMW (and
from some of the preliminary cases laying the groundwork for BMW and State Farm)-see,e.g., id.
(joining Justice Ginsburg's dissent), and Honda Motor Co., 512 U.S. at 436 (Ginsburg, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)-but joined the Court's opinion in State Farm. Whether he thought
there was a substantial difference between the two cases, simply acquiesced in the new rule on stare
decisis grounds, or came to appreciate the litigation-foreclosing consequences of the BMW rule, is
an open and ultimately unanswerable question.
212. Justice O'Connor has been the Court's staunchest advocate of strict constitutional policing
of the magnitude of punitive damage awards. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp.,
509 U.S. 443,472-73 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing for much more strident substantive
due process review of state court punitive damage awards); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 283 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing for federal
constitutional review of punitive damage awards under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause). Justices Kennedy and Stevens have been only one step behind her in their enthusiasm for
such reforms and have authored the major recent opinions. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416-18
(Kennedy, J.) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause imposes procedural
and substantive limits on punitive damage awards); BMW, 517 U.S. at 562 (Stevens, J.) ("The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from imposing a 'grossly excessive'
punishment on a tortfeasor."). It can be argued that Justice Stevens's views in this area appear to be
buttressed by his substantial commitment to reinvigorating judicial review of excessive criminal
punishments. This commitment might have sensitized him to the issues involved in excessive
punitive damages actions or it might have made his rulings in these cases appear strategically
useful. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 32-35 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
that "by broadly prohibiting excessive sanctions, the Eighth Amendment directs judges to exercise
their wise judgment in assessing the proportionality of all forms of [criminal] punishment"). For
good general discussions of the relationship between proportionality review in the criminal law and
punitive damages contexts, see, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and
Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2004); Pamela S. Karlan, "Pricking the Lines": The Due
Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 910-12
(2004); Adam M. Gershowitz, Note, The Supreme Court's Backwards Proportionality
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various Justices to embrace constitutional tort reform depends more on the
strength of each Justice's cross-cutting influences and intellectual
commitments than on21the
intensity of the individual Justice's particular shade
3
of litigation hostility.
IV. Hostility to
Jurisprudence

Litigation

and

the

Rehnquist

Court's

Federalism

The Rehnquist Court's propensity to limit access to courts, to deny or
narrowly construe available remedies, and, more generally, to impose
heretofore unknown constitutional and common law roadblocks to litigative
solutions can be demonstrated fairly easily by the kind of case survey
attempted in the pages above.21 4 However, to understand just how deeply the
Court's hostility to litigation runs, it is necessary to pull back from cases that
are self-consciously "about" the capabilities of the courts and to examine
whether the Court's attitudes towards litigation color its perceptions or
motivate its treatment of other issues.
In that vein, this section explores the interaction of the Court's hostility
to litigation with its federalism jurisprudence.2 5 Examining the contours of
the Court's recent federalism cases through the lens of hostility to litigation
offers significant insight into the perplexing question of why-if the Court is
truly motivated by concern for increasing the power and autonomy of the

Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive Criminal Punishments and Excessive
PunitiveDamagesAwards, 86 VA. L. REV. 1249, 1285-1301 (2000).
213. The Court's strong instinctual commitment to federalism is also crucially implicated by
the decisions in the punitive damages cases. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 189 (exploring the
federalism implications of these cases). I do not make more of this connection, however, because
federalism concerns emerge on both sides of the debate over substantive federal review of state
court punitive damages awards. Compare BMW, 517 U.S. at 570-74 (arguing that federal
constitutional review is necessary to prevent one state from nullifying the independent policy
judgments of other states) with id. at 607-08, 613-14 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that federal
constitutional review interferes with the states' inherent authority to structure their tort systems
according to their own policy preferences).
214. See supra Part II.
215. This Article's decision to treat the interaction of its proposed theme with the Court's
federalism jurisprudence is dictated not only by the abundance of fertile ground created by
juxtaposing the two themes, but also by the centrality of the federalism cases to the current Court's
legacy. while a handful of commentators have downplayed the importance of the Rehnquist
Court's federalism cases, see, for example, Garnett, supra note 11, at 3-6, they represent a decided
minority. Given the near consensus that the Rehnquist Court's claim to fame rests in great part with
its federalism decisions, the developing conventions of Rehnquist Court proto-history
(appropriately) require an explanation as to how a proposed addition to our collective understanding
of the Court's intellectual matrix influenced (or failed to influence) those seminal cases. Several
successful attempts have been made to explain how other themes fit with the Rehnquist Court's
federalism decisions. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 1, at 433-34 (reading leading federalism cases as
reflecting the Court's "conservatism"); Kramer, supra note 1, at 137-62 (reading leading federalism
precedents as reflecting a commitment to "judicial supremacy"); cf Colker & Scott, supra note 1, at
1370-72 (noting the Court's propensity to "diss" states by overturning state statutes and overruling
state officials' actions and using those cases to argue that the Court's purported commitment to
federalism is a subsidiary theme in the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence).
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states-it has chosen to pursue and extend particular federalism-oriented
doctrines (such as sovereign immunity) while failing to pursue others (such
as a truly robust Commerce Clause jurisprudence) and affirmatively
eschewing still others (such as a less expansive notion of preemption or
greater autonomy for state courts from federal legislative intrusion).1 6 Put
simply, the Court has shown its greatest sympathy for federalism doctrines
that protect the states from litigation 2 17 and has shown almost no interest in
developing new doctrines that provide the states with greater autonomy to
shape their own institutions if that autonomy could conceivably be used to
develop a more litigation-friendly environment.21 8
A. Sovereign Immunity
1. The Court's Decisions.-The Rehnquist Court's sovereign immunity
decisions need no introduction. In approximately a dozen important cases
reaching back roughly a decade, the Court has reinvigorated the states'
immunity from lawsuits by private citizens in a myriad of ways. In short
order, the Court has reaffirmed and firmly constitutionalized the expansive
and counter-textual reading of the Eleventh Amendment propounded in the
much criticized 2 19 nineteenth-century case Hans v. Louisiana,220 held that
Congress may not abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under any
of its Article I powers, 221' developed a faiily intrusive test to determine
whether Congress has properly abrogated the states' immunity pursuant to its
Fourteenth Amendment powers,222 and applied that test with increasing rigor
216. For an attempt to answer this question from a very different perspective, one might say
from within the Court's federalism jurisprudence, see Young, supra note 13.
217. See infra subpart IV(A) (discussing sovereign immunity cases).
218. See infra section IV(B)(1) (discussing preemption cases and cases raising the issue of
states' autonomy to structure their own court systems); see also supra notes 174-176 and
accompanying text (discussing the Court's decisions curtailing states' autonomy to impose
substantial procedural or substantive restrictions on the availability of arbitration).
219. Criticism of Hans is widespread. See Alfred Hill, In Defense of Our Law of Sovereign
Immunity, 42 B.C. L. REv. 485, 487 n.1 (2001) (collecting the leading articles critical of modem
state sovereign immunity doctrine). For a profound attack on the integrity of the Hans decision
from an historical perspective, see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The ParticularlyDubious Case of Hans v.
Louisiana: An Essay on Law, Race, History, and "FederalCourts," 81 N.C. L. REv. 1927 (2003);
see also id. at 1943 n.61 (collecting further sources).
220. 134 U.S. 1(1890).
221. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69-70, 72-73 (1996) (overruling
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989), and reading Hans to state that the Eleventh
Amendment, not federal common law, prevents citizens from suing their own states in federal court
for violations of federal law and using that reading to hold that Congress cannot abrogate state
sovereign immunity under any of its Article I powers). But see Cent. Va. Comm. Coll. v. Katz, 126
S. Ct. 990 (2006) (holding that at the time of the founding the states gave up their sovereign
immunity against most lawsuits filed pursuant to valid Bankruptcy Clause legislation).
222. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (developing the "congruence and
proportionality" test for assessing whether legislation is properly enacted pursuant to Congress's
authority to enforce the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment). Because of the Court's holding the
prior term in Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59, Congress is only empowered to abrogate state
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and skepticism. 223 At the same time, the Court has-without relying on the
Eleventh Amendment or any other textual provision-held that the
Constitution's structure requires that the states be accorded sovereign
immunity from suits in their own courts (absent their consent) 224 and from
federal administrative proceedings that bear significant indicia of
adjudication. 225 In a variety of less well-known cases, the Court has also
narrowed the well-established doctrine whereby individuals may,
notwithstanding sovereign immunity, seek injunctions against state officials
in their official capacity, 226 made it easier for state officials to obtain
dismissal of lawsuits on sovereign immunity grounds at an early stage in the
litigation process, 227 and overruled precedent suggesting that a state does not
posses full Eleventh Amendment immunity when it engages in routine
commercial activity. 228
sovereign immunity pursuant to its Fourteenth (and perhaps Fifteenth) Amendment Enforcement
Clause powers. Hence, the Boerne decision, while not itself an Eleventh Amendment immunity
case, had obvious and immediate impact on that area of law.
223. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Title I
of the Americans with Disabilities Act is not valid Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Clause
legislation and, thus, does not validly abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity); Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding same with regard to Age Discrimination in
Employment Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999) (holding same with regard to Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act).
But see Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (holding, over the strenuous dissents of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, that Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act is valid Enforcement Clause legislation at least to the extent that it ensures access to
courtrooms and, thus, validly abrogates state sovereign immunity in the case at hand); Nev. Dep't of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (holding, over strenuous dissents of Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas, that the family-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act is valid
Enforcement Clause legislation and, thus, validly abrogates state sovereign immunity).
224. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
225. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S. C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
226. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (holding the Ex
parte Young doctrine inapplicable to an action by an Indian tribe and its members against a state
seeking declaration of ownership rights in certain lands because allowing the action would strike at
the heart of state sovereignty); see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73-75 (holding Exparte Young
relief unavailable in the case at issue because to allow such an action would thwart a "crafted and
intricate remedial scheme" developed by Congress). In Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 273-80, Justice
Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, suggested that a broad Ex parte Young doctrine was
inconsistent with the Court's evolving sovereign immunity jurisprudence and that the doctrine
should be drastically limited or even expressly overruled. Though the majority of the Court did
carve out an exception to the preexisting doctrine and find in favor of Idaho's sovereign immunity
claim, they rejected Justice Kennedy's offer to use a sledgehammer where a chisel would do. See
id. at 288-97 (O'Connor, J., joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
227. See P. R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf& Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993) (holding
that states may take interlocutory appeals from decisions of trial courts denying motions to dismiss
on Eleventh Amendment grounds).
228. See Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999) (overruling Parden v. Terminal R. of Ala. Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964)). The Court
has, however, declined opportunities to further weaken the waiver doctrine. See, e.g., Frew v.
Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004) (unanimously overruling a lower court decision holding that federal
court actions to enforce the terms of consent decrees are subject to the Eleventh Amendment unless
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With few if any exceptions,229 the Rehnquist Court's most momentous
sovereign immunity decisions have come over the vigorous dissent of
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. In explaining and defending
its decisions in the face of persistent and voracious internal and external
criticism,

230

the five-member majority has developed a number of themes.

Two, however, have grown to dominate the Court's rhetoric: fidelity to
history and the "dignity" appropriately accorded the states.
First, the Justices committed to a broad view of state sovereign
immunity have strenuously argued that a proper reading of history
commands their approach.23 ' In broad terms, they have argued that
eighteenth century practice and understanding support expansive immunity
for all sovereigns, that the few relevant nineteenth century cases embrace it,
and that the few recent decisions that suggest otherwise are fragmented,
under-theorized, and ill-advised. 2 On the other hand, the dissenting Justices
terms of the voluntary decree meet the congruence and proportionality test); Lapides v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613 (2002) (unanimously overruling a lower court decision
holding that state does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity by removing case to federal
court). Nor has the Court been willing to abandon the traditional rule that the Eleventh Amendment
does not bar in rem actions involving states as long as the federal court has properly obtained
jurisdiction over the property at issue. See, e.g., Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S.
440 (2004); California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491 (1998).
229. The usual dissenters have, of course, been in the majority in the cases in which the Court
has chosen not to broaden sovereign immunity. For partial lists of such cases, see supra note 226,
and infra note 231. Of the decisions cited therein that expand the scope of sovereign immunity,
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented from every one in which they participated. Justice
Souter joined the majority opinion in Puerto Rico Aqueduct, but has dissented from all the others.
230. For some (but by no means all) of the voracious external criticism aimed at the Court's
recent sovereign immunity jurisprudence, see the works cited in Hill, supra note 219, at 487 n. 1. As
for internal criticism, each major decision has produced at least one stinging dissent (usually two or
three). Some of the highlights include FederalMaritime Commission, 535 U.S. at 772 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 376 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 760 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe, 517
dissenting); Puerto Rico Aqueduct, 506 U.S. at 148 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
U.S. at 100 (Souter, J.,
Perhaps the most striking thing about the dissents in these cases is the degree to which they
forthrightly refuse to accept the majority's take on sovereign immunity as binding precedent. See,
e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 97-98 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Despite my
respect for stare decisis, I am unwilling to accept Seminole Tribe as controlling precedent.... The
kind of judicial activism manifested in cases like Seminole Tribe, Alden v. Maine, Florida
Prepaid... , and College Savings Bank... , represents such a radical departure from the proper
role of this Court that it should be opposed whenever the opportunity arises.") (citations omitted).
231. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 754 ("In light of history, practice, precedent, and the structure
of the Constitution, we hold that the States retain immunity from private suit in their own courts, an
immunity beyond the congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation."); Seminole Tribe,
517 U.S. at 68 (arguing that sovereign immunity jurisprudence reflects a fundamental historical
"postulate," insisting that the caselaw "must proceed with fidelity to this century-old doctrine," and
criticizing the dissent for rejecting this historical-doctrinal approach for "a theory cobbled together
from law review articles and its own version of historical events"); cf Alden, 527 U.S. at 763
(Souter, J., dissenting) ("The Court's principal rationale for today's result, then, turns on history:
was the natural law conception of sovereign immunity as inherent in any notion of an independent
State widely held in the United States in the period preceding the ratification of 1788 (or the
adoption of the Tenth Amendment in 1791)?").
232. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 712-40; Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54-55, 65-66, 68-70.

1156

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 84:1097

have-with equal vigor-offered a counter-narrative, arguing that the allencompassing sovereign immunity the majority embraces was in historical
decline by the time of the American founding, that the Eleventh Amendment
and the early cases interpreting it reflect a commitment to a more cabined
understanding of the states' immunity, and that the twentieth-century Court's
struggles to define the contours of that immunity was a principled attempt to
give effect to that moderate course.233 While the benefits and strengths of
these two approaches have excited much academic commentary,234 few if any
commentators have taken seriously the notion that the current Court's major
rift over the proper scope of sovereign immunity results primarily from
disagreements about historical facts reached after neutral examination of the
relevant sources.
To the contrary, most commentators have assumed that some normative
vision underlies the Rehnquist Court's adoption of a broad theory of state
sovereign immunity (and, conversely, the dissenters' adoption of a more
modest version).
In pursuing the sovereign immunity revolution's
motivating rationale, scholars have increasingly taken as their starting point
the Court's frequent references to the role sovereign immunity plays in
protecting the dignity of the states. 235 First appearing in the Court's opinion
in a relatively minor 1993 case,2 36 references to state dignity immediately
233. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 760 (Souter, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 100
(Souter, J., dissenting).
234. For a few of the many interesting articles discussing this history, see Erwin Chemerinsky,
Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1207-09 (2001); John F. Manning, The
Eleventh Amendment and PreciseConstitutionalTexts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1674-86 (2004); James
E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1269 (1998).
235. For interesting commentary homing in on the "dignity" rhetoric, see Ann Althouse, On
Dignity and Deference: The Supreme Court's New Federalism, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 245, 250-56
(2000); Evan H. Caminker, JudicialSolicitude for State Dignity, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. SCi. 81 (2001); Scott Dodson, Dignity: The New Frontierof State Sovereignty, 56 OKLA. L.
REV. 777 (2003); Daniel A. Farber, Pledging a New Allegiance: An Essay on Sovereignty and the
New Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133 (2000); Daniel J. Meltzer, Essay, State Sovereign
Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1038-47 (2000);
Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in
Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921 (2003); Peter J. Smith, States as Nations:
Dignity in Cross-DoctrinalPerspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1 (2003); Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign
Immunity and the Futureof Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 51-58.
236. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf& Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993). As will
be discussed below, see infra notes 271-276 and accompanying text, Puerto Rico Aqueduct
involved the question of whether district court orders declining to dismiss actions against state
entities on Eleventh Amendment grounds are immediately appealable "collateral orders." Writing
for the Court, Justice White answers that question in the affirmative, concluding that the Eleventh
Amendment is meant to protect states not only from liability but also from coerced participation in
lawsuits brought by private parties. See id. at 145-47. In support of that conclusion and of the
relatively uncontroversial resolution of the case at hand, Justice White rescues from the dustbin of
history a powerful and loaded sentence from In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 503 (1887), a relatively obscure
nineteenth-century case: "'The very object and purpose of the 11 th Amendment were to prevent the
indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process ofjudicial tribunals at the instance of private
parties."' Id. at 146 (quoting Ayers, 123 U.S. at 505). He then adds a second iteration of the dignity
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began decorating the Court's sovereign immunity opinions and quickly
became de rigeur.237 When, in cases such as Alden v. Maine238 and Federal
Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority,239 the Court
began to address sovereign immunity claims untethered to the text of the
Eleventh Amendment, dignity earned a promotion from rhetorical flourish to
explanatory principle. As Justice Thomas explained in an opinion that
provides the fullest articulation of the dignity principle, "[t]he preeminent
purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord the States the dignity that is
consistent with their status as sovereign entities. 2 4 °
2. Unpacking the Dignity Rationale.-The majority Justices' reliance
on the dignity rationale as the normative basis for their broad vision of
sovereign immunity has excited substantial commentary and critique from
both inside and outside the Court. From within, the four Justices who have
not signed up for the sovereign immunity revolution, have been
uncharacteristically caustic in their dismissal of the dignity rationale, with
241
Justice Stevens going so far as to label it "embarrassingly insufficient.,
The dissenters have argued that there is nothing inherently undignified about
requiring a sovereign to conform its conduct to the law. Indeed, as Justice
Souter is wont to point out, certain well-grounded conceptions of dignity
suggest that it enhances rather than diminishes an entity's dignity if it is
language all his own, emphasizing "the importance of ensuring that the States' dignitary interests
can be fully vindicated." Id. at 146; see also id. (stressing "the respect owed [the states] as
members of [a] federation").
237. See, e.g., Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 268 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
announcing the judgment of the Court) (referring to the Eleventh Amendment's role in protecting
the "status and dignity" of the states); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58 (quoting Puerto Rico
Aqueduct for the sentence it revived from Ayers); Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S.
30, 31, 41, 47, 52 (1994) (repeatedly stating that an action under a federal compact does not insult a
state's "dignity" as support for the argument that it does not violate the Eleventh Amendment).
238. In Alden, 527 U.S. at 706, the Court based its conclusion that nonconsenting states are
immune from suits brought in their own courts by private parties to enforce federal law on the
Court's understanding of the "essential principles of federalism," id. at 748, and the "structure of the
Constitution," id. In several crucial places in the opinion, the Court emphasized that safeguarding
the dignity of the states is one of those essential principles and that, as a result, the structure of the
Constitution commands rules that protect the states from dignitary harms (such as the harm of
compelled litigation). See, e.g., id. at 714, 715, 749.
239. In Fed. Maritime Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002), the Court
offered both its deepest reliance on the "dignity" principle and its fullest explication. In deciding
that sovereign immunity precludes federal administrative agencies from adjudicating private
complaints against nonconsenting states if the administrative proceedings in question sufficiently
resemble civil litigation, the Court (through Justice Thomas) noted once again that the Eleventh
Amendment is "but one particular exemplification" of a general principle of sovereign immunity,
id. at 753, and then made the dignitary implications of a proceeding the touchstone for the inquiry
into whether such a proceeding violated the general principle, id. at 760-61. In the two central
normative paragraphs of his opinion, Justice Thomas references dignity four times (once in each of
the first four non-quotation sentences), makes additional references to "indignity" and the
"becoming"-ness ofjudicial proceedings, and includes nary a mention of any other value. Id.
240. Id. at 760.
241. PuertoRico Aqueduct, 506 U.S. at 151 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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willing and able to demonstrate fidelity to the law.242 Moreover, Justice
Stevens has argued-with some significant support in the historical
record243-that "Chief Justice Marshall early on laid to rest the view that the
244
purpose of the Eleventh Amendment was to protect a State's dignity."
Outside the Court, the dignity rationale has been dissected as much for
what it fails to say as for what it does say. According to the majority of
commentators, the dignity argument is cryptic and under-theorized.24 5 In the
memorable phrase of one commentator, the sovereign immunity cases reveal
"five authors in search of a theory. 2 46 Never themselves at a loss for
theories, scholars who have recognized the dignity leitmotif have posited
several potential explanations for the Court's embrace of the dignity
rhetoric.2 47 Some have suggested that the Court's concern is substantive and
that dignity is a shorthand term for the respect that the Court is going to
accord to state autonomy in its new structuralist constitutionalism. 248 Others
have posited that the Court's concern is expressivist and that the language of
dignity is intended to inculcate a greater public respect for the states and for a
more balanced federalism. 249 Still others have suggested that the language of

242. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 803 n.35 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing, based in part on
classic sources, that the dignity of the state is enhanced, not diminished, by adherence to the law).
243. It is uncontestable that after Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), the dignity
rationale did not appear in the Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence until In re Ayers, 123 U.S.
503 (1887); that with the lone exception of Ayers the Court did not affirmatively rely on the dignity
rationale in any cases until the last quarter of the twentieth century; and that the only decision even
mentioning the word dignity in this context in the first three-quarters of that century brought up the
argument in order to reject it. See Petty v. Tenn.-Mo. Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 276 n.l
(1959). It also appears quite clear from the text of Cohens that Marshall was genuinely of the
opinion that the Eleventh Amendment had little or nothing to do with the dignity of the states. On
the other hand, to argue that Chief Justice Marshall "laid the argument to rest" implies that, due
either to his access to the framers of the Amendment or the strength of his argument, his conclusion
on this issue has been and should be treated as conclusive. Some scholars have argued to the
contrary, suggesting that Ayers and Cohens represent coherent alternative readings of the
Amendment, both of which have always had their adherents. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 235, at
798-803 (tracing the history of the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and
reading that story as, to a large extent, turning on sharp disagreements between those advocating the
reading of the Eleventh Amendment propounded in Cohens and those supporting the Ayers
reasoning). Morevover, as I argue below, see infra text accompanying notes 261-264, there is
reason to believe that the dignity argument currently en vogue differs in substance from the one
Chief Justice Marshall repudiated.
244. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 96 (1996) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (citing
Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 406-07).
245. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 235, at 5 (referring to the Court's dignity rhetoric as
"increasingly odd," "arguably oxymoronic," and a "puzzle").
246. See Meltzer, supra note 235, at 1.
247. For some of the leading works, see supra note 235.
248. See, e.g., Timothy Zick, Statehood as the New Personhood: The Discovery of
Fundamental "States' Rights, " 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 213, 219-20 (2004) (discussing the
Court's new focus on dignity and other attributes of sovereignty as reflecting identification of
"rights" belonging to states in the structure of the Constitution).
249. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 235, at 82 (suggesting that dignity rhetoric might be
directed at avoiding "expressive harm" implicit in demeaning a sovereign state).
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dignity is borrowed from international relations and reflects an analytical
move by which the Court is now conceptualizing the various United States as
genuine (albeit limited) sovereigns.25 °
While the scholarly arguments tracing the roots of the dignity language
and explaining its purpose are insightful, they lack the ability to explain why
sovereign immunity has become a particular focus of the Court's efforts to
adjust the balance of federalism. It may be that the Court (purposefully or
unconsciously) uses the language of dignity in explaining its move towards
providing greater protections for the states because it wants to encourage the
public to accord greater respect to the states or because it conceptualizes the
states as retaining some of the attributes of nation-states, but that does not
explain why sovereign immunity-rather than, say, preemption or the
independence of state judicial proceedings-serves as the doctrinal platform
for the Court's rhetoric.
Similarly, it may be that the Court views
maintaining the dignity of the states as an essential and enforceable
constitutional postulate, but, again, that does not explain why the Court
views one particular kind of intrusion into the states' autonomy-compelled
participation in judicial proceedings brought by private parties-as injurious
to that dignity while myriad other intrusions into the states' autonomy pass
constitutional muster.
While the answer as to why sovereign immunity has excited the Court's
particular interest is likely complicated and multi-factored, the Rehnquist
Court's hostility to litigation is a central, and often overlooked, part of the
explanation. To put this observation in the simplest terms, one need only
perform a little linguistic parlor trick: Thus far most of the scholarship on the
sovereign immunity decisions has explored why the Court has so
vociferously exclaimed, "You can't sue states!" Much can be learned,
however, from shifting the emphasis in that sentence and reconceptualizing
the Court's sovereign immunity decisions as instead exclaiming, "You can't
sue states!"
To unpack that argument, harken back to the decisions discussed in Part
III above. In case after case, in wildly divergent areas of the law, the Court
reacts as if there is something discomforting and vaguely disreputable about
the use of the litigation process to resolve disputes and collectively
administer justice. This under-theorized hostility to litigation operates on
two levels. First, the Court appears to be influenced by an unspoken
assumption that there is something undignified about the litigation process
itself, that the lawsuit-friendly legal culture we have developed scars those
who participate in it. The notion that anyone can be dragged into court
against their will to answer the unscreened claims of another citizen-while
perhaps accepted intellectually by the Justices as a necessary democratic

250. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 235, at 5-6 (focusing on "law-of-nations doctrine of foreign
state sovereign immunity" as a source for the "dignity" idiom).
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mechanism 2 51'-seems to stoke the Justices' unconscious fears and tap into a
broader cultural anxiety about litigation.
Moreover, the Court's hostility to litigation is not evenly distributed
over all types of litigants or lawsuits. Certainly, as demonstrated above, the
Court's hostility to litigation extends to purely private tort and contract
disputes. 252 However, the Court's concern is particularly pronounced in
areas where the legal action in question in some way transcends the private
purposes of the plaintiff-either because the plaintiff is seeking to enforce a
statute which seems to vest primary enforcement authority in a public
agency, 253 because the defendant in question is a governmental body or a
public official,254 or because the relief sought is designed not just to
compensate the plaintiff but also to achieve broader social purposes.2 55
Looked at through the lens of these twin observations, the Court's focus
on sovereign immunity as a crucial bulwark in protecting state dignity and,
therefore, as a constitutional priority makes perfect sense. As the Court sees
it, compelling an unwilling state to defend a private lawsuit for damages
threatens state dignity for much the same reason and in much the same way
that subjecting a private party to such a suit diminishes the dignity and
threatens the status of that private party.256 The difference of course is that,
while ensuring the dignity of private parties is a laudable policy goal the
Court does its best to protect when opportunity arises, protecting the dignity
of the states is a constitutional command under the current majority's
understanding of federalism.
Further, while the Court's indignity-detector is activated by most forms
of litigation, the Court's particular aversion to litigation that implicates the
public good in some broader sense is fully at play in the sovereign immunity
context. Here, private parties are seeking relief from the state; their actions
have the potential to bum off or require the redistribution of public resources,

251. A proverbial idea most traditionally expressed by noting that in a republic, "no man is
above the law." Cf Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 764, 766 (1982) (White, J., dissenting)
("Attaching absolute immunity to the Office of the President, rather than to particular activities that
the President might perform, places the President above the law. It is a reversion to the old notion
that the King can do no wrong.").
252. See, e.g., supra subpart III(A) (discussing the Court's hostility to remedies); supra subpart
Ill(C) (discussing the Court's Federal Arbitration Act jurisprudence).
253. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (holding a § 1983 action
inappropriate in part because Congress adopted a remedial scheme that focused on government
enforcement); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding an implied private right of

action inappropriate for similar reasons).
254. See, e.g., supra subpart Ill(B) (discussing qualified immunity cases).
255. See, e.g., supra subpart Ill(D) (discussing punitive damages cases and explaining how the
societal purpose of such damages is a mark against them for the Court).
256. To reiterate, the heart of the Justices' concern appears to be the starkly and often crassly
democratic nature of our legal system, the belief that anyone (even a person or entity of substantial
status) can be dragged into court by a private plaintiff to answer unscreened claims of wrongdoing
under the requirement that he (or she or it) answer the allegations satisfactorily in order to avoid
monetary liability.
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to label the state as a transgressor of federal law, and even to exact changes
in state policies.257 To the extent, therefore, that the Rehnquist Court's
broader hostility to litigation is exacerbated by a sense that it is inappropriate,
inefficient, or undemocratic to make policy through litigation, the recent
sovereign immunity cases are particularly well-suited for drawing down the
ire of these Justices.
Interestingly, treating the Rehnquist Court's focus on sovereign
immunity in general (and on the rhetoric of dignity more specifically) as
stemming from the Court's hostility to litigation suggests that the underlying
dignity rationale broached by the current Court is somewhat different than
the dignity rationale raised and repudiated by Chief Justice Marshall in
Cohens v. Virginia.258 In that case, the proposed injury to the state's dignity
stemmed from the insult to its sovereignty allegedly implicit in being forced
to defend its actions before officials of another sovereign.259 In contrast, in
the modem sovereign immunity cases, the alleged insult to the state's dignity
stems not from the identity or provenance of the adjudicatory authority but
from the mire and unseemliness of the litigation process itself.260 As a
consequence, the relationship between dignitary harms and sovereignty
concerns is reversed. 26' In the older case, an injury to sovereignty (being
made to answer to another sovereign) causes concern about the state's
dignity; in the modem cases, an injury to the state's dignity (being dragged
through the mire of modem litigation at the whim of a private party) causes
concern about the state's sovereignty.
The evidence that the Court's recent sovereign immunity jurisprudence
is motivated in large part by the Court's hostility to litigation is hiding in
plain sight. Indeed, in many of the cases the Court comes very close to
making the point expressly. For example, the key sentence in the dignity
jurisprudence (mined from a nineteenth century precedent by Puerto Rico
Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Metcalfe & Eddy, Inc. and repeatedly quoted

257. The Court routinely acknowledges these concerns. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 750 (1999) ("Private suits against nonconsenting States---especially suits for money
damages-may threaten the financial integrity of the States."). So too does the academic
commentary. See, e.g., Young, supra note 235, at 56 ("Immunity protects the state treasury and
ensures that state officials, not private litigants or courts, decide which claims merit the allocation of
scarce public resources and which do not."). These quotations reflect a point of contact between the
Rehnquist Court's new defenses of sovereign immunity and earlier explanations of that doctrine's
purpose, as the early rationales relied heavily on "protecting the public fisc." See, e.g., Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821) (describing the Eleventh Amendment as a product of
the Court's decision to uphold its jurisdiction over claims against "greatly indebted" states).
258. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 406-07.
259. See id.
260. For some rhetoric drawn from the opinions demonstrating the essence of the argument, see
infra text accompanying notes 265-268.
261. If, as I suggest, the underlying dignity rationale in the modem cases diverges from the
dignity rationale in Cohens, one consequence is that the dissenters-and Justice Stevens in
particular-are a bit too quick in assuming that history and precedent conclusively reject the
majority's approach. Cf supra note 245 (evaluating dissenters' argument regarding Cohens).
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by later decisions) specifically identifies the relevant "indignity" at issue as
"subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance
of private parties., 262 That sentence might in the abstract be read as focusing
on the special attributes of statehood that make sovereign immunity
necessary, but the horrors that it is designed to evoke-the "coercive" nature
of court proceedings, the majesty of the "judicial tribunals" that sit in
judgment, the fact that nothing more than the insistence of a "private party"
is necessary to engage these daunting and coercive institutions-are more
universal. It is highly likely that this sentence escaped the dustbin of history
and became the launching point for a new normative theory of sovereign
immunity precisely because, at some visceral level, it tapped into the same
complex of ideas and emotions that have fueled the Court's other antilitigation offenses.
As the Court has come to rely more and more on the dignity rationale in
recent years, it has ratcheted up its language even further, drawing on our
collective cultural anxieties about litigation and the coercive power of the
state in order to exact sympathy for a sovereign stripped of its immunity. In
Federal Maritime Commission, for example, Justice Thomas repeats the
standard rhetoric about "subjecting" a state to "coercive process" at the
behest of private parties, but also talks openly of preventing a private party
from "haul[ing] the State in front of' a judge. 263 Similarly, in Alden, Justice
Kennedy follows the standard Ayres quotation with a new parade of
horribles, culminating in the prospect of a state "thrust, by federal fiat and
against its will, into the disfavored status of a debtor, subject to the power of
private citizens to levy on its treasury or perhaps even government buildings
or property which the State administers on the public behalf. '' 264 The merits
of its substance notwithstanding, the tone and psycho-social overtones of this
rhetoric are striking. Sovereign immunity is not merely a way to preserve
public officials' time or the public treasury, rather it protects us from a
Kafkaesque universe in which the defenseless state is "hauled" into Court or
"thrust" by "fiat" and "against its265will" into "disfavored status" and "subject
to the power of private citizens.,
3. Substantive Points of Contact with Litigation Hostility.-The
litigation hostility of the Rehnquist Court's sovereign immunity decisions is
262. E.g., P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalfe & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)
(quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)).
263. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760, 761 n.ll, 760 n.13
(2002).
264. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999).
265. The irony of the Court's rhetorical gambit is, of course, that in the sovereign immunity
drama the Court is scripting, the roles are reversed from the prototypical Kafkaesque tale. Here, it
is the state that is hauled into court against its will on the whim of another and under circumstances
portending procedural unfairness and substantive defeat, while the private individual is the powerful
agent of judicial oppression and procedural unfairness.
Evaluating the legitimacy and
persuasiveness of this act of appropriation is, thankfully, beyond the scope of this project.
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more than rhetorical. In substance, these decisions are of a piece with the
Court's litigation-hostile opinions in the areas surveyed above in several
interesting ways. To begin with the most obvious, the sovereign immunity
decisions, like those in the right of action, qualified immunity, and arbitration
cases, 266 have the specific consequence of foreclosing judicial consideration
of a substantial number of lawsuits for reasons that have nothing to do with
the merits of the litigation.2 67 Indeed, while some of the decisions pay lip
service to alternative remedies, 268 the cases-like those in the qualified
immunity context-clearly contemplate that there will be a category of
citizens who suffer significant injuries as a result of illegal governmental
conduct who will be unable to obtain appropriate compensation. 269 This
principle, implicit in the Court's earlier cases, was driven home in particular
by Alden, which definitively rejected the theory long held out by many that
the sovereign immunity embedded in the Constitution by the Eleventh
Amendment
does not preclude litigation but only channels it into state
0
27

courts.

Puerto Rico Aqueduct-the first case to develop the modem dignity
rationale-provides another intriguing point of connection. In that case, the
Court allowed for interlocutory appeals of decisions denying motions to
dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds with the specific intent of ensuring
that more suits are dismissed without trials on the merits.27 1 In reaching that
decision, the Court specifically relied upon precedents involving the

266. For discussions of these areas, see supra subpart III(A) (remedies and rights of action),
section III(B)(1) (qualified immunity), and subpart III(C) (arbitration).
267. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 754-55 ("The constitutional privilege of a State to assert its
sovereign immunity in its own courts does not confer upon the State a concomitant right to
disregard the Constitution or valid federal law. The States and their officers are bound by
obligations imposed by the Constitution and by federal statutes that comport with the constitutional
design.").
268. See, e.g., id. at 755-57 (arguing that states might still be forced to heed federal law and
federal rights by suits to which they consent, suits by the United States, suits against officials in
their individual capacities, and injunctive suits against officials in their official capacities).
269. The Rehnquist Court's willingness to tolerate laws and procedures that countenance
substantial gaps between rights and remedies is a central theme of this piece. Other recent works
treat this same theme using some similar and some very dissimilar areas of law. See, e.g., John C.
Jeffries, Jr., Essay, The Right-Remedy Gap in ConstitutionalLaw, 109 YALE L.J. 87 (1999) (arguing

that the rights-remedy gap serves some salutary purposes); Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the
Rights/Remedy Split, 88 VA. L. REv. 1 (2002) (discussing qualified immunity, harmless error, and
non-retroactivity doctrine from the perspective of the rights-remedy gap and concluding that
harmless error, but not the others, presents a substantial problem).
270. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 735 (noting, in a statement that pushes the boundaries of plausible
understatement, that "[t]here are isolated statements in some of our cases suggesting that the
Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable in state courts"); id. at 754 ("In light of history, practice,
precedent, and the structure of the Constitution, we hold that the States retain immunity from
private suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond the congressional power to abrogate by Article
I legislation.").

271. P. R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalfe & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 143-45 (1993).
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immediate appealability of decisions denying qualified immunity 272 and
spoke of its decisions in '273
both immunity contexts as attempts to enforce a
"privilege not to be sued.
Puerto Rico Aqueduct also serves to underscore the more general
connection between sovereign immunity and qualified immunity cases. As
scholars such as Richard Fallon and Richard Seamon have reminded us, it
behooves us not to pigeon-hole the Rehnquist Court's sovereign immunity
cases as "federalism" cases. 274 While they certainly do speak loudly and
persistently to federalism concerns, they are also governmental immunity
cases and, as such, bear comparison to the Court's other recent forays into
expanding official immunity, most notably its qualified immunity
decisions. 275 When a litigant injured by governmental action seeks relief, he
or she does not encounter sovereign immunity as a discrete "federalism"
obstacle but instead faces that doctrine as part of an integrated patchwork of
complicated governmental and official immunity doctrines which taken
together require extensive litigation planning and careful drafting.27 6 Though
correlation is not causation, the fact that the Court chose to drastically
expand these practically and conceptually linked immunity doctrines at the
same moment suggests that a common impulse may underlie both
developments.
Finally, in several of the other recent sovereign immunity cases, the
Court imposed new limitations on the ability of private litigants to seek
injunctive relief against the states, limitations designed in large part to
channel disputes over important issues of public policy out of the courts and
into alternative dispute resolution systems or remedial structures. 277 These
decisions are in substantial accord with the holdings and rationale of the
Court's decisions in the implied private right of action, § 1983, attorney's
fees, and punitive damage contexts.278 When given an opportunity to chip

272. See, e.g., id. at 143 (citing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), and Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985)).
273. Id. at 146 n.5.
274. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 464-65, 482-85 (putting recent sovereign immunity decisions
into conversation with qualified immunity decisions); Richard H. Seamon, Damages for
UnconstitutionalAffirmative Action: An Analysis of the Monetary Claims in Hopwood v. Texas, 71
TEMP. L. REv. 839 (1998) (sorting through the complicated and overlapping immunity issues in the
context of one particularly contentious case).
275. See supra section III(B)(1).
276. For the rare academic article that demonstrates the validity of this observation-an
observation that is obvious to most civil rights practitioners, see generally Seamon, supra note 274.
277. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 287-88 (1997) (holding
the Ex Parte Young doctrine inapplicable to an action by an Indian tribe and its members against a
state seeking declaration of ownership rights in certain lands because allowing the action would
strike at the heart of state sovereignty); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73-75
(1996) (holding Ex Parte Young relief unavailable in the case at issue because to allow such an
action would thwart a "crafted and intricate remedial scheme" developed by Congress).
278. See generally supra subpart III(A) (treating the Court's jurisprudence limiting implied
private rights of action and noting decline of such actions as a vehicle for enforcing federal law);
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away at the policymaking power of courts and litigants, the Rehnquist Court
was happy to oblige.
B. Paths Not Taken
The Rehnquist Court's hostility to litigation helps explain not only why
the Court has chosen to pursue its federalism initiative with vigor in certain
areas of the law, but also why it has eschewed opportunities to pursue other
plausible state-protective doctrinal paths. In one such area, preemption, the
Court's failure to pursue state-protective doctrine has been the subject of
substantial criticism, both internal and external.279 In another such area, the
right of states to set the rules and procedures of their own courts free from
federal interference, the commentary and criticism has been more sporadic.2 8 °
This subpart explores the opportunities the friends of a robust federalism
have had to develop new doctrines in these two areas, the manner in which
they have rejected those opportunities, and the plausibility of hostility to
litigation as an explanation for the Court's reluctance to pursue these paths.
1. Preemption.-Preemption is by far the most common federalism
issue facing the courts. In hundreds, perhaps thousands, of cases every year,
judges must determine whether particular state law enactments
impermissibly conflict with or hamper the operation of federal law such that
they are preempted and thus unenforceable. 81 In most years, a handful of

section III(B)(2) (explaining that the Court's narrow reading of civil rights attorney's fee statutes
has the consequence of reducing the use of private civil rights actions as vehicles for enforcing
federal law); subpart Ill(D) (arguing that the hostility to punitive damages has much to do with the
policymaking aspect of such damages).
279. For external sources noting a purported inconsistency between the Rehnquist Court's
handling of preemption cases and its other federalism doctrines, see, for example, Erwin
Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69
BROOK. L. REv. 1313, 1314 (2004); Fallon, supra note 1, at 429-30; Massey, supra note 1, at 50212; Meltzer, supra note 1, at 362-78; and Young, supra note 13, at 30-32. For the most striking
internal criticism, see Egelhoffv. Egelhoff 532 U.S. 141, 153, 160 (2001) (Breyer, J., joined by
Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]n today's world, filled with legal complexity, the true test of federalist
principle may lie, not in the occasional constitutional effort to trim Congress' commerce power at
its edges... or to protect a State's treasury from a private damages action... , but rather in those
many statutory cases where courts interpret the mass of technical detail that is the ordinary diet of
the law .... ).
280. There is one significant scholarly article on this subject. Bellia, supra note 13. The cases
that have presented opportunities in this area have been the subject of scattered constitutional
commentary, though most serious study of those cases has focused primarily or exclusively on other
constitutional issues. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Lochner's Legacy for Federalism:Pierce County v.
Guillen as a Case Study, 85 B.U. L. REv. 727 (2005) (focusing on Commerce Clause and Spending
Clause issues); Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and Gullibility: Piercing the Surface of Commerce
Clause Doctrine, 89 IOWA L. REv. 1487 (2004) (focusing on Commerce Clause issue); Garnett,
supra note 11, at 5 n.23 (commenting on the unresolved Spending Clause issue in Guillen).
281. To crudely illustrate this point, a search for the term "preemption" in Westlaw's
"ALLCASES" database of cases decided between December 22, 2003 and December 21, 2004
reveals 1452 cases that use the term. The great bulk (but not all) of those cases involve at least
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these cases cause such consternation and conflict that they make their way to
the Supreme Court.282
One might expect a Court committed to protecting state autonomy and
limiting federal regulatory authority to be sympathetic to arguments that state
laws should not easily be overridden by federal laws, at least absent clear
evidence of Congress's desire to preempt state regulation. While the
Rehnquist Court has, at times, endorsed just such a "presumption against
preemption" in words,2 83 it has consistently rejected such an approach in
practice. In cases dealing with a wide cross-section of regulatory arenas, the
Justices have overwhelmingly sided with those advocating the invalidation of
state regulation and against their erstwhile allies, the states.2 84 Though the
numbers have leveled off a bit in the last few terms,285 for much of its time
together, the Rehnquist Court was finding preemption in over two-thirds of
the cases raising the issue.286 During the 1999 and 2000 terms, the Court did
itself one better and found preemption in every single case raising the issue
(seven out of seven).287

tangential preemption issues. Of course, not all cases that raised preemption issues resulted in
written opinions discussing the issue by name.
282. By my count, the Supreme Court decided two preemption cases during October Term
2004; three during October Term 2003; six during October Term 2002; five during October Term
2001; three during October Term 2000; and six during October Term 1999, for a total of 25 in the
last six years. Because of the difficulty of classifying peripheral cases, these numbers do not
necessarily match the calculations of other academics cited herein. At minimum, however, these
numbers give an accurate portrayal of the scale of such litigation.
283. See, e.g., De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 813 (1997)
(referring to the "normal presumption against pre-emption"); Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504, 518 (1992) ("[Wle must construe these provisions in light of the presumption against the
pre-emption of state police power regulations.").
284. A list of such cases would be long and pointless. For one scholar among many who notes
this trend, see Young, supra note 13, at 30. For quantification of this claim, see the text
immediately following this note and accompanying notes.
285. During its last term, the Supreme Court considered only two preemption claims and
rejected them both. See Mid-Con Freight Sys., Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 125 S. Ct. 2427
(2005); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005). During the previous term, the
Court only accepted one out of three such claims. See Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200
(2004) (preemption found); Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Mgmt. Quality Dist, 541 U.S. 246
(2004) (no preemption); Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004) (no preemption).
Whether these cases reflect a shift in the Court's approach-perhaps prompted by the carping of
friends of the Court's federalism--or merely reflect the fact that some lower courts are now finding
preemption in outlandish situations is an open (and perhaps unanswerable) question. However, it is
worth noting that some commentators familiar with these cases argue that, while the Rehnquist
Court has been pro-preemption, it has not been as aggressively committed to a broad preemption
doctrine as some of the circuit courts. To the extent the Rehnquist Court has had to temper the
enthusiasm of the lower courts for doctrines it itself created, the dynamic in preemption cases is
similar to the one operating in qualified immunity cases. See supra text accompanying notes 139141.
286. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 462 & n.221 (noting findings of preemption in twenty-two out
of thirty-five cases decided between fall of 1991 and spring of 2001); Meltzer, supra note 62, at 369
(same).
287. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 462-63 & n.222 (making the point and listing the cases).
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Moreover, the Court's unwillingness to loosen the grip of preemption
has been driven almost entirely by the same set of Justices who have in other
contexts been the champions of state autonomy. Though the alliances have
been somewhat more fluid in the preemption context than in the sovereign
immunity context, 288 the usual defenders of states' rights (Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) have tended to find themselves in
the pro-preemption majority with their usually more nationalist colleagues in
dissent.28 9 Justice Stevens has been the most consistent vote against broad
290whlhea
preemption, while he and Justice Breyer have authored the sharpest attacks
on the majority's approach. In general, their dissents have not been shy to
accuse the majority of inconsistency and even hypocrisy for its
unwillingness, in this context, to accord the states broad latitude to
legislate.2 9'
Though many factors undoubtedly contribute to the Rehnquist Court's
determination to embrace a potent form of preemption despite that doctrine's
adverse consequences for the autonomy of the states,29 2 most commentators
288. See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 354-55 (2001) (Stevens,
J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (expressing a much narrower view of implied
preemption than that adopted by the other Justices). See also Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529
U.S. 861 (2000) (delineating the relationship between implied and express preemption in the
context of common law actions; Justice Breyer finding preemption and writing the majority
opinion; Justice Thomas dissenting with the three remaining liberals).
289. One scholar has calculated that during the 1999-2001 terms, the Court decided twelve
preemption cases on the merits and that in those cases the four more liberal Justices (Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) voted for preemption between three and five times, while the five
more conservative Justices voted for preemption between nine and eleven times. See Meltzer, supra
note 62, at 370 n. 117 (providing case-by-case table).
290. See id. (noting that Justice Stevens voted for preemption only three times during the 19992001 terms).
291. See, e.g., Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 160 (2001) (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[I]n today's world, filled with legal complexity, the true test of federalist principle
may lie, not in the occasional constitutional effort to trim Congress' commerce power at its
edges ... , or to protect a State's treasury from a private damages action... , but rather in those
many statutory cases where courts interpret the mass of technical detail that is the ordinary diet of
the law .... ") (internal citations omitted); Geier, 529 U.S. at 887 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("'This is
a case about federalism,' that is, about respect for 'the constitutional role of the States as sovereign
entities.' It raises important questions concerning the way in which the Federal Government may
exercise its undoubted power to oust state courts of their traditional jurisdiction over common-law
tort actions." (citations omitted)).
292. Some commentators have argued that the Court's failure to apply a broad presumption
against preemption on federalism grounds is an accurate and principled reading of the relevant
See, e.g., Dinh, supra note 13, at 2088 (arguing that "resort to the
history and doctrine.
constitutional structure of federalism does not support a general, systematic presumption against
preemption"); Nelson, supra note 13, at 290-303 (noting that the characterization of the Supremacy
Clause as a non obstante provision undermines the recognition of a general presumption against
state law preemption). Others, to the contrary, trace the Court's failure to embrace such a rule as a
failure of will or imagination, suggesting that if the Court fully understood both its own normative
vision and the federalism consequences of loosening preemption's reins, the Court would turn
course. See, e.g., Massey, supra note 1, at 502-12. Still others see the seeming incongruity of the
Court's actions in the preemption areas as a product of the Court's larger ideological commitments,
rather than issue-specific merits considerations or judicial oversight. See, e.g., Young, supra note
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appropriately center their explanation on the anti-regulatory implications of
the contemporary doctrine.293 As others have noted, what most of the
modem preemption cases have in common is that they challenge a restriction
or requirement imposed on business or commerce by state or local
government. 299
Though it is theoretically possible to pose preemption
problems where a state is seeking to permit an activity arguably prohibited
by federal law, in modem practice the vast majority of close or important
preemption cases instead pose the opposite problem: state law seeks to
impose a second level of regulation or liability on top of a federal regulatory
scheme and the parties vigorously dispute whether the federal scheme either
expressly or impliedly authorized the conduct it did not prohibit.2 95 Faced
often enough with this recurring situation, Justices whose inclinations lean
towards less aggregate regulation might well embrace a firmer preemption
doctrine, abstract concerns for state autonomy notwithstanding, particularly
if-as is the case here-the preexisting precedents and underlying
constitutional structures offer significant support for their position.29 6
The generalized hostility to regulation that runs through the Rehnquist
Court's preemption jurisprudence is supplemented and reinforced by a more
particularized hostility to litigation that by now ought to be familiar. A
striking number of the most significant preemption cases of the last decade
involve claims that federal law expressly or impliedly preempts state
common law causes of action, and the Court has been even more likely to
find preemption in these cases than in any cases that involve potential
conflicts between federal law and state statutes or administrative
determinations.2 97 To take just a few examples, the Rehnquist Court has

13 (arguing that the majority Justices' embrace of preemption reflects an approach to federalism
characterized by respect for the states' "dignity" rather than their "autonomy").
293. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 11, at 1310; Fallon, supra note 1, at 471-72.
294. See, e.g., Staab, supra note 13 (discussing the Rehnquist Court's use of preemption
doctrine to invalidate commercial restrictions enacted by state governments with respect to products
liability).
295. This general description applies with equal force to the kind of tort cases discussed infra
text accompanying notes 298-305 and the more common challenge to a direct state regulatory
action. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (involving regulations
promulgated by the Massachusetts Attorney General); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000)
(involving regulations adopted by a Washington administrative agency at the direction of its
legislature).
296. See generally Nelson, supra note 13 (arguing with considerable persuasiveness that
federalism does not require and history does not support a presumption against preemption); Dinh,
supra note 13 (arguing similarly).
297. Though the sample sizes are sufficiently small to be coincidence, the Court has in recent
years been much more likely to find a state tort claim (or a similar state common law lawsuit)
preempted than a general state regulatory provision. In the last two terms, for example, the Court
found preemption in only one case and it was one of the two cases involving a state tort action. See
supra note 285 (listing and discussing cases from the last two terms). In the last nine terms, the
Court has found preemption in every case raising a challenge to state common law tort provisions
save two: Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544 U.S. 431 (2005), and Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537
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invalidated decisions relying on state tort law that would have permitted
lawsuits seeking compensation from HMOs for violation of their "duty of
care" to their policyholders,2 98 from manufacturers of faulty medical devices
for using fraud to obtain approval of the devices, 299 from car manufacturers
for failing to install optimal safety devices, 30 0 and from cigarette
manufacturers for failing to warn about the consequences of smoking.3 0 1 In
these cases, the Court's overarching concern over the appropriate volume of
regulation is augmented by additional anxiety prompted by the identity of the
state regulator. Like in other areas surveyed above, particularly punitive
damages, 30 2 the Court finds something particularly disquieting about the
power that litigation gives judges and private parties to shape social policy
goals and the rules of appropriate corporate conduct.
In ways that continue to track the other topics surveyed, the preemption
decisions reveal the degree to which such institutional concerns are joined in
the Court's under-theorized hostility to litigation with more specific
disgruntlement towards the substance of our modem litigation culture. In
case after case, the Court is confronted with a creative team of plaintiffs'
lawyers seeking to obtain substantial damages under a cutting-edge theory of
liability, often after simpler paths to recovery have been found preempted or
unsupportable.30 3 In such cases in particular, the authority to declare state
U.S. 51 (2002). For an argument that Sprietsma is, in a broad sense, a pro-preemption decision, see
infra note 300.
298. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004) (finding a Texas tort law claim
expressly preempted by ERISA).
299. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001) (finding a class of
Pennsylvania tort claims impliedly preempted by the regulatory scheme established by the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act, the Medical Devices Amendments, and the FDA's regulatory policies).
But cf Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (finding that longstanding state common law
torts that do little more than supplement the same regulatory scheme are not expressly preempted).
300. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (finding a District of Columbia tort
law claim impliedly preempted by Department of Transportation safety standards even after
concluding that the claim was not expressly preempted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act); cf Sprietsma, 537 U.S. 51 (2002) (agreeing with Geier that promulgation of federal
safety statutes might impliedly preempt common law actions for failure to install additional safety
devices even when the relevant express preemption provision is limited to statutory law, but
concluding on the facts that the safety standards promulgated in this instance were not intended to
be exclusive). Sprietsma is generally in accord with the Court's anti-litigation preemption
jurisprudence, but marks off the limits of that jurisprudence by rejecting the view-seemingly
adopted by some lower courts-that the mere existence of federal safety standards necessarily
invalidates state common law actions to enforce stricter standards. For my acknowledgment of the
possibility that the recent uptick in cases where the Court has rejected preemption claims might
reflect the fact that the lower courts are now outpacing the Supreme Court in their embrace of
preemption, see supra note 285.
301. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). Cipollone is a complicated
decision that found only some of the relevant state law claims preempted and reached different
results about even those claims for different periods based on shifting express preemption
provisions in the relevant federal statute.
302. See supra subpart Ill(D).
303. See, e.g., Buckman, 531 U.S. at 343 (finding fraudulent representation claims made under
state law to be preempted by federal law); Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 508-12 (finding some contract
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law tort remedies preempted is a potent weapon and a substantial temptation
to those who genuinely believe our current tort regime to be out of control.
Recognizing this reality, Justice Stevens has chided his colleagues to
remember that "the Supremacy Clause does not give unelected federal judges
carte blanche to use federal law as a means of imposing their own ideas of
tort reform on the States. 3 °4 Though the substantive issues are different and
the lineups are interestingly intermingled, the similarity between the dissents'
30 5
lament in the tort preemption and punitive damage areas is striking.
The interrelationship of the Court's generalized hostility to regulation
and its even more pronounced distaste for the use of litigation as an engine of
regulatory policy is unclear. More likely than not, the Court's special
skepticism about the legitimacy of state courts' attempts to regulate behavior
through common law rules is just a more intense variation of the antiregulation impulse that dominates the preemption decisions, ratcheted up a
notch by the Court's hostility to litigation but not fundamentally altered. On
the other hand, there is at least some possibility that the anti-regulation bent
of the Rehnquist Court's broader preemption jurisprudence itself stems from
the Court's hostility to litigation. Given the centrality of the litigation cases
to the Court's preemption jurisprudence and the deeper intensity that such
cases have tended to engender, there is some chance that, when thinking
about and forming their reactions to preemption in the abstract, the Justices
conceptualize a challenge to a state common law tort action as the fir-case,
the prototypical dispute. If that is the case-a possibility but far from a
certainty-then litigation hostility has played a central role in shaping the
distribution of regulatory authority in the American polity. Even if it is not,
litigation hostility remains part of the story, sharpening the Court's antipathy
to regulation in a noticeable subset of preemption cases and, in so doing,
pushing the Court's general preemption jurisprudence in a more expansive
direction.
2. The Independent Authority of the Courts to Set Their Own
Procedures.-Though preemption is the most commented-upon area in
which the Court has declined to pursue an available doctrinal avenue that
would have further protected the authority or autonomy of the states, it is far

claims based on fraudulent misrepresentation to be preempted by federal law); cf Aetna, 542 U.S. at
221 (finding that a statutory tort right asserted to evade denial of benefits under ERISA was
preempted).
304. Geier, 529 U.S. at 894 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529
U.S. 344, 360 (2000) (Ginsburg, J.,dissenting) (complaining with regard to the decision in a
railroad crossing case that "[tihe upshot of the Court's decision is that state negligence law is
displaced with no substantive federal standard of conduct to fill the void").
305. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. Both sets of cases involve majorities reading
particular constitutional provisions in ways that clamp down on the availability of tort remedies and
dissenters who, while broadly sympathetic to that agenda, cannot swallow the requisite
constitutional analysis.
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from the only one.3 °6 Take, for example, the power of state courts to set their
own rules and procedures.3 °7 While there is little if any preexisting
jurisprudence that treats this power as constitutionally protected, 0 8 there are
many reasons to suspect that the issue might be of interest to the profederalism Justices on the Rehnquist Court. First, on the single issue of
sovereign immunity, the Justices have already relied on general structural
principles to protect the authority of state courts to establish their own
rules. 30 9 Second, the current Justices have developed-from an equally blank
slate-parallel doctrines that protect the autonomous decisionmaking
authority of state legislators and executive officials from federal
encroachment. 31 0 Third, the Court's more general federalism jurisprudence
has focused on protecting the dignity of the states and respecting our unique
system in which the states retain a meaningful sovereignty,3 1 values that are
hard to mesh with the image of one sovereign micro-managing key
institutions of the other. Finally, recent decades have seen a steady stream of
federal legislation mandating and prohibiting certain procedures in state
courts, a relatively new development that arguably undermines a tacit
understanding about the appropriate exercise of federal power.312

306. Many opponents of the Court's federalism initiative have noted this fact as part of an
argument that the Court's real motivation is some form of substantive conservatism. See, e.g.,
Colker & Scott, supra note 1, at 1370-72; Cross, supra note 11, at 1306-13; Fallon, supra note 1, at
429. Friends of the Court's federalism have done the same in an effort to encourage it to push
further. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 280, at 751-63 (discussing the Spending Clause); Garnett,
supra note 11, at 34-38 (discussing criminal law federalism).
307. The path that the Court might (have?) tread in this area is mapped out in Professor Bellia's
elegant Yale Law Journal article. Bellia, supra note 13; see also id. at 951 n.14 (enumerating
preexisting literature on the issue); David S. Schwartz, The FederalArbitration Act and the Power
of Congress Over State Courts, 83 OR. L. REV. 541, 547-70 (2004) (discussing these issues deftly
in the context of Federal Arbitration Act case law). While I recommend this literature, I do not
engage it, as the merits of this federalism argument are outside the purview of this Article.
308. On the other hand, there is a slight body of law to the contrary, most notably Testa v. Katt,
330 U.S. 386, 391-94 (1947), and its progeny, which hold that Congress may as a general matter
require state courts to hear federal law claims. These cases (and others imposing similar
requirements) provide some authority for a general federal right to determine state court procedures
if doing so serves a legitimate federal interest; however, these cases could be distinguished if the
Court were interested in pursuing this line of inquiry. In particular, the relevant precedents deal
almost exclusively with rules imposed in state courts in federal law cases, leaving open whether
such a power extends to routine state law cases. But see Schwartz, supra note 307 (arguing that the
Constitution prohibits many kinds of interference, even in federal law cases).
309. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that, with limited exceptions,
constitutional structure precludes Congress from requiring states to waive their sovereign immunity
in their own courts).
310. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (prohibiting the federal government from
"commandeering" state and local executive officers to enforce federal law); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (prohibiting the federal government from "commandeering" state
legislatures).
311. See supra subpart IV(A) (discussing the Rehnquist Court's sovereign immunity
jurisprudence and its focus on the dignity of states).
312. See, e.g., Bellia, supra note 13, at 953-63 (discussing this trend).
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These indicia of potential interest notwithstanding, the Court has been
largely indifferent to the issue of state court autonomy. In a number of recent
cases, the Court has been presented with opportunities to articulate limits on
the power of the federal government to regulate state courts' structure,
procedure, or rules.3 13 In particular, two cases decided early in 2003
provided plausible opportunities for the Court to develop and employ such
limits if it were so inclined.314 At a minimum, the cases presented the Court
with appropriate vehicles to discuss the relationship between Congress and
the state courts and explain the implications of that relationship for
Congress's power. In both cases, however, the Court declined to address the
issue in any substantive way. In the first case, the Court declined to reach the
issue because it was not addressed by the lower court,315 while in the other it
raised the question in a general way but dismissed its relevance in a single,
largely unreasoned paragraph.3 16
The first case, Pierce County v. Guillen,31 7 involved a federal statute
prohibiting the discovery or admission as evidence in "a Federal or State
court proceeding" of most reports or data prepared to assess the safety of
roads and intersections.3 18 The Washington Supreme Court had struck the
statute down as exceeding Congress's enumerated powers,31 9 but the United
States Supreme Court unanimously reversed in a decision by Justice Thomas,
holding that the provision was "legislation aimed at improving safety in the
channels of commerce and increasing protection for the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce" and was thus within Congress's Commerce Clause
power.32 ° Justice Thomas's very brief discussion of the constitutional issues
in this case mentions only in a footnote the fact that the statute seeks to
regulate the rules of discovery and evidence in state courtrooms and contains
no more general discussion of the fact that the statute directly regulates legal
proceedings rather than roads or vehicles. 321 In the relevant footnote, the

313. Cases that might be implicated by a rule protecting the autonomy of the state courts are
surprisingly frequent and diverse. One area where the question comes up repeatedly is the Court's
application of the Federal Arbitration Act to the states. See generally Schwartz, supra note 307;
supra subpart Ill(C).
314. Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456 (2003); Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129
(2003).
315. Guillen, 537 U.S. at 148 n. 10.
316. Jinks, 538 U.S. at 464-65 ("Assuming for the sake of argument that a principled
dichotomy can be drawn, for purposes of determining whether an Act of Congress is 'proper,'
between federal laws that regulate state-court 'procedure' and laws that change the 'substance' of
state-law rights of action, we do not think that state-law limitations periods fall into the category of
procedure' immune from congressional regulation.").
317. 537 U.S. 129 (2003).
318. 23 U.S.C. § 409 (2000).
319. Guillen v. Pierce County, 31 P.3d 628 (Wash. 2001).
320. Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. at 147. Since the Court found the statute within
Congress's Commerce Clause power, it did not address whether it is also an acceptable exercise of
Congress's Spending Clause Power. See id. at 147 n.9.
32 1. Id. at 148 n.10 (noting issue of regulation of state court rules).
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Court declines to address whether the statute unconstitutionally interferes
with the autonomy of the state
courts on the ground that the issue was not
322
decided by the lower court.
The second case, Jinks v. Richland County,323 involved the tolling
provision of the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute.324 Under that
provision, in an action filed in federal court alleging federal law claims and
pendent state law claims, the state statute of limitations is automatically
tolled while the case is in federal court and for thirty days afterward, such
that, if the federal court ultimately dismisses the case without ruling on the
merits of the state claim the plaintiff will have at least thirty days to file in
state court.32 5 In assessing whether the statute could constitutionally be
applied in an action against a municipality, the Court seriously considered
two claims: whether the provision fell within Congress's enumerated powers,
and whether any special federalism concerns precluded the application of the
statute when the defendant was a non-consenting municipality who otherwise
could take advantage of a limited grant of sovereign immunity under state
law. 326 Determining without much trouble that the statute was valid
legislation under Congress's authority to establish and administer the federal
courts and that the Constitution did not recognize any form of sovereign
immunity for a municipality, the Court unanimously upheld the statute.327
The Court acknowledged that the decision imposed rules on federal
courts and noted in passing that some have objected on constitutional
grounds to federal legislation that interferes with the internal operations of
state courts. 328 However, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, quickly
dismissed the applicability of the doctrine to this case.329 His move was deft
but not particularly analytical, classifying the objection as concerning only
"procedural" rules and then entering into an arcane and relatively unreasoned

322. See id. The Court's invocation of this prudential principle was somewhat strained in this
case, particularly as the Court has routinely treated the state autonomy-anticommandeering issue as

part and parcel of whether a statute falls within Congress's powers, rather than as a separate Tenth
Amendment inquiry. See, e.g., Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 464 (2003); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997).
323. 538 U.S. 456 (2003).
324. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2000).
325. In a 2002 case that relied heavily on the state's sovereign immunity from the initial lawsuit
in federal court, the Supreme Court held that the tolling provision did not act to save a claim filed
against a non-consenting state that would be time-barred under applicable state law. Raygor v.
Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 (2002). Jinks involved the next question-whether
federalism concerns precluded the application of the statute to municipalities. If the Court had
found for the county, the constitutionality of the statute when applied to litigation involving only
private parties might or might not have been endangered depending on the Court's rationale.
326. Jinks, 538 U.S. at 462-63 (enumerated powers question); id. at 465-67 (sovereign
immunity question).
327. Id. at 467.
328. Id. at 464-65.
329. Id. at 465.
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discussion of whether the tolling provision in this case was330"substantive" or
"procedural," ultimately concluding that it was substantive.
Taken together and in conjunction with others like them, these cases
seem to suggest that the Rehnquist Court had no real interest in establishing
rules protective of state court autonomy or even in clarifying the
constitutional relationship between the federal governments and the state
courts. With regard to the usual federalism dissenters, this causes no
surprise; for them the argument was likely frivolous. 33 1 For the Printz v.
United States and Alden majority, however, it requires some explanation.
While the answer to why they-and with them the Rehnquist Courteschewed this path is likely complex and multivariate, their hostility to
litigation likely played some part.
At first blush, that proposition might seem counter-intuitive, as Jinks
upheld a congressional statute that was purposefully pro-litigation.3 32 To
treat the decision as pro-litigation for that reason, however, represents a
failure to see the forest for the trees. It has been one of the central
assumptions of this Article that Justices do not encounter cases as discrete
disputes but instead come to them with all sorts of inchoate or undertheorized assumptions about law, culture, and human nature. If, for whatever
reason, the Justices subscribe--either intellectually or viscerally-to the
assumption that judicial federalism is litigation-positive, then, for the reasons
demonstrated throughout this Article, their natural indication will be to shy
away from doctrines that promote this aspect of federalism. While this
inclination might be overcome in particular cases by the starkly pro-litigation
consequences of a given decision or by some countervailing element of their
complex, intellectual matrices, they will approach claims about the sanctity
of state court procedures with more skepticism and reluctance than other,
broadly anti-litigation, federalism initiatives.
330. Id. Since, as Justice Scalia acknowledges, id. at 465, statutes of limitations are treated
alternatively as substantive and procedural depending on the purpose for which the Court is drawing
the distinction, it was incumbent on him to explain what "procedural" meant in the context of this
possible constitutional objection before he could dismiss the claim on the basis of the substanceprocedure distinction. Doing so, however, would have necessitated explaining in some detail how
the Court conceptualized the potential constitutional challenge and perhaps even evaluating its
strength. For some reason (or likely combination of reasons), the Justices were unwilling to do so.
331. Cf Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 968-70 (1997) (Stevens, J., joined by Souter,
Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that Testa and its progeny refute anti-commandeering
arguments even with regard to executive officers).
332. The tolling clause at issue in Jinks serves primarily to ensure that litigants with credible
state law claims do not lose their day in court merely because of a discretionary decision by a
federal court judge not to retain jurisdiction of the case. 538 U.S. at 463-64 (explaining that when
both federal- and state-law claims are asserted in federal and state court, any state-law claims "will
not become time barred [and run the risk of being dismissed] while pending in federal court").
Guillen, in contrast, did reach a litigation-hostile result, in that the discovery and admissibility rules
at issue remove a potentially useful source of evidence for tort plaintiffs. 537 U.S. at 731-32
(holding as constitutional and within Congress's power a statute preventing a plaintiff's attempt at
discovery and admission of evidence of a state's highway reports and surveys that the state pursued
for the purpose of elimination of roadway hazards).
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The current political climate suggests that this argument is descriptive
as well as theoretical. As the Justices well know, in contemporaneous
political debates, particularly the ongoing debate over tort reform, judicial
federalism is seen as a friend to litigation and a foe to reform. 333 In part, this
perception may be the result of nominal factors in our modem litigation
culture which make state courts more hospitable to personal injury claims
than federal courts at the present time. On the other hand, there is also a
more fundamental connection between judicial federalism and litigation
hospitability. To the extent that our system continues to allow plaintiffs the
right to choose where to file their lawsuits, they will benefit from the
availability of a diverse set of forums with different rules and procedures.3 34
While class action rules and venue provisions might be tightened to reduce
the effects of such forum shopping,3 35 no change short of stripping the right
of plaintiffs to initiate their own action will entirely eliminate this effect.
Moreover, even if this forum-shopping effect were eliminated entirely, states
that adopt litigation-friendly rules and procedures that either directly or
indirectly subject nationwide businesses to substantially greater liability than
they would face in other jurisdictions will continue to have a disproportionate
effect on the policies and behavior of those businesses.33 6
The Justices need not have thought through these theoretical arguments
themselves to have imbibed the policy community's general understanding
that judicial federalism is conducive to extensive litigation and substantial
tort liability. If, as is likely, they have absorbed that correlation into either
their conscious or unconscious understanding of the way in which the world
is structured, their litigation hostility might well predispose them to view
constitutional claims like those raised in this section skeptically. At a
minimum, pro-federalism but litigation-hostile judges are likely to move
cautiously in this area, waiting for a case that starkly and inescapably forces

333. Questions of federalism emerge in the battle over every significant tort reform proposal
introduced in Congress. For one important recent tort reform statute that specifically relies on
federal displacement of state courts in order to limit litigation, see the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, § 2(a)(2)(A) (codified as note to 28 U.S.C. § 1711), which
both federalized most state court class actions by permitting federal court jurisdiction in class
actions that have only minimal diversity and liberalized removal rules.
334. Of course, plaintiffs are not the only parties who can and do "shop" for hospitable forums.
See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal
Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction,83 CORNELL L. REv. 581
(1998) (demonstrating that civil defendants have a particularly high rate of success on the merits
when they remove diversity cases to federal courts and arguing that much of this difference survives
attempts to account for potential explanations other than the favorability of the forum).
335. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
336. This issue is specifically discussed by Congress in the text of the Class Action Fairness
Act. See id.
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them to choose between those strands of their jurisprudence.3 37
course, is exactly what the "federalist five" have done.
V.

That, of

Reading Bush v. Gore Through the Prism of Litigation Hostility

From a sociological perspective, the case of Bush v. Gore was a
controversial modem Supreme Court case on steroids. Like other recent high
profile cases, the case produced multiple and fractured writings from a set of
Justices determined to record their views.338 Its opinions were filled with
contentious rhetoric that revealed fissures and animosities that appeared to
transcend the case at hand. The opinions of the Justices were rapidly
digested and repackaged for popular consumption by a horde of legally
sophisticated and ideologically committed court-watchers of varying stripes.
The decision let loose a cavalcade of academic commentary so mammoth
that insightful analyses were lost in a fog of noise and partisanship.3 39
However, on a more substantive level, it is not clear whether the case
truly is emblematic of the Rehnquist Court. While many scholars have
sought to claim this memorable and momentous decision as evidence for
their own broader analysis of the Rehnquist Court, others have treated the
case as an anomaly-a once-in-a-lifetime event produced by an extraordinary
set of circumstances and signaling little about the legacy or direction of the
3 40
Court.
The Court's own language gives some support to this reading, 341 as
does the seeming incongruity between the majority's resolution342of the case
and its demonstrated fondness for federalist rhetoric and results.

337. To frame this concern more concretely, they do not want to state a general theory in a
relatively low-stakes case only to discover that they have effectively prejudged (and doomed) the
constitutionality of major tort reform legislation.
338. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (consisting of a per curiam opinion and five
additional signed opinions).
339. For one attempt to categorize the scholarship on the case, see Richard L. Hasen, A Critical
Guide to Bush v. Gore Scholarship, 7 ANN. REV. POL. Sci., June 2004, at 297. For one particularly
insightful examination of the Court's behavior, see David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were
They Thinking?, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 184 (Richard A. Epstein &
Cass R. Sunstein eds., 2001). For an interesting attempt to link the Court's reasoning to broader
trends in the Court's jurisprudence (which has been lost in the fog), see Mary Anne Case, Are Plain
Hamburgers Now Unconstitutional? The Equal Protection Component of Bush v. Gore as a
Chapter in the History ofIdeas About Law, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 55 (2003).
340. Compare, e.g., Kramer, supra note 1 (reading Bush v. Gore as representative of the
Court's embrace of judicial supremacy), with Richard A. Posner, Bush v. Gore: Prolegomenon to
an Assessment, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (2001) (reading the case as an extraordinary incident
requiring an extraordinary response).
341. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109 ("Our consideration is limited to the present
circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many
complexities.").
342. Many commentators have noted this disconnect. For example, Jack Balkin observes:
The same five conservative Justices who formed the majority in Bush v. Gore had been
engaged, for over a decade, in a veritable revolution in constitutional doctrines
concerning civil rights and federalism. In those decisions, the five conservatives had
been promoting a relatively consistent set of ideological positions like colorblindness,
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Anyone who wades into the thicket of situating Bush v. Gore in the
jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court is faced with two immense burdens of
persuasion: establishing that this mountain of a case has something to say
about the molehills of the Court's jurisprudence and suggesting a plausible
reading of the case that has not been exhausted by the gallons of ink scholars
have already expended on the subject. This section attempts the task of
meeting those burdens. Part A offers a narrative of the election controversy
that, I believe, best explains both the quandary facing the country and the
Court's point of entry into the debate. Part B provides a brief explanation for
the extraordinary animosity the Supreme Court displayed for the seemingly
routine actions of the Florida Supreme Court. Finally, Part C demonstrates
how an explanation of the Supreme Court's behavior that focuses on the
majority Justices' skepticism about the ability of courts to resolve disputes
and collectively administer justice explains many facets of the Court's
various opinions that have appeared opaque or anomalous.
343

A. Narratingthe Controversy

The results of the 2000 presidential election laid bare the dirty little
secret of American democracy: The results so confidently reported after an
election are nothing more than an accurate poll of voters' expressed
preferences. On the one hand, this is the inevitable result of human frailties
on the part of both voters and election officials and the need to calculate and
report the results with relative dispatch. On the other hand, the transparency
with which the preferences of voters are translated into reported vote totals
ebbs and flows based on issues of election administration, ballot design, and
voting technology. 344 Because reported vote totals are only a close

respect for state autonomy from federal interference, and protection of state
governmental processes from federal supervision. But the decision in Bush v. Gore did
not seem to further those values, at least not directly. Rather, the five conservatives
seemed to adopt whatever legal arguments would further the election of the Republican
candidate, George W. Bush.
Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407,
1408-09 (2001).
343. To understand the Bush v. Gore decision, one must first understand the events that brought

the case to the doorstep of the Supreme Court. That presents enormous pitfalls, as there are
innumerable ways to describe and situate the conflict the Court resolved in Bush v. Gore-allwith
enormous ramifications for evaluating the merits not only of the legal case but also of the behavior
of the relevant parties during the controversy. Acknowledging that the narrative described belowlike that offered by other scholars-is open to contestation on any number of points, the depiction
of the controversy that follows is both descriptive and predictive. It lays out the salient details of
the controversy as I predict the history books will eventually come to describe the aftermath of the
presidential election of 2000.
344. One of the many notable things about the 2000 election in Florida was that the state and
local officials manifestly failed to take appropriate preventive action to reduce the margin of error.
To the contrary, their administrative practices, ballot designs, and choices of voting technology
combined to produce a robust margin of error. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 134 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("[A] different order of disparity obtains under rules for determining a voter's intent that
have been applied.., to identical types of ballots used in identical brands of machines and
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approximation of voters' actual preferences, elections, like polls, have
margins of error. Occasionally, the results of an election will fall within that
margin of error. In 2000, the balloting to select Florida's presidential
electors was such an election. Because of the confluence of the indecisive
Florida results with the outcome in other states, so too was the presidential
election. While the circumstances in Florida were rare, they were far from
unique. In any given election cycle, a small but significant number of races
will fall within the margin of error. These races will produce results so close
that there is no way to be certain that the candidate who is reported to have
received the largest number of votes is actually the candidate who was
preferred by the largest number of voters.34 5
When an election falls within the margin of error, there are two broad
options for certifying elections from which states can choose, each with its
advantages and its disadvantages. First, the state can stick to its normal
procedures for producing the initial results and declare the winner under that
procedure the winner of the election, perhaps after brief and relatively
cursory rechecking or recounting procedures to make sure that no obvious
computational or reporting error was made. Alternatively, the state can
develop ad hoc procedures, tailored to the specific dispute and designed to
determine to the greatest extent possible the intent of every voter,
aggregating those results so as to get a better guess as to the preference of the
electorate. Because of the division of labor in the modem American polity,
the second option usually requires-either in the first instance or later on
down the path-the supervision and approval of a court acting in an

exhibiting identical physical characteristics."); Kenneth Chang, From Ballots to Cockpits, Questions
of Design, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2001, at Fl (discussing design problems in ballots used in the 2000
presidential election); Ford Fessenden, Contesting the Vote: The Voting Machines; No-Vote Rates
Higher in Punch Card Count,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2000, at A29 (noting comparative failure rates of
punch-card and optical-scan machines); Rick Weiss, Canadian Study Calls Butterfly Ballot
'Confusing', WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2000, at A22 (reporting on problems associated with the
butterfly ballots used in the presidential election); Joanne Mariner, Not Everyone Counts: Florida's
436,900
Missing
Votes,
FINDLAW,
Nov.
11,
2000,
http://writ.news.fmdlaw.com/mariner/20001130.html (criticizing Florida's permanent disallowance
of voting rights to ex-felons).
345. Most of the significant election law precedents cited during the Bush v. Gore controversy
involved such an election. See, e.g., Pullen v. Mulligan, 561 N.E.2d 585, 588-90 (I11.
1990)
(relating to an election with margin of victory of 31 votes); Delahunt v. Johnston, 671 N.E.2d 1241,
1241 (Mass. 1996) (relating to an election with margin of victory of 175 votes). Nor is this an
archaic problem; the volume of elections falling within the margin of error is, if anything,
expanding. Washington State's 2004 gubernatorial election, for instance, fell within the margin of
error and ended up in court. See Ralph Thomas, Gregoire Declared Governor-elect, but Rossi
Wants New Election, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 30, 2004, at Al (reporting results of final recount in
Washington gubernatorial election, in which the candidate who originally trailed now led by 129
votes). It is worth noting that several other states seemingly fell within the margin of error in the
2000 presidential election, including New Mexico (0.06%), Wisconsin (0.20%), Iowa (0.32%), and
Oregon (0.45%). Bill Briggs, Professor of Mathematics, University of Colorado at Denver,
Aftermath(ematics) of Election 2000 (Dec. 2000), http://www-math.cudenver.edu/-wbriggs/
qr/election_2000_files/election2000.hml.
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equitable mode,
serving as an impartial arbiter, and lending its imprimatur to
34 6
the results.
The first approach has the advantages of speed, predictability,
transparency, and incorruptibility. There is an elemental fairness to stating
all the rules of something as important as an election up front and following
them wherever they may lead. Moreover, the decision to set the rules a priori
reduces-but does not eliminate-the possibility that the rules will be
manipulated for partisan advantage. If it is impossible for an election to ever
serve as an absolutely accurate reflection of the true preference of the voters,
perhaps the only way to conceptualize an election is as a contest the object of
which is to receive the highest number of reported votes under the
mechanisms and procedures the state has adopted. Among the members of
the Supreme Court that decided Bush v. Gore, Justice O'Connor was the
strongest public proponent of this view of elections and, thus, of such a view
of the proper resolution of elections that fall within the margin of error.347
The second approach is borne out of the same democratic aspirations
that motivate popular elections in the first place. According to proponents of
this approach, the right to vote and have your vote counted is the core
constitutive right of democratic citizenship.348 While it is eminently
reasonable to use procedures that take expense and efficiency into account
when tabulating the results in a normal election, the calculus changes
markedly if any given election ends up within the margin of error. At that
point, the right to have one's preference accurately recorded and reflected in
the vote count becomes of paramount importance, trumping other
considerations. The responsibility of the state is to bend over backwards to
uncover and assimilate all tangible evidence of manifested voter intent. The
state agencies vested with responsibility for resolving the disputed
elections-whether they be executive agencies, courts, or some combination
of the two-need to study the particular roadblocks to an accurate count
raised by the states' voting technology and ballot counting procedures and
devise protocols for minimizing the distorting effects of those roadblocks.
346. While I am sure they exist, I have searched in vain for an election for a state or national
office in which the election fell within the margin of error, the state set out to count or recount

ballots in a manner that involved some degree of independent judgment (rather than mere
mechanistic retabulation), and the election did not in some way, shape, or form reach the courts.
The fact that (nearly?) every such dispute ends in the courts does not, of course, mean that in every
case the courts overturn the judgment of election officials. For an argument that the real cause of
the crisis in 2000 was the Florida Supreme Court's failure to defer to election officials, see George
L. Priest, Reanalyzing Bush v. Gore: Democratic Accountability and Judicial Overreaching,72 U.
COLO. L. REv. 953 (2001).
347. Justice O'Connor consistently voiced this sentiment at oral argument. See, e.g., Transcript
of Oral Argument at 58, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949), available at
http://election2000.stanford.edu/949trans.pdf ("Why isn't the standard [for deciding that a ballot
contains a legal vote] the one that voters are instructed to follow, for goodness sakes? I mean, it
couldn't be clearer. I mean, why don't we go to that standard?").
348. See, e.g., Senator Barbara Boxer, The Count Every Vote Act of 2005, HUM. RTS. Q., Spring

2005, at 20.
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Among the Justices of the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens has most
vigorously advocated this vision as the proper resolution of elections falling
within the margin of error.349
When faced with the choice between these two methods of resolving
those elections falling within the margin of error, the great majority of
American jurisdictions have chosen the latter approach. Evidence of this
preference for inclusion abounds-in the statute books and constitutions of
many states,35 ° in the decisions of state courts interpreting their election
codes, 351 and in the decisions of federal courts policing state court
interventions for constitutional infirmity.3 52
When, however, the Florida courts sided with the position taken by
most states and established an equitable procedure for better ascertaining the
intent of its voters,3 53 the United States Supreme Court put is foot down,
twice granting certiorari and twice vacating opinions of the Florida Supreme
Court.35 4 While the Court's first opinion was cryptic and its second
fractured,355 the import of its decisions was crystal clear: the Florida Supreme
Court was precluded from choosing between the two approaches to

349. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 1047-48 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting from order
granting stay and writ of certiorari) (advocating that every legal vote should be counted); Hartke v.
Roudebush, 321 F. Supp. 1370, 1378-79 (S.D. Ind. 1970) (Stevens, J., dissenting), rev'd, 405 U.S.
15 (1972) (adopting in large part then-Judge Stevens's dissent below).
350. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-645(A) (1996 & Supp. 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 9-150a(j) (West 2002 & Supp. 2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-12-1-1 (West 1997); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1(13) (1993 & Supp. 2005); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 11-302(d)
(LexisNexis 2003); MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 53, § 70E (West 1991); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN.
§ 65.009(c) (Vernon Supp. 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-644(A) (2003).

351. See, e.g., Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So.2d 259, 269 (Fla. 1975) ("In summary, we hold that
the primary consideration in an election contest is whether the will of the people has been
effected."); State ex rel. Carpenter v. Barber, 198 So. 49, 51 (Fla. 1940) ("It is the intention of the
law to obtain an honest expression of the will or desire of the voter."); Pullen v. Mulligan, 561
N.E.2d 585, 611 (111. 1990) ("The purpose of our election laws is to obtain a correct expression of
the intent of the voters."); Delahunt v. Johnson, 671 N.E.2d 1241, 1243 (Mass. 1996) (holding that
the role of government is to "seek to discern the voter's intention and to give it effect"); Duffy v.
Mortenson, 497 N.W.2d 437, 438 (S.D. 1993) (asserting that the duty of the courts is to "determine
and carry out the intent of the voter").
352. See, e.g., Roudebush, 405 U.S. at 25-26 (holding that a state may order a recount in a
senatorial election without infringing the Senate's power under Art. I, § 5); accord Hartke, 321 F.
Supp. at 1378-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state authorities should be permitted to
order a ballot recount without federal intervention).
353. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1243, 1261-62 (Fla. 2000) (asserting that the court has
authority to fashion such orders as it deems necessary to provide appropriate relief in election
disputes); Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1220, 1240 (Fla. 2000)
(invoking "the equitable powers of [the] Court to fashion a remedy that will allow a fair and
expeditious resolution of the questions presented").
354. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S.
70 (2000); cf Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1046-47 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in order granting
stay and writ of certiorari) (defending the decision of the Court to grant a stay of the second Florida
Supreme Court decision).
355. See Palm Beach County, 531 U.S. at 70 (short and undefinitive per curiam opinion); Bush
v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 98 (containing six opinions).
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managing elections that fall within the margin of error. The state had no
choice but to rely on the results as estimated by the voting machines (with
whatever modifications the modest and mechanical automatic recounting
procedures required).
B. Explaining the Reaction of the Court
To understand the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore, it is necessary to
discern what got the Court's five most conservative members so worked up
in the first place. Presumably, some of the Justices' initial animosity
stemmed from the fact that the Florida Court (made up entirely of
Democratic appointees) 3 6 appeared to be acting against the interest of their
preferred candidate. The decision to intervene may also have been based on
a sense that it was somehow inappropriate for a local court to claim the last
word on issues of such national import. Finally, it is certainly plausible that
the Court was to some degree motivated by genuine disagreements as to the
proper interpretation of Florida statutory law.
However, there was also something deeper and more visceral at work: a
fundamental hostility toward the role the Florida Supreme Court took upon
itself. Looking at the action of the Florida Court, what-beyond a politically
disturbing outcome-did the five most conservative members of the Supreme
Court see? While I suppose we will never be able to answer this question
definitively, the analytic frame developed in the pages above suggests an
answer. First, the majority Justices likely saw a lower court advocating the
primacy of a litigation solution to a contentious public debate. While the
Rehnquist Court is justifiably famous for its willingness to hoard for itself
the last word on all manner of politico-constitutional questions,35 7 it has
consistently expressed little patience with lower courts that have attempted to
carve out for themselves a broader role in resolving disputes and
administering justice. 358 The certiorari petitions in this case thus presented
the Justices with a rare opportunity to indulge both their judicial-supremacist

356. Justice Leander J. Shaw was appointed to the Florida Supreme Court in 1983 by Governor
Bob Graham; Justice Major B. Harding was appointed in 1991 by Governor Lawton Chiles; Justices
Charles T. Wells and Henry Lee Anstead were appointed in 1994 by Governor Chiles; Justice
Barbara J. Pariente was appointed in 1997 by Governor Chiles; Justice R. Fred Lewis was appointed
by Governor Chiles in 1998; and Justice Peggy A. Quince was appointed jointly by Governor Chiles
and newly elected Governor Jeb Bush in 1998. Jessica Reaves, They Who Must Decide: The
Florida
Supreme
Court,
TIME,
Nov.
15,
2000,

http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,88402,00.html.
357. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 1, at 14, 128-29 (arguing that the Rehnquist Court views
itself as "the only institution empowered to speak with authority when it comes to the meaning of
the Constitution").
358. Cf, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1989)
(criticizing the lower court for reaching a result suggested by the Supreme Court's recent decisions
but in conflict with more direct, albeit older, Supreme Court precedent, while simultaneously
overruling its own precedent to reach same result as the lower court). See generally supra Part III.
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tendencies 359 and their judicial-passivist ideology; 360 they could insert
themselves into the spotlight only to rule definitively that meddling judges
had overstepped their bounds.
The conservative Justices also likely took note of the fact that in
addition to simply taking jurisdiction over this crucial national issue, the
Florida Supreme Court had also cheerfully taken up the role of grand
equitable umpire, vesting itself with the power to craft ad hoc remedial
solutions to a problem the legislature had not fully contemplated. For
many-perhaps most-Justices throughout our history, the role assumed by
the Florida justices might not have seemed extraordinary. But for the five
Justices who drove the tempo and timbre of the Rehnquist Court agenda, the
Florida Supreme Court's embrace of such a role was a provocative act, one
guaranteed to raise their hackles. If a court behaving in such a fashion in a
routine civil case was enough to raise the ire of Justice Scalia or Chief Justice
Rehnquist, 361 doing so when the presidency was on the line was sure to drive
them to distraction. The Florida justices had inadvertently stumbled across
the ideological fault line of the Rehnquist Court, a line not to be crossed.
C. The Explanatory Power of the Court's Hostility to Litigation
Without access to the minds-or better yet the souls-of the nine
Justices, one cannot do justice to the myriad cross-cutting ideas, emotions,
and strategic considerations that motivated their behavior during the tense
days in which Bush v. Gore was decided. 36' However, the footprints their
opinions left in the sand-particularly when read in light of their opinions in
other contemporaneous cases-provide some clues as to their intellectual and
psychological preoccupations.
Just as an affinity for contemporary
conservative politics and a penchant for arrogating itself a central role in the
polity run through the Court's opinions, so too does a guttural contempt for
ad hoc remediation efforts and the courts who undertake them. Moreover,
reading Bush v. Gore through the prism of the Rehnquist Court's hostility to
litigation offers explanations to several crucial puzzles about the Court's
actions during this case that have thus far not been satisfactorily explained by
the commentary.363
359. Cf Kramer, supra note 1, at 14 (arguing that the Rehnquist Court was defined by an
overarching "judicial supremacy"). 360. Cf Meltzer, supra note 62, at 343, 409 (arguing that the Rehnquist Court's nonconstitutional decisions demonstrate a crabbed understanding of the judicial role that amount to
unwarranted "judicial passivity").
361. See, e.g., supra subpart Ill(A) (discussing right of action cases in which courts arguably
assumed such a role and the almost-hostile opinions reversing those decisions).
362. Though I was a law clerk for Justice Stevens during the term Bush v. Gore was decided, I
emphasize that (1) I neither possess nor rely on any special insight into the hearts and minds of any
of the Justices and (2) my analysis does not rest in any way on confidential in-chambers

conversations or other privileged information.
363. The scholarly commentary has touched on how Bush v. Gore fits into the Rehnquist
Court's debates about the role of courts and the proper scope of remediation, although only in ways
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1. The First Cryptic Per Curiam.-The United States Supreme Court's
first decision in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board364 is widely
considered to have been a strategic retreat by a Court unwilling to put its
institutional credibility on the line by subjecting its bitter internal division to
public scrutiny.365 Commentators reading the decision in such functionalist
terms have largely assumed that the Court's ostensible legal rationale-that a
remand was necessary so that the Florida Supreme Court could clarify
whether it was striking down portions of the state's election code under the
state constitution or merely interpreting ambiguous portions of the code in
light of the values laid out in that constitution 66-was simply the
fig leaf that
367
cover.
for
reached
Court
the
when
around
happened to be lying
Even assuming that the rationale was picked out of convenience rather
368
than conviction, why did that particular issue happen to be lying around?
In large measure, the answer may be the degree to which this relatively tepid
claim is built upon some very pointed and very familiar accusations about the
behavior of the Florida Supreme Court. Though the Article II hook that
transformed the reference of the Florida Supreme Court to its own
constitution into a federal issue was, of course, novel, the frustration of the
Court at the methods of interpretation and argument of the Florida Supreme
Court was entirely predictable, in that it drew on a familiar staple of anxieties
about litigation, equity, and ad hoc judicial management.

tangential to the argument contained herein. See, e.g., Case, supra note 339, at 55-56 (outlining the
extent to which Bush v. Gore is consistent with the Justices' general jurisprudential commitments);
Spencer Overton, Rules, Standards,and Bush v. Gore: Form and the Rule of Democracy, 37 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 66 (2002) (reading Bush v. Gore as an episode in the long-running debate
between "rules" and "standards"); Robert A. Schapiro, Article II as Interpretive Theory: Bush v.
Gore and the Retreatfrom Erie, 34 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 89, 91 (2002) (interpreting the Chief Justice's
concurring opinion as reflective of the Rehnquist Court's efforts to delegitimize non-textualist
methods of statutory interpretation and the Court's drift back towards the understanding of the role
of state courts reflected in Swift v. Tyson); Tracy A. Thomas, UnderstandingProphylacticRemedies
Through the Looking Glass of Bush v. Gore, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 343 (2002) (reading the
case for lessons about the remedial power of courts, but focusing only on the United States Supreme
Court's remediation efforts, rather than those of the Florida courts); Young, supra note 1, at 1156
(discussing in passing whether Bush v. Gore fits into the Rehnquist Court's general aversion to
broad remedial orders).
364. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
365. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Learning to Live with Bush v. Gore, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 381
(2001) (noting that the opinion "masked profound divisions within the Court"); Linda Greenhouse,
Bush v. Gore: A Special Report, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2001, at Al [hereinafter Greenhouse, Bush v.
Gore: A Special Report] (explaining events in greater detail).
366. Palm Beach County, 531 U.S. at 77-78.
367. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 339, at 185; Greenhouse, Bush v. Gore: A Special Report,
supra note 365.
368. In suggesting that the argument was "lying around," I do not mean to prejudge the
question whether some Justices consciously picked a rationale they considered skimpy for strategic
purposes. To the contrary, I mean to suggest that-whether or not they ultimately turn out to be
meritorious-particular issues jump out of the pages of cases based on the intellectual and cultural
milieu in which the reader is situated. They are, to use another metaphor, "in the air."
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Intelligent minds have disagreed about whether the Florida Supreme
Court utilized the Florida Constitution to trump provisions of the state's
election code and whether doing so actually violates the commands of Article
11.369 On the level of doctrinal analysis, answering these questions is of
obvious importance. However, in understanding both the dynamics of the
election controversy and the Rehnquist Court's broader intellectual matrix,
they are surprisingly irrelevant. Whether the Florida Supreme Court was
invalidating the state's election laws under its own constitution or was simply
referencing the state constitution as one source among many for its
decision, 370 the court was allowing a broad and abstract cultural commitment
to democracy-rather than a careful parsing of statutory text-to drive its
analysis. While the Rehnquist Court did not universally shy away from such
a methodology, particularly in federal constitutional cases, 37 1 it generally
employed a tighter, more text-driven methodology in
its own work 372 and
373
so.
do
to
frequently castigated lower courts for failing
Turning to the text of the Florida Supreme Court's decision only
reinforces the conclusion that the state court drafted an opinion almost
uniquely designed to provoke the anger of the Rehnquist Court. While the
opinion contained a section carefully analyzing the structure and text of the
relevant statutory provisions,3 74 the court cabined off that discussion into a
separate part, likely to be overlooked by readers drawn to the opinion's more
incendiary passages. In making the case for a broad remedial solution to the
electoral deadlock, the court borrowed from prior decisions a series of block
quotes and decontextualized pronouncements all loudly trumpeting a
commitment to democracy in language more conducive to a civics textbook
than to a judicial opinion. 375 Most importantly, it clumsily articulated its

369. Compare Balkin, supra note 342, at 1413-25 (criticizing the Court's resolution of these

issues) and James A. Gardner, The Regulatory Role of the State Constitutional Structural
Constraints in PresidentialElections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 625, 628-29 (2001) (same) with
Richard A. Epstein, "In Such Manner as the Legislature May Direct": The Outcome in Bush v.
Gore Defended, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 339, at 13
(supporting the Court's interpretation) and Richard A. Posner, Florida2000: A Legal and Statistical
Analysis of the Election Deadlock and the EnsuingLitigation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 48-53 (same).
370. The latter being my view.
371. See generally supra subpart IV(A) (discussing the Rehnquist Court's sovereign immunity
decisions); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding laws banning consensual
same-sex sexual activity unconstitutional, relying primarily on general notions of liberty and
autonomy). For the use of such reasoning in statutory cases, see, for example, Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 679 (2001), which read in a "reasonable time" limitation on the allowable period of
detention of foreign aliens into the relevant statutes, despite the absence of any statutory language
mandating such a limit.
372. On the "textualist" focus of the Supreme Court's statutory interpretation jurisprudence,
see, for example, Eskridge, supra note 41, at 652-58; Manning, supra note 41, at 3-7.
373. See, e.g., Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 239 (2004) (criticizing
the court of appeals for "fail[ing] to examine... surrounding language" in interpreting a statute).
374. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1230-36 (Fla. 2000).
375. Among the choicest examples, one might count:
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project in a series of jaw-dropping sentences whose content was perfectly
defensible but whose bluntness and phrasing could not have been
better
376
majority.
traditional
Court's
Rehnquist
the
antagonize
to
designed
Nor did it help the Florida Supreme Court's cause that its decision
invoked disfavored methods of statutory interpretation for the very purpose
of granting the courts greater power. Not only was the Florida Supreme
Court jettisoning "technical statutory requirements93 77 to pursue the
vindication of the "preeminent right" without which "all others would be
' but it was also arrogating
diminished,"3 78
to itself ultimate authority over the
details of the ad hoc machinery designed to make real that commitment.
While perhaps-and I stress perhaps-either a grossly purposivist method of
statutory interpretation or a conclusion that vested ultimate remedial
authority in the courts might have slipped past the Rehnquist Court, an

The real parties in interest here, not in the legal sense but in realistic terms, are the
voters. They are possessed of the ultimate interest and it is they whom we must give
primary consideration. The contestants have direct interests certainly, but the office
they seek is one of high public service and of utmost importance to the people, thus
subordinating their interests to that of the people. Ours is a government of, by and for
the people. Our federal and state constitutions guarantee the right of the people to take
an active part in the process of that government, which for most of our citizens means
participation via the election process. The right to vote is the right to participate;it is
also the right to speak, but more importantly the right to be heard. We must tread
carefully on that right or we risk the unnecessary and unjustified muting of the public
voice. By refusing to recognize an otherwise valid exercise of the right of a citizen to
vote for the sake of sacred, unyielding adherence to statutory scripture, we would in
effect nullify that right.
Id. at 1227-28 (emphasis added) (quoting Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 263 (Fla. 1975));

and:
It is significant that our Constitution thus commences by specifying those things which
the state government must not do, before specifying certain things that it may do.
These Declarations of Rights... have cost much, and breathe the spirit of that sturdy
and self-reliant philosophy of individualism which underlies and supports our entire
system of government. No race of hothouse plants could ever have produced and
compelled the recognition of such a stalwart set of basic principles, and no such race
can preserve them. They say to arbitrary and autocratic power, from whatever official
quarter it may advance to invade these vital rights of personal liberty and private
property, "Thus far shalt thou come, but no farther."
Palm Beach County, 772 So. 2d at 1236 (quoting State v. City of Stuart, 120 So. 335, 347 (Fla.
1929)).
376. See, e.g., Palm Beach County, 772 So. 2d at 1227 ("Twenty-five years ago, this Court
commented that the will of the people not, a hyper-technical reliance upon statutory provisions,
should be our guiding principle in election cases .... "); id. at 1237 ("Courts must not lose sight of
the fundamental purpose of election laws: The laws are intended to facilitate and safeguard the right
of each voter to express his or her will in the context of our representative democracy. Technical
statutory requirements must not be exalted over the substance of this right.") (footnotes omitted); id.
at 1239 ("[T]he will of the electors supersedes any technical statutory requirements: '[T]he
electorate's effecting its will through its balloting, not the hypertechnical compliance with statutes,
is the object of holding an election. There is no magic in the statutory requirements."') (alteration
in the original) (quotations omitted).
377. Id. at 1237.

378. Id. at 1236.
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opinion combining both had virtually no chance in the hothouse environment
of a Court already accustomed to protracted battles over just such issues.
The sophisticated Supreme Court litigators and former Supreme Court
clerks representing Governor Bush quickly realized that the Florida Supreme
Court had stumbled into the wheelhouse of the Supreme Court and packaged
their merits brief accordingly. From the very first pages, their brief is filled
with references to the Florida Supreme Court's decision as an "equitable
decree, 379 long verbatim quotations of the passages discussed above,3 8 ° and
increasingly acerbic references to the state court's unwillingness to allow
"hypertechnical" interpretations 381 or "technical statutory requirements" to
settle the case.382 The Florida Supreme Court's purported "reluctance to
rewrite the Florida Election Code" is pointedly contrasted with its decision to
"invoke the equitable powers of this Court to fashion a remedy that will
'383
allow a fair and expeditious resolution of the questions presented here.
Whatever the issue, the brief s argument is the same-this case is an
example of power-hungry, equity-embracing judges run amok. For example,
the section on the federal statutory question that initially lead the Bush
campaign's argument includes eight increasingly contemptuous references to
the Florida Supreme Court's embrace of "equity" or "equitable powers. 384
The Article II argument that follows ratchets up the argument one degree,
claiming that the Florida Supreme Court "made clear that it felt no obligation
to adhere to the statutes applicable to the election., 385 By the time the brief
even mentions the references to the Florida Constitution that ended up
justifying the remand, the Bush lawyers had carefully packaged the Florida
Supreme Court as a power-hungry body, intent on running roughshod over
the state election code, federal statutes, and the federal Constitution in order
to feed its insatiable equitable appetite. Placed in that context, the purported
reliance of the Florida Supreme Court on the state constitution is portrayed
not only as a legal error, but also as a cynical attempt to find cover for a
blatant power grab or, in the words of the brief, "an unconstitutional
386
arrogation of power."

379. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 1, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S.
70 (2000) (No. 00-836), 2000 WL 1761134 (referring twice to the Florida Supreme Court's opinion
as an equitable decree).
380. E.g., id. at 10-11.
381. Id. at 10, 13, 45 (referring to the Florida Supreme Court's rejection of "hypertechnical"
reliance on statutory language).
382. Id. at 10, 26, 45, 50-51 (referring to the state court's unwillingness to defer to "technical
statutory requirements").
383. Id. at 11; see id. at 18, 46 (making similar points using same language).
384. Id. at 18, 19, 21, 25, 26, 31 n.9. Interestingly, when the brief references "equity," it puts
the term in quotation marks, the written equivalent of a cocked eyebrow.

385. Id. at 44-45.
386. Id. at 48. One of the primary authors of the brief was law professor John Manning, a
former clerk for Justice Scalia and the leading academic proponent of the argument that careful
textual methods of statutory interpretation are constitutionally required. See John F. Manning,
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2. The Curious Persistence of the Article II Issue.-When the election
controversy returned to the Court a second time, the fragile harmony of the
Palm Beach County per curiam opinion quickly crumbled. As we all know,
the fractured opinions in Bush v. Gore included another per curiam in which
the Rehnquist Court's usual five-justice majority determined that the failure
of the Florida Supreme Court to specify precise standards for conducting
further recounts violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and that, under the relevant state statute, time had run out on any
further attempts to specify such standards. 387 Though this was the basis for
the decision, it was not the issue on which the Justices focused the bulk of
their writing.
To the contrary, the opinions included a substantial
concurrence by Chief Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justices Scalia and
Thomas) 388 and opinions by each of the four dissenters all focusing on the
propriety of the behavior of the Florida courts and the Article II
consequences of the state courts' mode of judging. 389 The Justices' strong
interest in these issues is further evidence for the proposition that, at least in
part, they experienced the Florida election cases as yet another battle over the
propriety of litigation solutions to contentious public issues and the remedial
role of the courts.
This connection is particularly evident in Chief Justice Rehnquist's
concurring opinion. While a thorough parsing of the opinion's argument is
beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth exploring briefly the degree to
which the opinion encapsulates an attitude about the work of the courts that

Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 675 (1997); Brief for Petitioner
at 51, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (No. 00-836) (listing
Professor Manning as counsel); David Von Drehle et al., In FloridaDrawing the Battle Lines: Big
Guns Assembled as Recount Begins, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2001, at Al (discussing Professor
Manning's central role in formulating arguments for the brief). While the Rehnquist Court has
never gone so far as to argue that as a general matter its preferred methods of statutory construction
are constitutionally required, it has made it clear that it views many alternative strategies as
fundamentally misguided and illegitimate. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S.
440, 473 (1989) ("Where it is clear that the unambiguous language of a statute embraces certain
conduct, and it would not be patently absurd to apply the statute to such conduct, it does not foster a
democratic exegesis for this Court to rummage through unauthoritative materials to consult the
spirit of the legislation in order to discover an alternative interpretation of the statute with which the
Court is more comfortable."); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 221 (1979) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) ("Today... the Court behaves much like the Orwellian speaker earlier
described ....
[W]ithout even a break in syntax, the Court rejects 'a literal construction. . .' in
favor of newly discovered 'legislative history."'). The Republican briefs were able to harness the
majority's sympathy for the proposition that there is something suspect about broader, multi-faceted
methods of statutory interpretation by arguing that in this particular context Article II provides a
textual hook for their inclination that the Constitution commands their vision of the judicial role.
387. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000).
388. Id. at 11 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
389. Id. at 123-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (addressing the Article II issue); id. at 129, 130-33
(Souter, J., dissenting) (addressing the Article II issues in depth before turning to the equal
protection question); id. at 135-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (addressing the Chief Justice's
argument by name and in long detail); id. at 145, 147-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same).
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broadly characterizes the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence (and especially the
jurisprudence of its three signers).
From the onset, the concurring opinion is a biting indictment of the
Florida Supreme Court's behavior and methodology. That approach is
initially laid bare in a revealing, preliminary observation: In scrutinizing the
meaning of the relevant Article II provision, the Chief Justice asserts that,
given the language of the federal Constitution, "the text of the election law
itself, and not just its interpretation by the courts of the States, takes on
independent significance." 390 While it is easy to glide over that observation
particularly during an era dominated by textualist statutory interpretation, the
Chief Justice's argument is actually quite radical. He is not arguing, as many
conservative lawyers and commentators did, that, under Article II, the state
courts have no role in interpreting their election laws nor that such a role
exists only at the sufferance of the legislature.
These claims, while
substantively debatable, are coherent explanations of the division of powers
mandated by Article 11. 391 Rather, his assertion is that the courts are free to
speak to the meaning of the law but that one should not confuse the courts'
construction of the statute with its true meaning. As the dissenters argue, the
Chief Justice's point, no matter how rhetorically powerful it may be, is
incoherent within the framework of traditional methods of statutory
interpretation and traditional understandings of the separation of powers.392
Many laws, particularly dense and confusing laws like Florida's election
code, often need judicial interpretation to take full effect. Historically, once
judges speak to the relevant questions of statutory interpretation, these
judicial decisions give meaning to the statute and are treated as if they have
always been part and parcel of the statutory text.393 To argue, as the Chief
Justice does, that there exists a true meaning of a statute that exists apart
from its judicial interpretation (and that can be discerned from a
commonsense parsing of the statutory language) is to suggest that the

390. See id. at 111, 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see also id. at 115 ("This inquiry does
not imply a disrespect for state courts but rather a respect for the constitutionally prescribed role of
state legislatures.").
391. See Richard A. Epstein, In Such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct, The
Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra
note 339, at 1, 19-35 (noting that "[i]f... the state courts or executive officials have failed properly
to apply the state scheme, resulting in a gross deviation from the legislature's directives, then a
federal court can review the matter under Article II").
392. Cf, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 130-31 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Bush does not, of
course, claim that any judicial act interpreting a statute of uncertain meaning is enough to displace
the legislative provision and violate Article II; statutes require interpretation, which does not
without more affect the legislative character .. ");id. at 141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The
Framers of our Constitution, however, understood that in a republican government, the judiciary
would construe the legislature's enactments.").
393. See, e.g., id. at 128 & n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Like any other judicial interpretation
of a statute, [the Florida court's] opinion was an authoritative interpretation of what the statute's
relevant provisions have meant since they were enacted."); Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511
U.S. 298, 312-13 (1994) (explaining the rationale behind and operation of this principle).
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judiciary has so fundamentally failed to perform its duties that we should
regard as fictional, and therefore discard, this well-established mechanism for
coordinating the crucial functions of the legislature and the judiciary. To do
so off-hand and without explanation, as the Chief Justice does, is to suggest
that that failure is so systemic and so obvious that no explanation is
necessary. In one seemingly innocuous comment, Chief Justice Rehnquist
speaks volumes about the Supreme Court's assessment of the work product
of the contemporary American judiciary.394
The opinion strongly suggests that the Article II argument is nothing
more than a convenient hook for an attack on the Florida Supreme Court's
judicial methods. This is evidenced by the fact that the central substantive
section of the opinion-Section II-spends eight paragraphs criticizing the
state court's statutory interpretation without once citing to Article II or any
other provision of federal law. 395 This section goes out of its way to assume
the cadence and the narrative of an appellate court opinion reversing a lower
court's decision for abuse of discretion. First, it describes the state election
code as a "detailed, if not perfectly crafted, statutory scheme," both
suggesting that the lower court had a responsibility to decipher and enforce
the legislative will and offering a half-hearted excuse for its alleged failure to
do SO. 39 6 Then it narrates the relevant statutes. When this section of the
opinion finally turns to the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of those
statutes, it relies primarily on labels and conclusions, rather than argument,
describing the state court's positions as having "no basis ' 397 and "of course
absurd, 398 suggesting that "[n]o reasonable person would" adopt such
positions, 399 and insisting that the court "plainly departed from the legislative
scheme. 4 °°

394. A prevailing reading of the Chief Justice's opinion-one shared in large measure by the
dissenting opinions-is that he was arguing that there was something so uncommonly rotten about
the Florida Supreme Court's statutory interpretation that it could only be explained by rank
partisanship and should, therefore, be treated as a legal nullity. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at
135-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The Chief Justice maintains that Florida's Supreme Court has
veered so far from the ordinary practice of judicial review that what it did cannot properly be called
judging."). Certainly, the Chief Justice's analogies to the decisions of the southern courts resisting
the civil rights movement and the Virginia courts resisting the establishment of federal judicial
review over state court judgments, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 114-15 & n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring), give that impression. The preliminary observation quoted in the text-in combination
with the Court's other actions in this case and its decisions in other contemporary cases-suggests
that, while the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas saw the Florida Supreme Court's
behavior as rotten, they did not necessarily see anything uncommon about that fact. To the
contrary, the Chief and his ideological allies can almost be heard murmuring "there they go again."
395. Id. at 116-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
396. Id. at 116.
397. Id. at 120.
398. Id. at 119.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 118.
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There is not a word in this section about the Florida courts taking on
powers prohibited by Article II or about the court relying on sources that are
not legitimately within its purview. The Article II argument made in this
opinion is more straightforward and less refined than the one hinted at in the
first opinion and argued for in Governor Bush's briefs. 40 1 According to the
Chief Justice, the Florida courts violated Article II simply by being bad
judges. A sense of constrained catharsis permeates the opinion: tightly
bridled joy at smacking down an activist, equity-oriented, litigation-friendly
court seeps out of the text at its every pore.
Like in the first case,40 2 the general indictment by the Court of the
Florida Supreme Court's methodology is coupled with a substantive hostility
to an equity-driven, court-oriented approach to resolving elections that fall
within the margin of error. In fact, it is a series of assumptions about the
absurdity of such an approach that provide the "evidence" put forth by the
Court in its condemnation of the Florida Supreme Court's performance. The
Chief Justice's concurring opinion firmly states that "Florida statutory law
cannot reasonably be thought to require the counting of improperly marked
ballots ' 40 3 and lampoons the idea that "an error in the vote tabulation" or a
"rejection of ... legal votes" has occurred when "electronic ' or4
electromechanical equipment performs precisely in the manner designed. A
The idea that the Florida legislature would have adopted an election code
which "regularly produces elections in which legal votes are predictably not
tabulated, so that in close elections manual recounts are regularly required" is
"absurd" to the three concurring Justices.40 5 The provision of instructions,
sample machines, and sample ballots, and the posting of a warning to
recheck one's ballot (in capital letters) are treated as prima facie evidence
that the state has no interest in the complaints of would-be voters whose
preferences are not properly recorded.40 6
These observations are wonderfully evocative of the worldview shared
by these three Justices. The idea that we live in an imperfect world where
systems that are normally efficient and workable might still break down
under stress is foreign to them. The thought of a system whereby the
legislature recognizes the impossibility of predicting every eventuality and
cedes remedial power to the courts to deal with unexpected contingencies
sends shudders down their spines. The notion that anyone-let alone the
majority of a state legislature-might favor a system whereby we bend over
backwards to discern the intention of voters who were not capable of
following the rules prominently displayed in their polling places is

401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.

See supra section V(C)(1).
See supra text accompanying notes 364-376.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 118-19.
Id. at 119.
Id.
See id. (recounting these steps and reprinting the warning (still in capital letters)).
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inconceivable. That substantive justice might be achieved by such a system
is of no moment. Ad hoc remedial solutions are to be avoided at all costs.
3. The Chasm Between the Majority and Justices Breyer and Souter.The majority went out of its way to claim a 7-2 victory on the crucial equal
protection issue.40 7 Given the focus of the public on the bottom line of who
would be president, this would have been a hard sell no matter what Justices
Souter and Breyer said in their opinions. However, the strident language
with which they attacked the majority's resolution of the case and the care
they took to mark themselves as dissenters made it impossible.40 8 Still, their
acceptance of the majority's central argument hangs like a pall over the case,
confusing those who seek a simple explanation for the division of the Court.
In particular, readers of the opinions have found it difficult to understand
why Justices Souter and Breyer attacked the majority with such relish if their
"only disagreement [wa]s as to the remedy" for the state's unconstitutional
actions.4 °9
Reading the case through the prism of the Court's hostility to litigation
provides an easy answer to this question. While Justices Souter and Breyer
disagreed with the majority only as to remedy, remedies are in the end, what
the case is about: remedies for flawed ballots; remedies for failing
technology; remedies for partisan behavior by local and statewide election
officials; remedies for election procedures that did not provide detailed
instructions for handling the kind of crisis the election had produced; and
remedies for judges who were over-cautious or over-aggressive in
constructing solutions to all of the other remedial problems. The overarching issues that separated the majority and the dissent were the questions
of how such momentous remedial issues should be resolved and by whom.
For the majority, as most vocally articulated by the Chief Justice's
concurrence, 410 the answer was obvious: whatever limited remedial options
the designated election officials deemed available under the state's election
code should be followed and the results of the election certified without
407. See id. at 111 (asserting that "[s]even Justices of the Court agree that there are
constitutional problems with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court that demand a
remedy" and then citing Justice Souter's and Justice Breyer's opinions).
408. Both opinions were styled as "dissenting" opinions rather than opinions "concurring in
part and dissenting in part." Their conclusions are instructive as well. See id. at 129 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("The Court should not have reviewed either Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing
Bd. or this case ....
The case being before us, however, its resolution by the majority is another

erroneous

decision.")

(internal

citations

omitted);

id. at 158 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I fear that in order to bring this agonizingly long election
process to a definitive conclusion, we have not adequately attended to that necessary 'check upon
our own exercise of power,' 'our own sense of self-restraint.' Justice Brandeis once said of the
Court, 'The most important thing we do is not doing.' What it does today, the Court should have
left undone. I would repair the damage as best we now can, by permitting the Florida recount to
continue under uniform standards.") (internal citations omitted).
409. Id. at 111 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
410. See supra section V(C)(2).
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recourse to any further judicially crafted remediation. For the dissenters,
including Justices Souter and Breyer, the answer was equally obvious: the
Florida courts should exercise their authority under Florida law "to fashion
such orders as he or she deems necessary to ensure that each allegation in the
complaint is investigated, examined, or checked, to prevent or correct any
alleged wrong,4 11and to provide any relief appropriate under such
circumstances."
In order to understand why Justices Souter and Breyer styled themselves
angry dissenters, we need only take seriously what they wrote on this issue.
Both men believed that the Florida courts were simply doing their job in
taking on the role of equitable umpires and working to craft a litigationdriven ad hoc remedial solution to the problems posed by this peculiar
election.41 They thought that the Florida courts might well have crafted an
appropriate and constitutionally permissible set of remedies if left alone to
complete their work.4 13 They believed the Court acted precipitously and
without legal justification in intervening to stop the remedial project in media
res.4 14 Forced to address the Florida Supreme Court's half-finished remedial
scheme as frozen in time by the Court's precipitous stay, Souter and Breyer
reluctantly concluded that the truncated remedial scheme before the Courtwhich was never intended to be the complete Florida scheme in the first
place 4 15 -violated the Equal Protection Clause. 4 16 Even then, it seemed
411. FLA. STAT. § 102.168(8) (Supp. 2001); see Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 133 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (quoting this language); id. at 152 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same).
412. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 133 (Souter, J., dissenting) (concluding that the Florida
Supreme Court "engaged in permissible construction" of relevant state law and "proceeded to direct
the trial judge to deal with [the matter] in the exercise of the discretionary power, generously
conferred by" the Florida statute); id. at 152 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing to the same Florida
statute in defending the Florida courts' remedial activity).
413. See, e.g., id. at 129 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("If this Court had allowed the State to follow
the course indicated by the opinions of its own Supreme Court, it is entirely possible that there
would ultimately have been no issue requiring our review ....");id. at 133 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(concluding that the Equal Protection issue "might well have been dealt with adequately by the
Florida courts if the state proceedings had not been interrupted"); id.at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(lamenting that the equal protection issue "might have been left to the state court to resolve if and

when it was discovered to have mattered").
414. See, e.g., id. at 129 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The Court should not have reviewed either
Bush v. Palm Beach County CanvassingBd. or this case, and should not have stopped Florida's

attempt to recount all undervote ballots by issuing a stay of the Florida Supreme Court's orders
during the period of this review.") (citations omitted); id. at 144 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The Court
was wrong to take this case. It was wrong to grant a stay.").
415. The Florida Supreme Court's opinion had not itself established a remedial scheme (except
to the extent that it ordered the inclusion in the vote count of votes that had already been identified
in two counties), but rather had, consistent with the relevant statutes-see, for example, FLA. STAT.
§ 102.168(5) & (8) (Supp. 2001)--remanded the case to the circuit court for the crafting of
appropriate equitable orders. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262 (Fla. 2000). The circuit
court judge had then ordered the counties to proceed, offering no initial guidance beyond the
statutory intent of the voter standard. However, the circuit court judge continued to supervise the
case and was charged with the authority to review the conclusions of the county election officials, to
impose further or different requirements, and to order any appropriate relief. See id.; see also Bush
v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that "a single impartial magistrate will
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obvious to the two Justices that the case should be remanded to the Florida
courts to allow them to continue managing the case in their equitable roles.417
Both Justices seemed to trust that the result of such a remand would be the
fair and constitutional remediation of the two parties' grievances.4 18 More to
the point, they assumed that such remediation was the goal toward which all
parties should be striving.
4. Justice Stevens's Famous Dissent.-Of all the words written by the
Justices in their various opinions in Bush v. Gore, none have been more
quoted than the concluding lines of Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion:
"Although we may never know with complete certainty the winner of this
year's Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is
the Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of
law.",4 19 That bold statement of dissatisfaction has-more often than notbeen read as a general lament about the effect of the Court's decision on
popular confidence in the Supreme Court, implicitly predicting that the
people will read the Court's opinion and see it for the laughably partisan act
that it is. However, as conservative commentators have been quick to point

ultimately adjudicate all objections arising from the recount process"). Whether the Florida courts'
ultimate remedial order would have been subject to the same constitutional objections as the interim
remedial scheme the Court reviewed is yet another question whose answer "we may never know
with complete certainty." Id. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
416. See, e.g., id. at 133-34 (Souter, J., dissenting) (determining that, "because the course of
state proceedings has been interrupted, time is short, and the issue is before us," it is "sensible" for
the Court to reach the merits of the equal protection issue and that the practice of following different
standards in different counties "appear[s] wholly arbitrary"); id. at 144-45 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(decrying the decision of the Court to take the case, justifying the actions of the Florida Supreme
Court in denying to set "uniform subsidiary standards" for vote counters, and concluding that "in
these very special circumstances" the Florida court's failure to set such standards "implicate[s]
principles of fundamental fairness"). It is worth noting that, unlike Justice Souter, Justice Breyer
never comes out and says that the Equal Protection Clause has been violated.
417. See, e.g., id. at 134-35 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("I would therefore remand the case to the
courts of Florida with instructions to establish uniform standards for evaluating the several types of
ballots that have prompted differing treatments, to be applied with and among counties when
passing on such identical ballots in any further recounting (or successive recounting) that the courts
might order."); id. at 146 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("An appropriate remedy would be, instead, to
remand this case with instruction that, even at this late date, would permit the Florida Supreme
Court to require recounting all undercounted votes in Florida... and to do so in accordance with a
single uniform standard.").
418. See, e.g., id. at 135 (Souter, J., dissenting) (concluding that, while recounting all the ballots
in a short timeframe "would be a tall order," "the courts of Florida were ready to do their best to get
that job done"); id. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the equal protection claim "could still
be resolved through a remand conditioned upon the issuance of a uniform standard" which would
simultaneously protect the "competing fundamental consideration" of fairness to those whose votes
have not been counted); id. at 147 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Nor do I understand why the Florida
Supreme Court's recount order, which helps to redress this inequity, must be entirely prohibited
based on a deficiency that could easily be remedied.").
419. Id. at 128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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out,420 when the statement is put into context, the full text suggests that

Justice Stevens is referring not to the consequences of the public disbelieving
the Supreme Court (thereby losing confidence in it) but to the consequences
of the public believing the Court (thereby losing confidence in the state court
judges whose work the Court lambastes and reverses).4 2' If Justice Stevens is
just telling the Court not to belittle state courts, why the impassioned
rhetoric? The Supreme Court criticizes state courts all the time. If state
courts got the law wrong in this case, they deserve some criticism,
particularly if the case is very important and if, as the majority believes, they
got it really wrong.422
The explanation for the passion of Justice Stevens's rhetoric lies in the
same matrix of ideas and attitudes about the role of courts and litigation that
has engaged the two wings of the Rehnquist Court for almost two decades.
Though not a doctrinaire liberal or a particular friend to plaintiffs
litigation,4 23 Justice Stevens has long been a committed opponent of the
Court's anti-litigation turn. As others have noted,424 Justice Stevens is in
many ways an old-school common law judge, comfortable with legal
principles expressed in standards rather than rules. Sanguine about the
ability of a learned bench to resolve complicated disputes by the application
of their judgment, Justice Stevens has crafted opinions that demonstrate
increasing frustration with the efforts of some of his colleagues to strip courts
of interpretive authority, remedial powers, and discretion.4 25 For Justice

420. See, e.g., Nelson Lund, The UnbearableRightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOzO L. REV.
1219, 1221-24 (2002).
421. To underscore the fact that I and Justice Stevens's other law clerks from October Term
2000 possess no privileged insight into the "true meaning" of this dissenting opinion, I note that my
friend and co-clerk Professor Eduardo Pefialver disagrees in large part with my reading of these
lines. See Email from Eduardo Pefialver, Visiting Associate Professor, Yale Law School, to author
(Dec. 9, 2005) (on file with author).
422. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, The Authoritative Lawsaying Power of the State Supreme Court
and the United States Supreme Court: Conflicts of Judicial Orthodoxy in the Bush-Gore Litigation,
61 MD. L. REV. 508, 565-66 (2002); Lund, supra note 420, at 1223.
423. That Justice Stevens has long been considered an independent-minded and iconoclastic
jurist is a proposition barely in need of citation. Just in case, see William D. Popkin, A Common
Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The Opinions of Justice Stevens, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1087, 1088.
Though he has largely been a dissenter from the developments discussed in this Article, that is not
universally the case. In particular, he has been a leader in the development of the new constitutional
law of punitive damages discussed supra subpart Ill(D).
424. See, e.g., Ward Farnsworth, Realism, Pragmatism,and John Paul Stevens, in REHNQUIST
JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 162; Popkin, supra note 423. Justice Stevens's jurisprudence is the
subject of a recent volume of conference essays, many of which emphasize his common-law
approach and his preference for standards over rules. See generally Symposium, The Jurisprudence
ofJustice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming March 2006).
425. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128-29 (2000) (attacking the majority's endorsement
of an "unstated lack of confidence in the impartiality and capacity of state judges" that "can only
lend credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work of judges"); Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2816 n.6 (2005) (noting that the Court's "overconfident 'only us'
approach" to interpreting state law "lacks any cogent justification"); Great-West Life & Annuity
Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 219, 221-22 (2002) (reading certain ERISA provisions, contrary to
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Stevens (and others of his generation and/or disposition),4 26 the assault of the
Rehnquist Court on the efficacy of litigation and the authority of the courts,
is not a mere doctrinal trend, but rather an altogether-too-personal attack
upon the abilities and integrity of the judiciary.
The combination of his disagreement on first principles with the
Rehnquist Court's dominant anti-litigation sentiment and his sense of
personal and professional insult at the implications of that trend have, in
recent years, bubbled over in any number of heated dissents.42 7 In fact, as
noted above, the standard rhetoric in which the Court's wings engage on
issues of remediation and judicial power is remarkably pointed, particularly
in light of the relative narrowness of the issues in some of the cases. 428 To an
extent not noticed by the commentators, Justice Stevens's dissent in Bush v.
Gore simply mirrors the tone and themes of his dissents in cases like
Sandoval,429 albeit on a much larger stage.
These themes emerge early in Justice Stevens's dissent. For example,
in his initial discussion of the Article II issue, he portrays the position of
those who challenge the Florida Supreme Court's role in the case--or their
430
references to the state constitution-as a challenge to "judicial review.,
When he turns to the merits of the equal protection issue, he expresses
genuine surprise and dismay that anyone would suggest that the Constitution
has anything to say about whether state legislators and state supreme courts
should frame their initial commands to factfinders in terms of general
standards (e.g., follow the "intent of the voter") or more rigid rules (e.g., only
count punchcard votes if the chad is dislodged in three corners).4 31
Moreover, to the extent that the use of different substandards by different
counties might create initial inequities, those inequities can be managed by
"the single impartial magistrate" who "will ultimately adjudicate all
objections arising from the recount process. 'A 32 In short, the Florida courts
were doing what judges always have done-reviewing and interpreting
statutes, using their judgment to give content to general standards, and acting
in their equitable mode to manage remedies and alleviate developing
inequities.

the majority's view, "as having been intended to enlarge, not contract, a federal judge's remedial
authority").
426. Cf Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 803 (2002) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (defending the impartiality of the judiciary and the importance of its functions and
arguing that the Court ignores these values by striking down Minnesota's restrictions on the speech
ofjudicial candidates).
427. His dissents to the cases cited in subpart Ill(A) are a good starting point.
428. See supra subpart Ill(A).
429. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
430. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
431. See id. at 124-25.
432. Id. at 126.
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Justice Stevens next makes the point that, in failing to remand the case
for further recounts under a more uniform standard, the majority is leaving
other (greater) inequities unremedied.4 33 While this point troubles Justice
Stevens, it does not surprise or detain him for long. After nearly two decades
as a member of the Rehnquist Court, Justice Stevens has been witness to
dozens of decisions shrinking the remedial options open to litigants alleging
violations of their rights.434 Like any careful observer of the Rehnquist
Court, Justice Stevens understands that just because the voters whose
uncounted votes reflect their intention have a right to have their ballots
counted does not mean that the Court will accord them a remedy.
Wrapping up the opinion, he more explicitly states that the Florida
courts simply "did what courts do" and notes again the ordinariness of a
procedure that relies on a general legislative standard and review by an
impartial magistrate to administer individualized justice. 435 From there, he
launches into his famous closing paragraph. In the specific context of the
opinion and the broader context of his ongoing confrontation with the
Rehnquist Court's central anti-litigation, anti-judging theme, Justice
Stevens's words have particular resonance.
For him, "petitioners'
entire ... assault" is premised on "an unstated lack of confidence in the
impartiality and capacity" of the judiciary.436 That the majority of the Court
offers its "endorsement of that position '4 37 comes as no shock, for those same
Justices have long operated with similar disdain for the abilities and integrity
ofjudges. However, it is still disturbing, for this assault on the judiciary "can
only lend credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work of judges. 438
To Justice Stevens, this is frightening because "[i]t is confidence in the men
and women who administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of
the rule of law. 439 Partisan fortunes may ebb and flow, but fears for the
future will always be muted as long as the people possess an underlying faith
in the "rule of law" and the "impartial guardian[s]" of that commitment.44 °
That the majority of the Supreme Court has itself lost that faith is the lesson
and tragedy of not only Bush v. Gore, but also of the Rehnquist Court.
VI. Notes for a Rehnquist Court Historian
In the preceding Parts, I have sketched a picture of the Rehnquist Court
as a court whose decisions are heavily influenced by an attitudinal orientation
against litigation. This Part pulls back from the description offered in the

433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.

See id. at 126-27.
See generally supra subpart III(A) (discussing some such cases and explaining a trend).
Bush v.Gore, 531 U.S. at 128.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 129.
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previous parts to begin a discussion of the sources of this hostility. In pulling
back from the descriptive to the explanatory, I tread with care. While this
Article is intended as a participant in the burgeoning dialogue about the
Rehnquist Court's legacy, it does not purport to be itself a work of history.
Definitive historical analysis of the Rehnquist Court awaits a distant date
where the passage of time will have provided information as to which of the
Court's decisions have had a lasting impact, scholarly resources from other
related subfields of American history, and a vantage point that-if not
neutral-is at least removed from the unfiltered partisanship through which
we tend to view our own times. Nevertheless, the careful examination of the
caselaw required to construct this Article has left me with a number of
hypotheses and impressions about the factors contributing to the Justices'
litigation hostility. In this final Part, I offer some of those ideas, not as
definitive explanations but rather as notes for future Rehnquist Court
historians.
A. Defining the Phenomenon to Be Explained
The Rehnquist Court's orientation against litigation is a complicated
phenomenon. To begin with, the Court's hostility to litigation defies easy
categorization-it is a dense attitudinal orientation that is part intellectual
and part visceral. Though it is not entirely rational, neither is it immune from
rational influence. Therefore, it is rarely fully articulated in the Court's
published writings but often referred to obliquely and relied on partially in
the Court's reasoning. In certain categories of cases (such as private right of
action cases), 44 1 dissenters occasionally engage the majority in colloquies
about the Court's purported anti-litigation bent, but such instances are vastly
outnumbered by cases where there is no dissent, where the dissenters ignore
the majority's underlying anti-litigation sentiment, or where the dissenters
express similar skepticism about litigation.
Second, the Court's hostility to litigation takes different forms in
different cases. In some instances, it is targeted directly at the wisdom,
propriety, or efficacy of litigation mechanisms for resolving disputes,
righting wrongs, and administering justice.44 2 At other times, the Court
expresses its distaste for litigation solutions more obliquely, for example
when it targets certain styles of judging that it perceives as encouraging or
facilitating litigation.4 43 As we have seen, lower courts that embrace an

441. See supra subpart III(A).
442. See, e.g., supra subpart III(C) (discussing the Court's decisions privileging arbitration as a
forum for resolving disputes).
443. See, e.g., supra subpart III(A) (discussing cases that not only directly involve the
availability of remedies but also raise questions about the proper role of judges in facilitating or
hampering litigation); supra Part V (treating these issues in the context of Bush v. Gore).
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equitable role or adopt open-ended methods of statutory interpretation are
likely targets of the Court's venom. 4
Third, hostility to litigation cuts a broad swath across the Court's
docket, but affects divergent areas of the law unevenly. Sometimes the
Court's hostility comes through in the substance of its rulings, other times
only in the rhetoric. At still other times the Court's anti-litigation orientation
is entirely silent but still operates below the surface, shaping the frame of
mind with which the Justices view particular cases and helping to calibrate
their receptivity to particular arguments.445 Whether loudly trumpeted or
silently operating, the Court's hostility is sometimes the lead story in a case;
at other times, it is little more than interesting background music.
Fourth, the Court's orientation against litigation cuts across its political
divisions in complicated ways. The five most conservative members of the
Rehnquist Court are most consistent and most pronounced in their hostility to
litigation. As a result, a great many decisions reflective of the Court's antilitigation zeitgeist are decided by a five-to-four vote, with the usual quartet of
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in dissent. However, an antilitigation impulse is present to some degree and in some form in the
jurisprudence of each of the nine Justices. As a result, dozens of cases that
reflect the anti-litigation theme have been decided by other majorities,
sometimes broader ones, and on occasion unanimous ones." 6 Even when the
Court cleaves along familiar conservative/liberal lines in a given case, the
dispute is often about the degree to which the modem Court should curtail
litigation-friendly legal rules, rather than whether it should.44 7 In short, the
Rehnquist Court's hostility to litigation is a phenomenon of the entire Court,
not just of five of its Justices.
Finally, and most importantly, the Rehnquist Court's hostility to
litigation coexists with a countervailing theme: a bold and self-confident
protection of the Court's own institutional role. As many commentators have
noted,448 this zealous protection of its own authority has led the Court to give
less deference to the judgment of other actors-most noticeably Congress,
449
and even other courts. 450
but also administrative agencies, state officials,
When the Court finds a case to be legitimately within its purview, it is likely
444. See, e.g., supra Part V (reading Bush v. Gore in part as an attack on courts who claim

broad equitable powers).
445. The Court's federalism cases are a prime example. See supra Part IV.
446. For one classic example of an area that does not track the normal divide, see supra
subpart Ill(D) (discussing punitive damage cases).
447. The Court's implied private right of action cases are again the best example. See supra
text accompanying notes 111-113 (discussing the degree to which even dissenting Justices long ago
rejected the traditional broad view of availability of such remedies).
448. See supra note 8 and works cited therein.
449. Cf Colker & Scott, supra note 1 (discussing, quantifying, and analyzing current Justices'
willingness to override and often demean the work product of state legislators, regulators, and
judges).
450. See, e.g., supra Part V (discussing Bush v. Gore).
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to demand the last word on questions of constitutional meaning, statutory
interpretation, and often even factual validity, with little regard for
preexisting institutional settlements that may have delegated some measure
of interpretive independence to another body.4 5'
Ultimately, deciphering the intellectual and cultural sources for the
Rehnquist Court's hostility to litigation is a two-fold project. First, one must
make sense of the forces which have given rise to the Court's ubiquitous but
constantly shifting skepticism towards litigation, equity, and judicial
discretion. Then, one must explain how this anti-litigation impulse can
coexist with a jealous protection of the Court's own interpretive and
institutional authority.
B. Some PossibleExplanatory Vectors
As tempting as it may be to offer a single over-arching explanation for
the Rehnquist Court's hostility to litigation, the complex and under-theorized
nature of the Court's hostility and the idiosyncratic way in which each
Justice embraces the trend make such a neat explanation impossible.
Historians who take as their project the cultural history of the Rehnquist
Court will almost certainly need to wade through a thick set of political,
cultural, doctrinal, and sociological factors to build a coherent explanatory
model. What they will likely find is that the Court's hostility to litigation
was shaped by a number of trends and influences, each pushing the Court
generally in that direction, but each also suggesting a slightly different
variant.
Among the explanatory vectors worthy of exploration, the political
valence of the cases will certainly gain some attention. After all, it is
difficult to ignore the degree to which the great bulk of the litigation-hostile
decisions discussed above forward the policies or social vision of modem
American conservatism. 452 So too with the majority of the cases in which the
451. This self-confidence is most notable in decisions that assertively protect the Court's
exclusive authority to interpret the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
614 (2000) ("[T]he existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the
constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation .... Rather, whether particular operations affect
interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate
them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this
Court.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
527 (1997) (holding that although earlier decisions, most notably Katzenbach v. Morgan, 383 U.S.
641 (1966), "could be interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legislation that
expands the rights contained in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment," only the Court, and not the
Congress, has the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation). To some extent
this self-confidence also spills over to a more general unwillingness to see the power of the courts
curtailed. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (rejecting, with only one dissenter on
this point, the President's broad claims as to his authority to detain American citizens as enemy
combatants without judicial oversight).
452. To take but a few examples discussed above: (1) the Court's decisions often favor business
interests by limiting damages, closing courts, or otherwise making it difficult for civil plaintiffs to
prevail, see generally supra Part III; (2) in many areas, notably including sovereign immunity and
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Court has loudly trumpeted its own interpretive authority or zealously
protected its institutional role.4 53 A cynic or hardcore realist might insist that
the Court's purported commitment to ensuring its own interpretive authority
and its expressions of distrust towards the institution of Litigation are only
rhetorical strategies or after-the-fact justifications employed in the service of
a common substantive agenda when convenient and jettisoned when
inconvenient. A more generous observer might suggest that the Court's
jurisprudence is shaped by a commitment to achieving through law a
particular (generally conservative) social vision and that the Court's rabid
defense of its own institutional authority and equally tenacious hostility to
litigation are merely twin learned responses developed through persistent
interactions with other political and judicial actors who seek to use the law to
forward alternative social visions. Whatever version one adopts, the political
valence of the Court's decisions seems sufficiently correlated to the results of
the case to demand careful historical consideration.454
While I suspect that the political valence of the relevant cases is
crucially important in explaining the Rehnquist Court's dual commitments to
litigation hostility and judicial supremacy, there are a number of other less
obvious explanatory vectors worth serious examination. For example, both
the Court's litigation hostility and its assertive constitutional decisions are
consistent with the Court's embrace of what might (somewhat uncharitably)
be dubbed a "civics textbook" vision of the Constitution's separation of
powers provisions. In cases ranging from Bush v. Gore455 to Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass', 4 5 6 the Court's majority has paid increasing lip
service to the axiomatic division of power we all learn as children: the
legislative branch makes the law, the executive branch enforces the law, and

preemption, the Court's decisions have taken a noticeably anti-regulatory bent, see generally supra
Part IV; (3) in striking down or narrowly construing anti-discrimination statutes or remedies for
their violation, the Justices have embraced a narrower vision of the proper scope of society's
commitment to anti-discrimination, see generally Rubenfeld, supra note 1; subpart Ill(A); and, of
course, (4) the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore had the direct consequence of placing in the White
House the Republican candidate for president, see generally supra Part V.
453. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that states
cannot be sued for damages for violation of employment provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602 (invalidating civil remedy provision of the Violence
Against Women Act).
454. The correlation is, of course, not perfect, a point that I have made throughout the text.
Moreover, even if the fit between the political valence of cases and the Justices' behavior were
perfect or near perfect, simply noting that fact would not provide a sufficient explanation for the
Justices' hostility to litigation. The connection between conservative outcomes and the Court's
decisions establishes only correlation, not causation. Even assuming that there is some motivating
link between the conservative consequences of the Court's hostility to litigation and its decision to
adopt such an orientation, a persuasive historical account of the phenomenon would require some
account of the mechanisms of causation. The possibilities are endless-ranging from banal to
conspiratorial, laudatory to condemnatory-but sorting through them is an entirely different project,
one I am happy to leave for another day.
455. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
456. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
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the judicial branch interprets the law. The Court's increasing embrace of that
rhetoric suggests a growing impatience with the more complicated way in
which duties have actually come to be divided in the American polity.45 7
This tendency to think about and talk about separation of powers issues in
stark terms suggests that the Justices might actually see hostility to litigation
and an assertive court-centered constitutionalism as two sides of the same
coin, twin efforts to protect the legitimate prerogatives of the various
branches of government from the natural tendency of the other branches to
encroach on their authority. On this argument, the Court's hostility to
litigation is actually hostility to the tendency of the courts to take upon
themselves lawmaking powers that properly belong in the hands of
legislative officials.4 58 When the tables turn, however, and Congress or the
executive branch attempts to intrude on the core functions of the judicial
branch (e.g., interpreting the Constitution, reviewing executive detention),
the Court is properly vigilant to protect judicial authority.
Another vector worth examination is the degree to which the structure
and sociology of the contemporary American legal profession might impact
the way in which the Justices have viewed particular cases. While I have
argued that the Rehnquist Court's hostility to litigation is over-arching, that
does not mean that it is undifferentiated. To the contrary, as noted above,459
degrees of hostility have emerged, with particular kinds of litigation
provoking an even harsher degree of skepticism. While the Court may
conceptualize litigation in general as demeaning and disreputable, it appears
to treat tort litigation (and related forms of what has come to be known as
"plaintiff's litigation") as particularly so. 4 60 On the flip side, the Court is
least troubled by-indeed often genuinely excited to adjudicate-most forms
of constitutional litigation (the claims of criminal defendants being a notable
exception). While I have not studied this subject in any great detail, the
457. Leaving aside all normative questions, an honest descriptive survey of American
government would almost certainly acknowledge that administrative agencies and executive
officials make law through regulations and executive orders, courts utilize significant common-law
and equitable tools to shape the content of law, the elected branches of government independently
assess the legality and constitutionality of proposed conduct on a regular basis, and functions blur in
innumerable other ways. In other words, "making" law, "enforcing" law, and "interpreting" law are
not discrete functions that belong exclusively to one branch or another, but, at best, are fuzzy and
mutable descriptions of the tasks traditionally associated with each branch; there is a great deal of
play in the joints of government.
458. Throughout this Article, I have argued that this is not an accurate characterization of the
totality of the Court's litigation-hostile jurisprudence. See text accompanying notes 109-110.
However, that does not preclude the possibility that such ideas are a partial explanation for the
Court's litigation hostility or in the words of this subpart, one "explanatory vector."
459. See, e.g., supra subpart III(D) (dealing with punitive damages); supra subpart IV(B)
(dealing with preemption and the autonomy of state courts); cf Morrison, supra note 62, at 623-25
(discussing the Rehnquist Court's particular hostility to "private attorney general" actions and
noting that the Court's Article III injury doctrine "does significantly reduce the number of private
individuals constitutionally eligible to bring such litigation").
460. See, e.g., supra subpart III(D) (dealing with punitive damages); supra subpart IV(B)
(dealing with preemption and the autonomy of state courts).
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Court's relative preference for particular kinds of litigation roughly tracks the
stratification of the American bar. With sufficient exceptions to make one
weary of stating a rule, the best-trained and best-connected lawyers tend to
congregate in two areas of practice, civil defense and constitutional litigation.
(Indeed, the development of appellate practice groups at many leading law
firms has allowed many lawyers to practice actively in both areas.) To a
large extent, those categories accurately reflect the bulk of the Justices' own
practice experience. 461 To an even greater extent, they track the experiences
of the friends and former clerks with whom they interact on a regular basis.
Though one does not want to overstate the connection, at some visceral level
the Justices' generalized but stratified hostility to litigation may reflect the
professional values and interests of the elite American bar, a group that as a
whole embraces and practices most species of constitutional litigation but
spends the bulk of their litigation time defending against routine civil cases.
VII. Conclusion
This Article is self-consciously styled as part of an evolving group
effort to write the first draft of the Rehnquist Court's history. Its particular
project is to bring to the forefront an over-arching theme that has been
largely ignored, downplayed, or mischaracterized by prior commentators: the
Court's hostility to litigation. In forwarding the Court's litigation hostility it
neither discounts the importance of other strands in the Rehnquist Court's
intellectual matrix nor seeks to impose external coherence on the Court's
under-theorized and at times internally contradictory litigation-hostile
impulses. To the contrary, the Article attempts to lay out in a pointillist
fashion an image of the Rehnquist Court refracted through one of its grand
themes. Making sense of the Rehnquist Court is an ongoing process, and
only time will tell if the search for a satisfying understanding of the Court is
achievable or quixotic. This Article's firmest prediction is that historians
struggling for such an understanding will be forced to grapple with a guttural
hostility to the institution of Litigation that leaves footprints across the full
expanse of the Court's docket.

461. For biographies of the current Justices listing, inter alia, their prior work experiences, see
Legal Information Institute, Supreme Court Collection: Current Supreme Court Justices,
http://www.law.comell.edu/supct/justices/fullcourt.html.

